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In Frank Capra’s delightful 1947 film It’s a Wonderful Life, George Bailey is 
given a “wonderful” gift: the chance to see what the world would be like without 
him. Escorted by Clarence – an angel from Heaven sent to comfort and help 
George out of despair – George is given a sort of tour of the town in which he 
lives, the place in which he works, and most importantly the lives of the people 
he loves. The purpose of this exercise is to show George what things would 
have been like had he never have born. George discovers that everyone is not 
“better off without him,” as he had thought, and that no one “is a failure who 
has friends.”  
 The chance to see how things would differ were circumstances different is 
information that is, clearly, counter to fact. Conditionals that capture this 
counter-to-fact information are thus referred to as counterfactual conditionals. 
Such conditionals are in the subjunctive mood, and thus generally of the form 
If such-and-such were the case, then such-and-such would be the case. A
particular subset of these counterfactual conditionals are especially 
interesting, at least for philosophers of religion. This subset regards 
counterfactual conditionals that involve the free choices of agents. Such 
counterfactuals have the general form If person P were in situation S, then P 
would freely perform action A. What is interesting about these counterfactuals 
of (creaturely) freedom, as they are called, is that many philosophers believe 
that they provide the key to reconciling God’s foreknowledge and providence 
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with human free agency. The theory that purports to resolve the dilemma that 
divine foreknowledge and providence poses to human freedom by means of 
counterfactuals of freedom is the theory of middle knowledge. And those 
philosophers that embrace the theory are often called Molinists, after the 
theory’s primary architect Luis de Molina (d. 1600).   
 Middle knowledge, then, is the view that God knows counterfactuals of 
freedom (subjunctive conditionals of the form If person P were in situation S, 
then P would freely perform action A), and that by such knowledge God enjoys 
foreknowledge and providence by actualizing (creating) the circumstances 
specified in a counterfactual’s antecedent, in order to bring about the free 
action specified in the counterfactual’s consequent. The central objection to 
this view is that the counterfactuals upon which foreknowledge and providence 
purportedly rest cannot themselves be true. And the alleged reason they 
cannot be true, simply put, is that such counterfactuals lack “adequate 
metaphysical grounds” for their truth. 
 In broad terms, in this dissertation I argue that the grounding objection to 
the theory of middle knowledge (or Molinism) has an adequate reply. 
Essentially, that reply is to ground counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in the 
psychological states of agents, where at times what we do is causally 
determined by the psychological states that we have at those times. Toward 
showing how such states might serve as adequate metaphysical grounds for 
such counterfactuals, I develop a theory of free agency in which some of our 
actions remain free even though causally determined by our characters (or 
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psychological states). However, I argue that all of our actions cannot be so 
determined, otherwise we would never function as the ultimate cause of at 
least some of our actions, and so never assume ultimate responsibility for the 
character traits that are formed by means of our performing the actions that we 
do. Hence, with respect to those actions that we would be causally determined 
by our character to perform in certain situations, there can be true 
counterfactuals of freedom regarding those actions. But since not every action 
that we perform can be so determined, God cannot enjoy exhaustive 
counterfactual knowledge, and hence cannot exhaustively plan and actualize 
and entire possible world. He can, however, plan and actualize possible world-
segments, so far as his partial middle knowledge affords. This idea of God 
enjoying partial middle knowledge and so partial foreknowledge and 
providence is the view I refer to as restricted-Molinism.
In more specific terms, the following is a brief overview of each chapter. In 
Chapter 1 I develop two versions of middle knowledge (a classical and a 
contemporary version) and also look at two applications of the theory (in 
relation to the logical problem of evil and in relation to the soteriological 
problem of evil). The classical version of middle knowledge derives from Luis 
de Molina (1535-1600), the first to espouse the theory. Beginning the 
discussion here with Molina sets the historical context for the remainder of the 
dissertation. After developing Molina’s version of middle knowledge, I look at 
the contemporary version developed by Thomas Flint, who adorns the 
essentials of Molina’s theory with all the bells and whistles contemporary 
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metaphysics affords (namely, the contemporary developments in the notion of 
possible worlds). By way of application, contemporary Molinists  argue that 
middle knowledge provides considerable assistance in answering two 
objections to God’s existence (as traditionally conceived). First, that the 
existence of God and the existence of evil (in general) are logically 
incompatible. And second, that the existence of God and the existence of the 
condemned (a particular evil) are logically incompatible. For the rest of the 
chapter I explore the Molinist response to these two objections. 
 In Chapter 2 I develop two versions (from William Hasker and Robert 
Adams) of the most formidable objection to the theory of middle knowledge: 
the grounding objection. That objection, essentially, is that because 
counterfactuals of freedom have no grounds for their truth (that is, since there 
is nothing there in the world that brings about their truth), they are in fact all 
false. And because they are all false, of course they cannot do the theoretical 
work that proponents of middle knowledge assign them. Replies to this 
objection are not in short supply, and for the remainder of the chapter I survey 
the replies from Molina himself, Francisco Suarez (a contemporary of Molina), 
Alvin Plantinga, Alfred Freddoso, Calvin Normore, Edward Wierenga, and 
Thomas Flint. I argue along the way, however, that each of these replies is 
deficient for one reason or another, and so conclude that because the 
grounding objection currently has no adequate reply, a fresh reply is required. 
 In Chapter 3 I develop the foundation for an adequate reply to the 
grounding objection. And since on the whole I am responding to the grounding 
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objection by arguing that counterfactuals of freedom find adequate 
metaphysical grounds in the psychological traits of agents, in this chapter I 
develop a theory of freedom that shows how such traits might ground such 
counterfactuals. The view I develop is a mixture of elements from John Martin 
Fischer, Robert Kane, and Peter van Inwagen, and asserts that some of our 
actions can be causally predetermined by our characters (or psychological 
traits) so long as we function as the ultimate cause for at least some of our 
actions, and so assume ultimate responsibly for the characters that we form 
during such moments. In addition to this, I consider arguments for concluding 
that we rarely function as the ultimate causes of our actions, and so rarely 
enjoy the ability to do otherwise than we do. I refer to this view of free agency 
as semi-libertarianism.
In the final chapter, Chapter 4, I build upon the foundation of semi-
libertarianism to finally arrive at an adequate reply to the grounding objection. 
Because semi-libertarianism allows for some of our actions to be causally 
determined but still free, such causal necessitation (in conjunction with our 
characters) can reasonably serve as adequate metaphysical grounds for 
counterfactuals of freedom. Hence, counterfactuals of the sort If person P 
were in situation S, then P would perform action A are grounded and thus true 
via causation. However, since on semi-libertarianism some of our actions 
require that we function as the ultimate causes of our actions in order to 
assume responsibility for the characters that on certain occasions causally 
determine what actions we perform, it is not the case that there exists 
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sufficient grounds to ground all counterfactuals of freedom. In those moments 
of ultimate causation, what we do is entirely “up to us,” and thus there is no 
truth about what we definitely would do in those situations. Hence, in such 
situations there are no true counterfactuals of freedom and so not even God 
can know what we would do by knowing those counterfactuals. And if this is 
so, then God cannot exhaustively plan the course of the world by knowing 
counterfactuals of freedom, and so he cannot actualize an entire possible 
world, as traditional theories of middle knowledge affirm. However, because 
God enjoys some counterfactual knowledge, he can partially plan the course 
of the world given his partial knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom, and 
thus God can actualize possible world-segments (or portions of possible 
worlds). Actualizing only possible world-segments, and enjoying partial 
foreknowledge and providence based on a restricted knowledge of 
counterfactuals of freedom, is the view I refer to as restricted-Molinism. Thus, I 
argue that grounding counterfactuals of freedom in the psychological traits of 
agents requires modifying the traditional theory of middle knowledge in the 




Middle Knowledge and Applications 
 
Throughout the history of Christian thought, the majority of Christian 
thinkers have agreed that God’s having foreknowledge and providence over 
the actions of human beings is consistent with those actions being freely 
performed. The particular conception of freedom involved, however, has 
differed greatly from one historical figure to the next; some have endorsed 
theological determinism (where God causally predetermines whatever comes 
to pass), others a more libertarian conception of human freedom (where the 
actions of an agent are not predetermined by causes over which the agent has 
no control). But despite these differences, the conclusion that there is nothing 
logically absurd in conjoining exhaustive foreknowledge and divine providence 
with human freedom has historically been a point of consensus. The attempts 
that have been made to demonstrate the philosophical  compatibility of these 
two views are members of the family of views referred to as theological 
compatibilism. Not surprisingly, then, views that maintain that God’s enjoying 
exhaustive foreknowledge precludes human beings from enjoying free agency, 
or that human beings enjoying free agency precludes God from enjoying 
exhaustive foreknowledge, are members of a family of views referred to as 
theological incompatibilism.
In defense of the theological compatibilist position, in 1588 Spanish Jesuit 
Luis de Molina (1535-1600) published the first edition of his Liberi Arbitrii cum 
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Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione et 
Reprobatione Concordia (The Compatibility of Free Choice with the Gift of 
Grace, Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination and Reprobation). 
In this work, Molina proposed a rather ingenious solution to the problem divine 
foreknowledge and providence presents to the idea that human beings are 
genuinely free: the theory of middle knowledge. Middle knowledge – or 
Molinism after Molina himself – ignited quite a controversy, especially with 
respect to whether Molina pushed the bounds of freedom too far, thereby 
restricting the sovereignty of God over too little. In fact, in 1597 Pope Clement 
VIII established a theological commission, “initiating a ten-year period of 
intense study and public disputation which rendered the Concordia one of the 
most carefully scrutinized books in Western intellectual history.”1 By 1607 the 
commission had reached no decision, and then Pope Paul V decreed that the 
parties involved in the controversy were forbidden to refer to the other as 
heretical, and that the Church would resolve the issue at a more appropriate 
time. That time, however, has yet to arrive.2
In this chapter I intend to articulate the theory of middle knowledge, as well 
as the theory’s primary theological benefits or applications. In the first section I 
develop both Molina’s classical theory of middle knowledge, as well as 
Thomas Flint’s more contemporary version. Flint’s version capitalizes on the 
contemporary notion of possible worlds in order to better explain how middle 
 
1 Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, translated with 
introduction and notes by A. J. Freddoso, (Ithaca: London, 1998) viii. 
2 Eef Dekker, Middle Knowledge (Peeters: Leuven, 2000) 2. 
9
knowledge can resolve the difficulties that foreknowledge and providence pose 
for human free agency. In the second section I look at two applications of the 
theory of middle knowledge with respect to the problem of evil. The first is the 
role Alvin Plantinga assigns to the theory of middle knowledge – his own 
version of which he developed in 1973 without prior knowledge of Molina’s 
work – in order to rebut the logical problem of evil. The second is William Lane 
Craig’s application of Plantinga’s work regarding the logical problem of evil to 
answer what Craig calls the soteriological problem of evil. This problem is 
roughly that of reconciling the existence of God – traditionally defined as 
omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good – with the existence of the damned. 
We begin, then, with an explication of Molina’s theory of divine middle 
knowledge. 
1.1. MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE AND PROVIDENCE 
1.1.1. The Classic Statement 
The doctrine of middle knowledge is intended to remove the apparent 
incoherence of God possessing foreknowledge of and providence over the 
future and free actions of his creatures. One obvious solution to remove such 
prima facie incoherence would be to deny that God actually enjoys any 
foreknowledge or providence at all. Another obvious solution, though probably 
less attractive, would be to deny that human beings are free agents. Neither 
solution is at all attractive to most Christian theists. The latter move threatens 
the justice of God, given that he holds us morally responsible for actions that 
we do not freely perform. And the former move threatens the veracity of 
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Christian Scripture, given their suggestion that God knows “the end from the 
beginning, and from ancient times things that are not yet done” (Isaiah 46:10). 
Molina begins developing his solution to the foreknowledge-providence-
freedom dilemma here. That is, as a Christian, he first consults the “Sacred 
Writings” to see what the reasons are for holding that God enjoys 
foreknowledge of and providence over the free actions of his creatures in any 
case.3 For, of course, if there are no good reasons, there really is no dilemma 
to be resolved. Some of the passages Molina considers telling include the 
following. 
 To begin with, Molinia cites Psalm 138:3-4, which states “You [God] have 
understood my [the Psalmist’s] thoughts from afar; my path and my portion 
You have scrutinized. And all my ways You have foreseen … You have known 
all things, the newest as well as the old.”4 In Wisdom 8:8, divine wisdom is 
described in this way, “She knows the signs and the wonders before they 
come to be, and the unfolding of the times and the ages.” Ecclesiasticus 
23:28-295 states, “The eyes of the Lord are brighter than the sun, observing all 
the ways of man and the depths of the abyss, and looking into the hearts of 
men in their secret paths. For all things were known to the Lord God before 
they were created.” Later at 39:24-256 we find, “The works of all flesh are 
before Him, and nothing whatever is hidden from His eyes. From age to age 
 
3 Freddoso 167. 
4 As Freddoso notes, in some of these quotations Molina uses the Vulgate rather than the 
Hebrew numerical reckoning in referring to Scripture’s chapter and verse. Hence, according 
the Hebrew reckoning, the present reference is actually to Psalm 139, and the verses to 
numbers 3-5. 
5 The Vulgate 23:28-29 in more modern editions corresponds to 23:19-20. 
6 The Vulgate 39:24-25 in more modern editions corresponds to 30:19-20. 
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He watches, and nothing is surprising in His sight,” to which Molina adds “as 
though, that is to say, something might happen which He had not foreseen 
beforehand.”7 From the prophet Isaiah 41:23 we find, “Announce what is going 
to happen in the future, and we will know that you are gods.” And later at 48:5 
we read, “I revealed things to you beforehand; before they happened I 
announced them to you, so that you would not say, ‘My idols did these things, 
and my carved images and metal images decreed them.’” In the Gospel of 
John 14:29 we find Jesus saying, “And I have told you this now, before it 
happens, so that when it has happened, you might believe.” And according to 
Hebrews 4:13 we see the (unknown) author state, “No creature is hidden from 
His sight. All things are exposed and open to His eyes,” about which Molina 
comments “God knows all contingent things when they come to be and are 
already actual.”8
Some other passages that Molina did not mention, but could have 
mentioned, include the following.9 With regard to God’s foreknowledge of the 
general course of history, we read in Isaiah 46:9-10, “Remember the former 
things of old, For I am God, and there is no other; I am God, and there is none 
like Me, Declaring the end from the beginning, And from ancient times things 
that are not yet done.” In addition, Isaiah 44:7-8 reads, “And who can proclaim 
as I do? Then let him declare it and set it in order for Me, Since I appointed the 
ancient people. And the things that are coming and shall come, Let them show 
 
7 Freddoso 167. 
8 Freddoso 167. 
9 Many of the following passages are adopted from Gregory Boyd, God of the Possible (Baker: 
Grand Rapids, 2000). 
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these to them. Do not fear, nor be afraid; Have I not told you from that time, 
and declared it?”  
 Pertaining to God’s foreknowledge and foretelling of the specific historical 
circumstances that the Israelites would encounter, Genesis 15:13-14 states 
that God informs Abraham of Israel’s future captivity in Egypt: “your 
descendents will be strangers in a land that is not theirs, and will serve them, 
and they will afflict them four hundred years. And also the nation whom they 
serve I will judge; afterward they shall come out with great possessions.” 
Similarly, referring to Israel’s second captivity many years later in Babylon, 
Jeremiah 29:10 says, “After seventy years are completed at Babylon, I [God] 
will visit you and perform My good word toward you, and cause you to return 
to this place.”  
 In addition, with respect to God’s foreknowledge regarding specific 
individuals, there is an abundance of Scriptural evidence indicating that God 
foreknows precisely what their future holds. For example, 1 Kings 13:2 says, 
“Then he [an unnamed “man of God”] cried out against the altar by the word of 
the LORD: ‘Behold, a child, Josiah by name, shall be born to the house of 
David; and on you he shall sacrifice the priests of the high places who burn 
incense on you, and men’s bones shall be burned on you.’” In Isaiah 44:28 
God is quoted as saying, “Who says of Cyrus, ‘He is my shepherd, And he 
shall perform all My pleasure, Saying of Jerusalem, “You shall be built,” And to 
the temple, “Your foundation shall be laid.”’” The significance of these 
passages is that the former is traditionally thought (according to a traditional, 
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conservative dating of 1 Kings) to have occurred over 200 years prior to the 
birth of Josiah, and the latter (again, according to a traditional, conservative 
dating of Isaiah) over a 150 years prior to the birth of Cyrus, who would later 
become king of Persia. 
 In similar fashion, many details surrounding the life and ministry of Jesus 
strongly suggest that God (qua Father and Son) possesses foreknowledge. 
Matthew 26:34 records Jesus foretelling Peter’s denial of him, including minute 
details regarding when and even the number times Peter would do so: 
“Assuredly, I say to you that this night, before the rooster crows, you will deny 
me three times.” From John 6:64, Jesus also appears to have foreknowledge 
of Judas’ betrayal of him: “Jesus knew from the beginning who they were who 
did not believe, and who would betray him.” John 21:18-19 implies that Jesus 
foreknows the kind of death that Peter would face later in life. He says to 
Peter, “‘Most assuredly, I say to you, when you were younger, you girded 
yourself and walked where you wished; but when you are old, you will stretch 
out your hands, and another will gird you and carry you where you do not 
wish.’ This He spoke, signifying by what death he would glorify God.”10 Lastly, 
Matthew 16:21 states, “From that time Jesus began to show to His disciples 
that He must go to Jerusalem, and suffer many things from the elders and 
chief priests and scribes, and be killed, and be raised the third day.” According 
to the book of Acts, when these events transpired, they did so “by the 
determined purpose and foreknowledge of God” (Acts 2:23). The apostle Peter 
 
10 It is part of Christian tradition that Peter was martyred by being “stretched out” and crucified 
upside down. 
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later reiterated this thought saying, “For truly against Your holy Servant Jesus, 
whom You anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the 
people of Israel, were gathered together to do whatever Your hand and Your 
purpose determined before to be done” (Acts 4:27-28).11 
Given these passages and the detail they record regarding God’s 
foreknowledge – even foreordination in some cases – it is little wonder why 
Molina and other traditional Christian theists concur that “foreknowledge of 
future contingents in God is absolutely obvious from the Sacred Writings, so 
much so that the contrary position is … a manifest error from the point of view 
of the faith.”12 However, even if as much is obvious from the point of view of 
the faith, it is not in the same way obvious that God’s foreknowledge and 
providence can be philosophically reconciled with the free agency of human 
beings. So how does Molina reconcile the prima facie inconsistency regarding 
freedom, foreknowledge, and providence? 
 Molina tells us that in order to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human 
freedom, we must “distinguish three types of knowledge in God.”13 The first 
type is what Molina refers to as “purely natural knowledge,” which is 
knowledge that “could not have been any different in God.” Molina asserts that 
through this type of knowledge God “knew all the things to which the divine 
power extended either immediately or by the mediation of secondary causes, 
including not only the natures of individuals and the necessary states of affairs 
 
11 Aside from the passages cited by Molina, these verses are taking from the New King James 
Version of the Bible. 
12 Freddoso 167. 
13 Freddoso 168. 
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composed of them but also the contingent states of affairs.” This first type of 
knowledge, then, appears to be knowledge of all modal truths, such as 
necessary truths regarding the laws of logic. These truths are independent of 
God’s will and could not have been any different than they are. They are 
naturally, and so essentially, apart of God’s noetic structure. Included in this 
category of modal truths are truths regarding all possibilities or possible states 
of affairs. God knows every possible individual he could create, including 
every possible situation that individual could possibly find themselves in, and 
thus every possible action or reaction that individual could possibly have. 
Hence this type of knowledge is of either what must be the case or what could 
be case; it includes all necessary truths as well as all truths regarding all 
possibilities. 
 The second type of knowledge God possesses is what Molina calls “free 
knowledge.” It is described as being “after the free act of His will,” where “God 
knew absolutely and determinately, without any condition or hypothesis, which 
ones from among all the contingent states of affairs were in fact going to 
obtain and, likewise, which ones were not going to obtain.”14 There are two 
points to emphasize here. The first is that this type of knowledge is knowledge 
that is contingent as opposed to necessary (as is God’s natural knowledge). 
This type of knowledge is not essential or naturally part of the structure of 
God’s knowledge, but is only had by God after his decision to create a certain 
state of affairs. For example, had God decided to create states of affairs that 
 
14 Freddoso 168. 
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did not include George Bush, all of the true propositions that now exist 
regarding President Bush would not now be true. Such a decision to create 
Bush is in no obvious way necessary, and so the truth of these propositions 
depend on God’s decision to create the state of affairs that includes President 
Bush. Herein lies the second point. The contingently true propositions 
foreknown to God through his free knowledge are true as a result of God’s will. 
In God’s natural knowledge such propositions are only possibly true, but 
should God decide that they actually become true, they would, and thus 
compose the set of true propositions comprising God’s free knowledge. 
Hence, this type of knowledge in God is knowledge of what will be the case, 
given God’s decision to create whichever set of circumstances he does. 
 The third type of knowledge in God (on Molina’s view) is what he refers to 
as “middle knowledge.” Here “in virtue of the most profound and inscrutable 
comprehension of each faculty of free choice, He saw in his own essence 
what each such faculty would do with its innate freedom were it to be placed in 
this or in that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things – even though it 
would really be able, if it so willed, to do the opposite.”15 This type of 
knowledge, then, contains true propositions regarding what each possible free 
creature (“faculty of choice”) would freely do (in a libertarian sense: “it would 
really be able, if it so willed, to do the opposite”) when placed in any possible 
set of circumstances (“orders of things”) that God might create. In 
contemporary discussions, such propositions are referred to as 
 
15 Freddoso 168.  
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counterfactuals of freedom, and so Molina’s description of divine middle 
knowledge amounts to God’s having exhaustive knowledge of counterfactuals 
of creaturely freedom (propositions of the sort If subject S were placed in 
circumstances C, then S would perform action A). It is important to stress that 
these propositions or counterfactuals of freedom describe actions that are 
freely performed in a libertarian sense; a sense in which the subject in 
question possesses the genuine ability to do otherwise, and thus is genuinely 
able to choose to do otherwise given the very same set of circumstances C. 
Nothing about C determines that S do A, rather it is causally indeterminate 
whether in C subject S performs A, or something else.  
 It is equally important to stress, as Molina does, that in the structure of 
God’s knowledge counterfactuals of freedom must be “located” between God’s 
natural knowledge and his free knowledge. Toward showing that they cannot 
be “located” within the categories of God’s natural or free knowledge – and 
thus that a new category of knowledge is needed – Molinia says this. Perhaps 
“someone will ask if such middle knowledge should be called free or if it 
should be called natural.”16 Well, first Molina says that “such knowledge 
should in no way be called free, both because it is prior to any free act of 
God’s will and also because it was not within God’s power to know through 
this type of knowledge anything other than what He in fact knew.” The point, 
then, is that this type of knowledge, like God’s natural knowledge but unlike his 
free knowledge, is not knowledge that he has any control over. The true 
 
16 Freddoso 168. 
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counterfactual propositions that constitute middle knowledge are not 
propositions that God could falsify. Their truth-value is independent of his will 
and so is outside of his control.  
 However, according to Molina, it is also the case that it should “not be said 
that [middle] knowledge is natural in the sense of being so innate to God that 
He could not have known the opposite of that which He knows through it.” The 
reason is that if the “created choice [or subject] were going to do the opposite, 
as it indeed can, then God would have known that very thing through this 
same type of knowledge, and not what He in fact knows.” What Molina is 
emphasizing here is that God’s middle knowledge is contingent; it is 
knowledge that would be different if the free creature (or “created choice”) in 
question were to choose differently in the created circumstances (or “order of 
things”) in which that creature finds itself. Were the created choice or subject 
going to perform action A* in C rather than A, then the counterfactual If S were 
in C, then S would do A would be false, and the counterfactual If S were in C, 
then S would do A* instead would be true. Thus “middle knowledge partly has 
the characteristic of natural knowledge, since it was prior to the free act of the 
divine will and since God did not have the power to know anything else,” and 
“it partly has the character of free knowledge, since … [it] derives from the fact 
that free choice, on the hypothesis that it should be created in one or another 
order of things, would do the one thing rather than the other, even though it 
would indifferently be able to do either of them.”17 In short, middle knowledge 
 
17 Freddoso 169. 
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resembles natural knowledge in that it is knowledge over which God has no 
control, but it also resembles free knowledge in that it is knowledge that is 
contingent rather than necessary. 
 One question to ask, given this portrait of divine knowledge, is how does 
God actually know the truth-values for counterfactuals of creaturely freedom? 
Another is how exactly does middle knowledge assist God in providentially 
guiding the world? Regarding the first question, we have already seen 
Molina’s answer in part. Recall that in describing middle knowledge Molina 
described God as having such knowledge “in virtue of the most profound and 
inscrutable comprehension of each faculty of free choice.”18 And given this 
profound and inscrutable comprehension God “saw in His own essence what 
each such faculty would do with its innate freedom were it to be placed in this 
or in that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things.” Hence Molina’s 
preliminary response is that God has epistemological access to the truth-
values of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom simply in virtue of knowing his 
own nature. Now why such information is exactly as it is in God’s nature, as 
opposed to something else, is not a question Molina appears to address. He 
does indicate that “if [a] created free choice were going to do the opposite … 
then God would have known that very thing.”19 But, of course, this does not tell 
us why one free choice is made over another in the context in which the 
choice is made. Hence, saying that God would know something different were 
a free agent to do something different does not explain everything we would 
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like explained when asking why God’s middle knowledge is not different than it 
is. 
 Later in the Concordia, however, and in response to a quite different 
question, Molina does supply more content to this initial answer regarding the 
source or grounds of God’s middle knowledge. Here the question is whether 
“this middle knowledge is to be countenanced by any of the blessed in 
heaven?”20 Molina replies that the answer is no, even regarding Christ, 
because “Christ’s soul does not comprehend the divine essence.” Instead, 
“this sort of knowledge concerning created things is attributed [only] to God 
[the Father] … because He is God and for this reason comprehends each 
created faculty of choice in a certain absolutely profound manner.” This is 
important for Molina because “in order to see which part a free being will turn 
itself toward, it is not sufficient that there be a [mere] comprehension of the 
being or even that there be a comprehension that is greater than is the thing 
comprehended.” Instead, “what is required is an absolutely profound and 
absolutely preeminent comprehension, such as is found only in God with 
respect to creatures.”21 
It appears, then, that for Molina it is insufficient for knowing which decision 
a libertarian free agent will make in some specified set of circumstances that 
one merely comprehend the divine essence (as it is here where the 
information regarding the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom 
ontologically lies). Rather, if one wants to know what a libertarian agent will do 
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in a certain set of circumstances, one will need to comprehend the divine 
essence with an “absolutely profound and absolutely preeminent 
comprehension;”22 a kind of “supercomprehension,” as Robert Adams has 
called it.23 But even with these additional comments, of course, not everything 
regarding how exactly God obtains knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom is satisfactorily answered. It is apparent, though, that Molina believes 
enough has been said and argued such that given God’s omniscience and 
other cognitive credentials, it is unreasonable to think that knowing with an 
absolute and preeminent comprehension could not yield knowledge of the 
truth-values of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom under discussion. 
 Now as to the second question mentioned above – How precisely do these 
three types of knowledge assist God in his exercise of providence? – Molina 
distinguishes between three kinds of causes or ways of bringing something 
about. As he states, “among all the things created (i) some are from God 
immediately, (ii) others come to be through the mediation of just those 
secondary causes that act by a necessity of nature without any dependence 
on created free choice, and (iii) still others emanate from created free 
choice.”24 As Molina recognizes, God can be “a cause … of all things of the 
first and second types solely through His purely natural knowledge … 
 
22 In Chapter 2 we will see that such a suggestion is not nearly enough to satisfy critics of 
Molina’s theory, especially when the critics’ central criticism regards whether counterfactuals 
of creaturely freedom have truth-values to begin with.  
23 Robert Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 14 (1977), 111. 
24 Freddoso 178. 
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complemented by the free determination of His will.”25 However, in order for 
God to “predestine certain human beings or angels and to ordain all things to 
their proper ends, besides His purely natural knowledge … it was also 
necessary for Him to have that middle knowledge.”26 For God’s possessing 
middle knowledge allows him, “on the hypothesis that He should will to bring 
about this or that order of things, [to foresee] with certainty all that would come 
to be because of angelic and human free choice in each one of those orders 
of things.”27 And if God is then able to know what free creatures will do in any 
order of things he providentially places them, then he clearly is able to 
providentially control (in an indirect way) all of the free decisions of free 
creatures by providentially controlling (in a direct way) which orders of things 
and faculties of choices are created. Thus if God knows that If S were in C, 
then S would do A, and God desires that A obtain, he need only create C. And 
the same thing is true, of course, regarding any subject, any set of 
circumstances, and any subsequent action. Hence, Molina’s theory of middle 
knowledge, if defensible, provides an effective explanation with respect to how 
to reconcile God’s foreknowledge and providence with human freedom of a 
libertarian sort.  
1.1.2. The Contemporary Statement 
Modern versions of middle knowledge make use of the notion of possible 
worlds in explicating with greater detail how divine decision making should be 
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understood with respect to God’s choice of creating a world. Thomas Flint is 
one modern Molinist, and I draw from his Divine Providence in developing the 
contemporary view.28 
As a Molinist, Flint’s account of middle knowledge and its use in elucidating 
the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human freedom is alike in 
essentials to Molina’s account. Flint holds that the three types of knowledge 
that God enjoys are natural knowledge, middle knowledge, and free 
knowledge, which correspond respectively to God’s knowledge of necessary 
propositions, counterfactual propositions, and future-contingent propositions. 
Flint also accepts that God lacks any kind of influence or control regarding the 
truth values of propositions that reside in natural and middle knowledge, but 
that God does have some control regarding the truth values of propositions 
that lie within free knowledge. And, as we saw with Molina, this is simply 
because God’s decisions using natural and middle knowledge then determine 
just what his free knowledge will be. Graphically represented, the essentials of 
the Molinist view regarding the modal nature and structure of God’s knowledge 
are the following.29 
28 Thomas Flint, Divine Providence (Cornel University Press: Ithaca, 1998). 
29 The subsequent graphic is found in Flint 42. 
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Flint finds it important to emphasize that within God’s middle knowledge 
there are not only counterfactuals regarding creaturely freedom, but also 
counterfactuals of divine freedom. To see this, consider that via his middle 
knowledge, God knows that “if he were to create Adam in circumstances C, 
circumstances which include God’s assuring Adam that eating the fruit of a 
particular tree would lead to immediate expulsion from the garden, Adam 
would in fact freely eat the forbidden fruit.”30 Allowing D to stand for Adams’ 
“dastardly deed” of disobeying God and thus eating the fruit, God knows by his 
middle knowledge that were C to occur, D would follow (or, C→D). In addition, 
given God’s warning to Adam regarding expulsion from the garden in the 
event that Adam were to eat the fruit, God certainly seems counterfactually to 
know that  were D to occur, E would follow (or, D→E), where E stands for 
expulsion from the garden. But, as Flint notes, if C→D and D→E, then C→E, 
so God would know C→E as well. That is, God would know that If I create 
Adam in circumstances C, I would expel him from the garden. This proposition 
is clearly contingent since it was not causally necessary that Adam eat the 
fruit, but just as clearly it is not a proposition under God’s control, “for it follows 
from a counterfactual of creaturely freedom about Adam (over which truth God 
has no control) and a necessary truth about God’s doing what he has 
promised to do (over which truth he likewise has no control).”31 Hence, C→E
appears to be part of God’s middle knowledge although it is clearly not a 
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counterfactual of creaturely freedom. Rather, it states what God would do 
were certain circumstances to obtain, and so is a counterfactual of divine 
freedom. God’s middle knowledge, then, appears to include “much more than 
[simply] counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.”32 
Now with respect to the progression or development of God’s knowledge, 
Flint views God’s knowledge as, in a sense, “growing through four logical 
moments.”33 To clarify the notion of logical moments, as contemporary 
Molinists refer to them, it is important to see that they are distinct from 
temporal moments.34 Temporal moments are chronologically ordered such 
that regarding any two moments t1 and t2, t1 is said to be ‘temporally prior’ to t1
if only if t1 temporally precedes t2. Logical moments are different. Any two 
logical moments l1 and l2 could temporally occur concurrently, or be altogether 
atemporal. With logical priority, to say that something is logically prior to 
something else – that one moment is logically prior to another, for example – 
is to say that either something serves to explain something else, or that one 
thing provides the grounds or basis for another. Such explanations or grounds 
may temporally precede what they ground or explain, but they need not do so. 
To take a common example, the truth of the premises in a sound argument are 
logically prior to the conclusion, but it need not be the case that, temporally 
 
32 Flint 43. 
33 Flint 43.  
34 The importance of making a distinction between logical and temporal moments is that many 
(philosophical) theists do not want to be committed to the idea that in order to think and make 
decisions God must think discursively. Such a commitment is viewed as a constraint on God’s 
epistemic abilities, and as such it is argued that it is an unbefitting restriction on the divine 
mind. 
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speaking, the truth of the premises precedes the truth of the conclusion. 35 If (i) 
all men are moral, and (ii) Socrates is a man, it follows that (iii) Socrates is 
mortal. And though the truth of (iii) depends on or is explained by (i) and (ii), it 
is incorrect to say that (i) and (ii) were, in a temporal sense, both true before 
(iii).  
 As another example, consider the relationship between God and his 
properties (on the assumption that the theological doctrine of divine simplicity 
is false). If God is essentially omnibenevolent or all-good, and God exists 
necessarily (i.e., there are no metaphysically or genuinely possible worlds that 
do not include God), then God has always existed and has always been good. 
However, if goodness is an essential property or characteristic of God, then 
God cannot exist without that property. He thus depends, in a sense, on that 
property for his existence, and hence that property is part of what grounds his 
own existence. But on the assumption that God is essentially omnibenevolent 
and exists necessarily, the existence of the property of being good cannot 
temporally precede the existence of God. The relationship between God and 
his goodness, given that it is not a temporal relationship, is then strictly a 
logical one. The property of goodness logically precedes God, and it can be 
said to be logically prior to him, even though it could not have existed 
temporally prior to him.  
 Now according to this construal of logical priority, what are the four logical 
moments that God’s knowledge “grows” through, as Flint describes it? The 
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first moment encompasses God’s natural knowledge, where, as discussed 
above, God knows all necessary truths. The second moment contains God’s 
middle knowledge, where, as also discussed above, he knows all contingent 
truths over which he exercises no control. Thus, given God’s natural and 
middle knowledge, God knows in detail which world would result from any act 
of creation (or “creative act of will,” as Flint phrases it36) that he might perform. 
In the third logical moment, God decides upon a certain act of creation, which 
includes deciding which beings he will create and in which circumstances. 
From this decision, as well as the content of God’s natural and middle 
knowledge, proceed not only the initiation of the string of all the contingent 
creaturely events that will occur in God’s chosen world, but in addition the 
fourth logical moment in the structure of God’s knowledge: free knowledge. In 
this moment of free knowledge God knows all the contingent truths under his 
control, that is, propositions that became true as a result of God’s decision or 
(creative act of will) in the third logical moment. Graphically, the point can be 
put this way.37 
According to Flint the “problems of foreknowledge and sovereignty are 
solved on this picture,” and the reason is that God’s foreknowledge of 
contingent events flows from a combination of knowledge beyond his control in 
addition to decisions that are under his control. That is, because “he has 
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middle knowledge and makes free choices concerning which creatures will 
exist in which circumstances, God has both complete foreknowledge 
concerning how those creatures will act and great control over their actions.”38 
However, “because the knowledge which generates this foresight and 
sovereignty is not itself a product of free divine activity, our actions remain 
genuinely free, not the robotic effects of divine causal determination.”39 
To illustrate the point, consider this example from Flint.40 Say there is a 
subject – call him Cuthbert – who performs a free action – buying an iguana in 
some set of circumstances C. On the Molinist way of thinking God has 
foreknowledge of and (in a sense) control over this action. Prior to creation, 
and by means of God’s natural knowledge, God knew many truths concerning 
Cuthbert, one of which was that it is possible that he purchase an iguana. By 
God’s middle knowledge, God knew that Cuthbert would freely buy the iguana 
if placed in circumstances C. This knowledge leaves God a good deal of room 
to providentially maneuver. God could place Cuthbert in C, in some other set 
of circumstances C* (where Cuthbert still buys an iguana), in C** (where 
Cuthbert buys two iguanas), in C*** (where he buys none), and so forth. In 
addition, God could create a situation that, unhappily for Cuthbert, does not 
include his existence at all. Whatever option God decides to actualize, he 
would know precisely how the world would go were he to create it. Assume, 
then, that after due consideration God decides to create both Cuthbert and C. 
 
38 Flint 44. 
39 Flint 44. 
40 The following illustration is found in Flint 44. 
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This creative act of will immediately provides God with the foreknowledge that 
Cuthbert will purchase an iguana. As Flint concludes, middle knowledge then 
“affords God both foreknowledge of and control over Cuthbert’s free action.”41 
Before discussing in some detail Flint’s understanding of the selection 
process God performs in deciding upon a certain world for creation, it is 
appropriate here to underscore, as Flint does, two points regarding the nature 
of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. The first is that the counterfactuals 
that comprise God’s middle knowledge “need to be such that no assumption is 
made concerning the existence of the creature being discussed.” For middle 
knowledge to be of any assistance to God, middle knowledge must include 
counterfactuals about possible but nonactual free creatures. Obviously were 
God only aware of counterfactuals regarding those creatures that would turn 
out to be actual, it is difficult to make sense of there being a free decision on 
God’s part to create them. Hence, as Flint says, “to maintain God’s status as a 
free creator, and to safeguard the action-guiding status of his middle 
knowledge, the Molinist needs to affirm that, prior to his creative act of will, 
God has middle knowledge concerning the actions that would be performed by 
creatures who never in fact will be created.”42 
Flint is aware that thinking and speaking of nonexistent beings is a well-
known difficulty, but insists that much confusion can be mitigated by thinking of 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom as “making reference, not directly to 
creatures, but rather to the individual essences of such creatures, where the 
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essence of a creature is simply the set of properties essential to it.”43 Because 
such essences could exist without any actual being that instantiates them, the 
counterfactuals which God considers in the third moment of his knowledge are 
best thought of as referring to such essences.  
 The second point Flint underscores about counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom is that “the Molinist can and should think of the circumstances in 
which an action is performed as being complete.”44 By this Flint means that in 
the circumstances in which a subject were to find herself, God would know not 
just some but all of the causal conditions affecting her action. The “safest” way 
of explicating this idea is to “think of the circumstances as including all of the 
prior causal activity of all agents along with all of the simultaneous causal 
activity by all agents other than the agent the counterfactual is about.”45 And 
thinking of the circumstances comprehensively in this way in terms of causes 
is just what it is to think of the circumstances in counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom as being complete. With these points about counterfactuals in mind, 
Flint proposes conceiving of counterfactuals in the following way.  
If creaturely essence P were instantiated in nondetermining 
complete circumstances C at time t, the instantiation of P would 
(freely) do A.46 
The last item to consider before presenting Flint’s account of the selection 
processes God undertakes in selecting a particular possible world for 
actualization is that of a creaturely world-type. As indicated already, if God has 
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middle knowledge, he clearly then knows all true counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom, and in addition knows them prior to his creative act of will (the third 
logical moment in the structure of his knowledge). Thus, which counterfactuals 
God knows will obviously impose constraints on which possible world God is 
capable of actualizing. To illustrate the point, if God has knowledge of the 
counterfactual C→A, which means that in circumstances C Cuthbert will 
perform action A (the purchase of an iguana for example), then God knows 
that he cannot create a world including circumstances C but excluding 
Cuthbert’s performing action A. No doubt there are logically (or merely 
conceivable) possible worlds where Cuthbert in C performs some other action 
than A, but such worlds are not really or genuinely or metaphysically possible 
for God to actualize given the truth of the counterfactual C→A. Thus any world 
in which C obtains will be followed by the obtaining of A. Now God could, it 
seems, bring about C and then causally preclude Cuthbert from performing A 
(causing Cuthbert to purchase no iguana, for example), but of course such 
activity on God’s would render Cuthbert unfree on a libertarian conception of 
freedom. On that conception of freedom, if Cuthbert is not the ultimate (or first) 
cause of his action then the action is not properly described as being his 
action at all. Thus if God decides to bring about C, he then has no choice 
about whether Cuthbert will bring about A.  
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As Flint means it, then, a creaturely world-type is simply the complete set of 
logically consistent counterfactuals of freedom.47 Two counterfactuals are said 
to be logically consistent just in case they are not logically contradictory. Thus 
the counterfactuals If Cuthbert were in C, then he would buy only one iguana 
and If Cuthbert were in C, then he would buy only two iguanas though each 
logically possible are not together logically consistent. Both counterfactuals 
cannot be members of the same complete set of logically consistent 
counterfactuals, and so both counterfactuals are members of distinct complete 
sets, or creaturely world-types. The set of counterfactuals themselves is 
obviously larger than the set of true counterfactuals, and thus there are a great 
many permutations of this complete set of counterfactuals that can be ordered 
into logically consistent creaturely world-types. So there are as many 
creaturely world-types as there are logically possible permutations of logically 
consistent complete sets of counterfactuals of freedom. Now from this it 
follows that any true creaturely world-type that God might know would then 
impose some restrictions on the possible world that God might create. Hence 
God’s possessing middle knowledge not only requires that he prevolitionally 
know which counterfactuals are true, but also which creaturely world-type is 
true. And which creaturely world-type is true is simply determined by which 
complete set of logically consistent counterfactuals contains only 
counterfactuals that are true. 
 
47 In this context, a set of counterfactuals S can be said to be complete just in case there 
exists no counterfactual C that is logically consistent with S, but not a member of S.  
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Following Flint, let us refer to the true creaturely world-type as T.48 Given 
that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are only contingently true, the 
complete set of true counterfactuals will only be contingently true as well. 
Hence, the truth of T is contingent. In addition, T is consistent only with some 
possible worlds. It is obviously not consistent with those possible worlds that 
are themselves consistent with creaturely world-types that are in fact false. 
Call all of those worlds consistent with T, therefore, T-worlds, and ~T-worlds 
worlds which are inconsistent with T. Middle knowledge, then, informs God 
that his creative activity can only apply to T-worlds, even though there exists 
many other logically possible ~T-worlds. Given God’s middle knowledge that T 
is true, it is simply out of God’s hands that no ~T-world is creatable. 
 It is also out of God’s hands that he cannot actualize a world where every 
counterfactual that is a member of T corresponds to some state of affairs in 
that world. The truth of one counterfactual of creaturely freedom regarding a 
certain state of affairs may preclude the obtaining of another state of affairs 
corresponding to another true counterfactual of freedom. For example, if both 
counterfactuals If C were to obtain, then Cuthbert would forever be a bachelor 
and If C* were to obtain, then Cuthbert would marry Jane are true, then though 
each is true there is no possible world God could actualize containing C and 
C*. So there are many different possible worlds that are consistent with T, and 
thus many different possible worlds that God could select given his middle 
knowledge that T is true. 
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Putting this together, then, Flint’s account of divine world-selection is as 
follows. Let the set of possible worlds consistent with a creaturely world-type 
be called the “galaxy of worlds determined by that world-type.”49 It can then be 
said that a particular world is feasible for God to create just in case it is a 
member of the galaxy determined by T. Thus, any world that is a member of a 
different galaxy than that determined by T is properly referred to as a world 
that is infeasible for God to create. From this it follows that a galaxy itself could 
be wholly feasible or infeasible for God depending on whether the worlds that 
are members of it are themselves infeasible or feasible. On this way of 
construing matters, to say that God has middle knowledge is to say that he 
knows which worlds are feasible and which worlds are not. Hence, God knows 
prevolitionally (in the second moment in the structure of his knowledge) that 
his creative abilities are constrained by T and the galaxy of worlds it 
determines. Within that galaxy God can actualize whichever world he pleases. 
But, however unfortunate, worlds outside of that galaxy simply “are not even 
contenders for actuality.”50 
Flint finds talk of worlds and galaxies a nice heuristic for getting a firmer 
conceptual grip on the metaphysics of divine world-selection in particular, and 
so the Molinst’s position in general. He asks us to consider “the set of possible 
worlds as being represented by an infinite set of circles located at varying 
distances from one another” where the distances are to be thought of as 
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“representing the varying relationships of similarity among the worlds.”51 
According to what has been said above, the Molinist will “insist that these 
worlds differ with regard to which creaturely world-type is true, and hence will 
be grouped into various different galaxies. In some worlds, world-type T1 will 
be true; those worlds constitute galaxy G1. Other worlds boast the truth of 
world type T2; such worlds make up galaxy G2. And so on.”52 The following 
diagram depicts this description.53 
Now the diagram is obviously incapable of graphically depicting a limitless 
number of possible worlds, galaxies, as well as possibly true creaturely 
worlds-types. But, of course, such is not unique to this diagram. Thus, as Flint 
notes, so long as this is kept in mind, diagrams of this sort, as well as the ones 
that follow, “can help us to visualize how the Molinist sees worlds as 
arranged.”54 
As previously discussed, the Molinist of course does not think that these 
galaxies are all on an ontological par vis-à-vis God’s creative abilities. Given 
that only one complete set of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom is true, 
only one creaturely world-type is true. Hence, only those worlds that are 
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members of this privileged galaxy are worlds that are feasible for God; the 
other worlds in other infeasible galaxies are not genuine candidates for 
actualization. For the sake of the discussion, then, suppose that T1 is the true 
world-type and so G1 the only feasible galaxy of worlds. Since all the worlds 
not in this galaxy exist “in the shadow of unactualizabilty,” as Flint calls it, it is 
fitting to modify the diagram, shading those galaxies of worlds that are 
infeasible for God, and leaving unshaded that galaxy of worlds that are 
feasible for him. This modification, then, is reflected as follows.  
 
Remember that even if this is the correct picture of which worlds are 
feasible and which worlds are not, things could have turned out different. 
Given that counterfactuals of freedom are only contingently true, the true 
creaturely world-type and so feasible galaxy are likewise only true 
contingently. It easily might have turned out that T2 or some other creaturely 
world-type were true, and if it had then some other galaxy besides G1 would 
have been the feasible galaxy, all others being infeasible. Still, for the moment 
we are supposing that T1 is the true creaturely world-type, and so that G1
houses the only feasible worlds that God can create. Given these many 
creative options, then, God exercises a creative act of will, whereby among the 
many possible and feasible worlds, a single world “escapes the status of mere 
G1
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possibility and receives the fullness of actuality.”55 Graphically, this selected 
and actualized world can be depicted with a solid circle as follows. 
 
As Flint comments, a welcome result of these diagrams is that they 
correspond to the previous description of the “growth” in God’s knowledge. 
The first diagram “shows God’s position at the first logical moment, when only 
natural knowledge is present.” The next “represents his knowledge at the 
second moment, when middle knowledge is brought on stage.” And lastly, the 
final diagram “illustrates his position at the fourth moment, when, because of 
his creative act of will made at the third moment, free knowledge arrives.”56 
Hence, moving through the diagrams is analogous to moving or progressing 
from knowledge of which worlds are possible, to knowledge of which worlds 
are feasible, finally settling in the last diagram on which world is actual. 
 To summarize this first section, then, the orthodox theist who thinks there 
are good reasons for maintaining God’s (exhaustive) foreknowledge in 
addition to his ability to providentially govern human beings with libertarian 
freedom needs a way of accounting for how this can be so. The theory of 
divine middle knowledge provides a way of explaining how God can have 
foreknowledge and providence over the libertarian choices of free creatures, 
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and hence provides a prima facie plausible explanation for the theological 
compatibilism.57 The putative reconciliation of foreknowledge, providence, and 
freedom, however, is not the only philosophical use for the theory of middle 
knowledge. The theory can also do work in a theodicy by providing some 
detail in an explanation seeking to reconcile the existence of God and the 
existence of evil in general, as well as the existence of God and existence of 
certain evils in particular (viz., the damned). To this application of Molinism we 
now turn. 
1.2. MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE AND EVIL 
1.2.1. The Logical Problem of Evil 
In general, the problem of evil is the claim that the existence God 
(traditionally conceived of as all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good) is 
incompatible with the existence of moral evil.58 The logical problem of evil, 
more specifically, is the claim that God’s existence (as traditionally conceived) 
is logically incompatible with the existence of moral evil; that is, it is logically 
inconsistent or contradictory to affirm both the existence of God and the 
existence of moral evil. In contemporary philosophy of religion, one rather 
common way of logically reconciling the two is by means of what is called the 
Free Will Defense. This defense, of which Alvin Plantinga is the chief 
advocate, “can be looked upon as an effort to show that there may be a very 
 
57 Recall that the theological compatibilst asserts that foreknowledge, providence, and 
(libertarian) freedom are all copossible.   
58 For practical purposes I focus only on the problem presented by moral evil (evil agents are 
causally responsible for – murder, e.g.) and leave aside the problem presented by natural 
evils (evil nature is causally responsible for – the damage and death brought about by a 
hurricane, e.g.). 
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different kind of good that God can’t bring about without permitting evil. These 
are good states of affairs that don’t include evil; they do not entail the 
existence of any evil whatever; nonetheless God Himself can’t bring them 
about without permitting evil.”59 Hence, the logical problem of evil asserts that 
as a matter of logical necessity God and moral evil cannot coexist. The Free 
Will Defense, to the contrary, asserts that it is logically possible that they can. 
How does this defense proceed? 
 To begin, Plantinga defines several important terms in the Free Will 
Defense. The first is being free with respect to an action. To say that a person 
is free with respect to an action is to say “he is free to perform that action and 
free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws 
determine that he will perform the action, or that he won’t.”60 The sort of 
freedom Plantinga has in mind, then, is freedom of a libertarian sort; that is, a 
sort that asserts that freedom and causal determinism are not compatible. If 
an action is free it cannot be caused by a series of prior events over which the 
agent has no control that lead into the distant past. It must in some sense be 
up to the agent what action is performed. The second term is morally 
significant, where an action is morally significant for a given person “if it would 
be wrong for him to perform the action but right to refrain or vice versa.”61 The 
idea is that promise-keeping, for example, is normally an action that is morally 
significant for an agent, while (normally) eating one brand of cereal instead of 
 
59 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1977) 29. 
60 Plantinga 29.  
61 Plantinga 30. 
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another is not. The third term is significantly free. Here a person is said to be 
significantly free just in case “he is then free with respect to a morally 
significant action.”62 Lastly there is the difference between moral and natural 
evil, where the former results from the actions of free creatures, and the later 
then encompasses any other kind of evil. 
 With these definitions in mind, Plantinga’s statement of the Free Will 
Defense is as follows.  
A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely 
perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else 
being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now 
God can create free creatures, but He can’t cause or determine 
them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren’t 
significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To 
create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must 
create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can’t give these 
creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time 
prevent them from doing so. As it turned out, sadly enough, 
some of the free creatures God created went wrong in the 
exercise of their freedom; this is the source of moral evil. The fact 
that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts neither 
against God’s omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He 
could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by 
removing the possibility of moral good.63 
The essence of the Free Will Defense, then, is the claim that “it is [logically] 
possible that God could not have created a universe containing moral good (or 
as much moral good as this world contains) without creating one that also 
contained moral evil.”64 And if this is so then the existence of evil by itself does 
not, as the advocate of the logical problem of evil claims, logically preclude the 
existence of God. Hence the two are not logically incompatible after all. 
 
62 Plantinga 30.  
63 Plantinga 30. 
64 Plantinga 31. 
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What Plantinga concedes is a formidable objection, and one he credits to J. 
L. Mackie, is that surely it is logically possible for one to do only what is right, 
even if one is free to do what is wrong. It is logically possible “that there be a 
world containing free creatures who always do what is right. There is no 
contradiction or inconsistency in this idea. But God is omnipotent; his power 
has no nonlogical limitations.”65 Hence, if it is logically possible that there exist 
a world containing free creatures who are free but only choose what is right, 
then it clearly follows that an omnipotent being (defined in terms of having “no 
nonlogical limitations”) could create such a world. And if this is so, then the 
Free Will Defense is mistaken in concluding that God, though omnipotent, is 
not able to create a world containing significantly free creatures without 
permitting moral evil. 
 An important assumption, however, that Plantinga argues this objection 
makes is that it was within God’s power to create any possible world that he 
pleased. “But what is really characteristic and central to the Free Will Defense 
is the claim that God, though omnipotent, could not have actualized just any 
possible world He pleased.”66 So which is correct? Could God have created 
any possible world he desired, worlds which include moral good but not moral 
evil? Or, is God limited in the number of worlds he could have made, worlds 
which contain moral good but moral evil as well? Not surprisingly Plantinga 
defends the latter proposition, and it is in this defense that the doctrine of 
divine middle knowledge appears. 
 
65 Plantinga 32. 
66 Plantinga 34. 
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To show that God was limited in the numbers of worlds that he could have 
created, and that he was not at liberty to create a world with morally significant 
creatures without permitting evil, Plantinga asks us to consider the following. 
Suppose Curley Smith, the mayor of Boston, is opposed to a potential new 
freeway route. Smedes, the director of highways, is in favor of the proposed 
route and offers Curley a bribe of $35,000 to reconsider his opposition. 
Unwilling “to break with the fine old traditions of Bay State politics, Curely 
accepts.”67 Smede, then, wonders whether he could have bought Curley for a 
mere $20,000. Now, suppose he could have. Suppose that were Curley 
offered a bribe of $20,000, he would freely have accepted it. This means that 
the counterfactual (A) If Smedes had offered Curely a bribe of $20,000, Curley 
would have accepted it is true. As Plantinga notes, “if [A] is true, then there is 
a state of affairs S that (1) includes Curley’s being offered a bribe of $20,000; 
(2) does not include either his accepting the bribe or his rejecting it; and (3) is 
otherwise as much as possible like the actual world – in particular, it includes 
Curley’s being free with respect to the bribe; and (4) is such that if it were 
actual then Curley would have taken the bribe.” That is, the counterfactual (A*) 
If S were actual, Curley would have accepted the bribe is true; moreover (A*) 
describes the actual world, call it W. 
 It is important to recognize, as Plantinga does, that there is a possible 
world – call it W* – where S obtains and Curley does not take the bribe. That 
is, the counterfactual (R) If S were actual, Curley would have rejected the 
 
67 Plantinga 45. 
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bribe accurately describes events in W*. But, given the truth of the 
counterfactual A*, God could not have created W*. In order for him to have 
done so, he would have had to actualize S in W*. But as we have seen, “under 
these conditions Curley, as [A*] assures us, would have accepted the bribe, so 
that the world thus created would not have been [W*].”68 Thus it turns out that 
God could not have created W* after all, since creating W* entails creating S, 
and given A* Curley would have freely accepted, not rejected, the bribe in S. 
Hence the counterfactual (R) If S were actual, Curley would have rejected the 
bribe is false, and given that it is a counterfactual of freedom, not even God 
has the ability to make it true. 
 It is clear, then, that it is possible that there are some worlds that God 
cannot actualize, W* being one of them. But matters may be worse. Let W 
stand for any world in which Curley exists and is significantly free. It is possible 
that in W there exists a particular action A that Curley performs that has the 
following peculiar property: Curley is significantly free with respect to A and will 
morally go wrong with respect to A. This means, of course, that there are no 
worlds God could have created that both contain Curley and no moral evil. 
Every such world that contains Curley and no moral evil is infeasible69 for God, 
as there evidently exists a true counterfactual regarding any world in which 
Curley exists If W were actualized, Curley would morally go wrong regarding 
 
68 Plantinga 47. 
69 Recall from the discussion of Thomas Flint’s contemporary statement of Molinism that a 
world is infeasible for God just in case it is logically possible for God to create, but 
metaphysically impossible for him to do so given the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom 
that he knows.  
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A. Plantinga calls the “malady” from which Curley suffers that of “transworld 
depravity.”70 Thus given that Curley is transworld depraved, if God is 
interested in creating Curley, the cost of his doing so is creating a world that 
contains moral evil.  
 So how does all of this assist Plantinga in his defense against Mackie’s 
assumption that God could create any possible world he pleased, and that it is 
possible that God could not have created a world with moral good but without 
moral evil? Given the discussion of Curley above, Plantinga concludes that “it 
is possible that there be persons who suffer from transworld depravity. More 
generally, it is possible that everybody suffers from it.”71 Hence if this 
possibility is actual, then “God, though omnipotent, could not have created any 
of the possible worlds containing just the persons who do in fact exist, and 
containing moral good but not moral evil.” Creating anyone at all with 
significant freedom – a prerequisite for morally good choices – in addition 
includes creating individuals that are transworld depraved. And as Plantinga 
notes, such “persons go wrong with respect to at least one action in any world 
God could have actualized and in which they are free with respect to morally 
significant actions.” Hence, “the price for creating a world in which they 
produce moral good is creating one in which they also produce moral evil.”72 
Thus it is indefensible, as Plantinga sees it, to maintain that the existence of 
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moral evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of an all-powerful, all-
knowing, and all-good God.73 
To clarify the point that Plantinga is making, we can illustrate his argument 
by putting to work the diagrams Thomas Flint employed in explicating the 
contemporary version of middle knowledge. According to that version, recall 
that Flint illustrated God’s creative options before creating the actual world by 
distinguishing those possible worlds that were feasible for God – in 
conjunction with the true creaturely world-type or complete set of true and 
logically consistent counterfactuals of freedom – and those that were not. The 
diagram representing this content, recall, was as follows. 
 
Now, the claim that Plantinga initially makes is that God could not have 
created a world that contained moral good without also allowing the possibility 
that his free creatures might freely choosing perversely. Hence, the fact that 
they did is no fault on God’s part; for he could have precluded the possibility of 
evil only by precluding genuine freedom, and all of the moral benefits that such 
freedom includes. Mackie then objected that God’s power is only limited by 
logical limitations, and so since there is nothing logically impossible about a 
 
73 Note that the Free Will Defense is aimed at defeating only the logical problem of evil. The 
evidential problem of evil, the idea that the existence of evil renders the existence of God 
implausible, is a quite different (and also more difficult) problem to diffuse. 
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possible world that contains only moral good, God could have – and indeed 
should have – actualized such a world.  
 But if there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, Plantinga 
responds that Mackie’s claim is not necessarily so. For it is entirely possible, 
he argues, that all persons suffer from transworld depravity, in which case any 
possible world that God were to actualize with free creatures would 
additionally contain moral evil. In that case, there are no feasible worlds for 
God to create that contain significantly free creatures (such as ourselves) but 
no moral evil. And so in that case, the graphic representing what God actually 
has to work with in relation to creating a world with significantly free creatures 
but no moral evil is as follows. 
 
There simply are no such worlds, according to Plantinga, given God’s middle 
knowledge. Hence, given God’s middle knowledge, he cannot be faulted for 
creating a world with significantly free creatures and moral evil. Those were 
simply his creative options in the third moment of divine knowledge. And 
because this is all at least logically possible, Plantinga considers the logical 
problem resolved.  
 
G1
T1 consistent worlds 
Infeasible Worlds 
G2 G3 G4
T2 consistent worlds T3 consistent worlds T4 consistent worlds 
47
1.2.2. The Soteriological Problem of Evil 
 Another application of the doctrine of divine middle knowledge is in regard 
to what William Lane Craig has termed the “soteriological problem of evil.”74 
Essentially this is the problem of reconciling the existence of an all-powerful, 
all-knowing, and all-loving God, not with (his permitting) moral evil in general, 
as discussed above, but with the particular evil that (according to the Christian 
religion) there are some individuals (indeed a great many) who will not receive 
redemption, but rather eternal condemnation in Hell. And what reason is there 
for thinking that Christianity affirms this? The following is a short list of 
passages usually thought to provide such a reason.  
 In Acts 4:12 we are told “Nor is there salvation in any other [referring to 
Christ], for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which 
we must be saved.” The Apostle Paul in speaking to the largely gentile church 
in Ephesus states, “at that time you were without Christ, being aliens from the 
commonwealth of Israel and strangers from the covenants of promise, having 
no hope and without God in the world” (Ephesians 2:12). Jesus himself affirms 
as much by saying “I am the way, the truth, and the life. No one comes to the 
Father except through Me” (John 14:6). More pointedly, “He who believes in 
Him [referring to Christ] is not condemned; but he who does not believe is 
condemned already, because he has not believed in the name of the only 
begotten Son of God” (John 3:18). Additionally, the Apostle John asserts, “He 
 
74 The term ‘soteriology’ is a theological term and refers to the domain of theology that studies 
the doctrine of salvation. William Lane Craig, “‘No Other Name’: A Middle Knowledge 
Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ,” Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989), 
180.  
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who has the Son has life; he who does not have the Son of God does not 
have life” (1 John 5:12). In reference to the disproportionate and greater 
number of the damned over the redeemed, Jesus states “Enter by the narrow 
gate; for wide is the gate and broad is they way leads to destruction, and there 
are many who go in by it. Because narrow is the gate and difficult is the way 
which leads to life, and there are few who find it” (Matthew 7:13-14). Lastly, 
regarding the condition of those in Hell, Jesus plainly says, “Then He will also 
say to those on the left hand, ‘Depart from Me, you cursed, into the everlasting 
fire prepared for the devil and his angels’ …. And these will go away into 
everlasting punishment, but the righteous into eternal life” (Matthew 25:41, 
46). 
 Now if God is good and Hell is eternal, and the only means of escaping 
condemnation is through Christ, then it certainly appears as though that the 
majority of human beings have been, are being, and will be condemned to an 
eternity of suffering in Hell. If true, there is clearly an intuitive problem. How 
can this truth be consistent with the additional truth that an omnipotent, 
omniscient, and (especially) omnibenevolent God exists? How can the 
existence of such a God be reconciled logically with the existence of the 
eternally condemned in Hell?  
 Toward answering this question, Craig first argues that “the problem is not 
that the very notion of hell is incompatible with a just and loving God.”75 He 
relates that the New Testament clearly indicates that God does not want any 
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persons whatsoever to be damned. For in the Apostle Peter’s second epistle 
we read, “The Lord is not slack concerning His promises, as some count 
slackness, but is longsuffering toward us, not willing that any should perish but 
that all should come to repentance” (2 Peter 3:9). Elsewhere in Paul’s letter to 
Timothy we find, “[God] desires all men to be saved and to come to the 
knowledge of the truth” (1 Timothy 2:4). Therefore, as Craig sees it, God 
seeks to draw all men to himself. In his doing so those “who make a well-
informed and free decision to reject Christ are self-condemned, since they 
repudiate God’s unique sacrifice for sin.”76 And thus by spurning God’s 
sacrifice “they shut out God’s mercy and seal their own destiny.”77 It is, then, 
they, and not God, according to Craig, who “are responsible for their 
condemnation, and God deeply mourns their loss.”78 
Second, Craig argues that the problem is not God’s condemning persons 
who are either “un-, ill-, or misinformed concerning Christ and who therefore 
lack the opportunity to receive Him.”79 The reason is that one could maintain 
that God “graciously applies to such persons the benefits of Christ’s atoning 
death without their conscious knowledge thereof on the basis of their response 
to the light of general revelation and the truth they do have, even as He did in 
the case of Old Testament figures like Job who where outside the covenant of 
Israel.”80 Thus if one can be redeemed via general revelation81, it is untrue that 
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the absence of or misinformation about Christ guarantees that one is then 
condemned. 
 The real problem, according to Craig, with the existence of both God and 
the condemned in Hell “involves certain counterfactuals of freedom concerning 
those who do not receive special revelation and so are lost.” For if it is true 
that the “gate” leading to Hell is wide, and that there are many that enter it, 
while the “gate” leading to Heaven is narrow, and that there are few who enter 
it, might it not also be true that there are some who would enter the narrow 
gate had they only had access to special revelation, as opposed merely to 
general revelation? This question prompts Craig to ask a series of further 
questions. 
Why did God not supply special revelation to persons who, while 
rejecting the general revelation they do have, would have 
responded to the gospel of Christ if they had been sufficiently 
well-informed concerning it? More fundamentally, why did God 
create this world when He knew that so many persons would not 
receive Christ and would therefore be lost? Even more radically, 
why did God not create a world in which everyone freely receives 
Christ and so is saved?82 
Craig points out that it is important to recognize that these questions seem to 
presuppose that “certain counterfactuals of freedom concerning people’s 
response to God’s gracious initiatives are true,” and especially the last two 
seem to presuppose that “God’s omniscience embraces a species of 
 
81 Theologically, general revelation, as opposed to special revelation, is revelation that is 
found in nature (Psalm 19:1-4) regarding God’s power and intelligence (Romans 1:18-25), his 
goodness (Acts 14:17), and moral requirements (Romans 2:14-16). It is revelation that is 
available to all. Special revelation, on the other hand, is revelation from God via his prophets; 
the Bible is taken by Christians to be an example. This is revelation that historically has been 
available only to the few.  
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knowledge known as middle knowledge.”83 This certainly seems to be the 
case since if there are no such counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, then it is 
obviously not true that certain persons would receive Christ if they were to 
receive special revelation in addition to general revelation. Nor, it seems, can 
God be held responsible for the large number of the lost if he lacks middle 
knowledge, as without such knowledge he would have no way whatsoever of 
knowing how many (or, indeed, if any) persons would stand in need of 
redemption were he to create a world. Thus on the assumption that God does 
have middle knowledge, how might the soteriological problem of evil be 
resolved? 
 As Craig sees it, the soteriological problem of evil is quite simply that   
(1) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent  
 
is inconsistent with  
 
(2) Some persons do not receive Christ and are damned. 
 
And since (1) is essential to Christian theism, (2) must be denied.84 But 
because (1) and (2) are not logically contradictory – as neither is “the negation 
of the other,” and “a contradiction cannot be derived from them using first 
order logic”85 – Craig claims that the proponent of this argument must mean, 
then, that (1) and (2) are ontologically inconsistent, in that there exists no 
possible world where both propositions are true. But why should the Christian 
theist concede this? Craig suggests that the proponent of the soteriological 
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problem of evil may believe that one (or both) of the following two propositions 
provide the answer.  
(3) God is able to actualize a possible world in which all persons freely 
receive Christ. 
(4) God prefers a world in which no persons fail to receive Christ and 
are damned to a world in which some do.  
 
Indeed, one might argue that any theist who accepts (1) must also accept (3), 
given God’s omnipotence and omniscience. Furthermore, (1) seems to make 
(4) much more likely than not, if God genuinely is omnibenevolent. 
 But is it actually true, however, that the theist, who is in addition a Molinist, 
is rationally obliged to accept (3)? Craig finds this far from obvious. For, as we 
have seen regarding the discussion of the logical problem of evil, the mere 
existence of a particular possible world does not entail that such a world is 
creatable (or feasible) by God. Recall that God’s ability to actualize worlds 
containing significantly free creatures is limited by which counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom happen to be true. Hence there may very well be possible 
worlds where a subject S refrains in circumstances C from performing action 
A; such worlds may even be highly desirable worlds for God. But if the 
counterfactual If S were in C, then S would perform A is true, then even God 
cannot place S in C without then permitting A. Thus a world that includes S 
being in C and refraining from doing A is simply not feasible for God; it is a 
world that he cannot create. There are, then, potentially an infinite number of 
possible worlds known to God via his natural knowledge, but such that they 
are infeasible for him given the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom that 
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happen to be true. Thus, as did Plantinga above, Craig concludes that not 
even God can create any possible world that exists. 
 The question, then, is whether the Molinist is required to think that within 
the range of possible worlds which are feasible for God there is at least one 
world in which everyone freely receives Christ and so is redeemed. Craig 
argues that Molinist can plausibly hold  
(5) For some individual S, there are no circumstances in which S would 
freely receive Christ.86 
This means, of course, that the Molinist can consistently claim that there are 
no worlds feasible for God in which S exists and is redeemed. And so if God 
were to make a world that included S, it is not a world in which (3) would be 
true. That is, it is not a world in which all persons freely receive Christ, since S 
of his own volition would reject him. 
 But it is legitimate to ask, at this point, since there are at least some 
subjects that do receive Christ, why God could not create a world containing 
only those individuals that freely receive Christ. For if he could, then he could 
also create a world in which (3) is true. Craig argues that it is plausible to say 
that such a world is not a feasible world for God to create. And the reason is 
that the circumstances under which subject S* freely received Christ and so is 
redeemed and the circumstances under which another subject S** freely 
receives Christ and is redeemed may not in fact be conjointly possible. In 
other words, because there is a possible world where S* is redeemed and a 
world where S** is redeemed, it does not follow that there is a world where 
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both S* and S** are redeemed. Furthermore, it might be that “in circumstances 
C1, individual S1 would do action a and that in C2 individual S2 would do b and 
that C1 and C2 are compossible, but it does not follow that in C1 & C2 [that] S1
would [still] do a or that in C1 & C2 [that] S2 would [still] do b.”87 Thus, “even if it 
were the case that for any individual He might create, God could actualize a 
world in which that person is freely saved, it does not follow that there are 
worlds which are feasible for God in which all individuals are saved.”88 Hence 
rather than holding (3), Craig maintains that the Molinist can credibly hold  
(6) There is no world feasible for God in which all persons would freely 
received Christ. 
 
In short, then, regarding the idea that God can actualize a possible world in 
which all persons receive Christ and so are redeemed, Craig argues that 
unless we have good reason to think that (6) “is impossible or essentially 
incompatible with Christian theism, the objector has failed to show (1) and (2) 
to be inconsistent.”89 To put the point graphically, given the counterfactuals of 
freedom that are true, and thus the creaturely world-type that is true, we can 
say that according to Craig the following illustrates feasibility in relation to the 
logically possible worlds in which all persons are freely redeemed.  
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The Molinist, then, can consistently hold that there simply are no feasible 
worlds in which (3) is true.  
 Now what about (4) – that God prefers a world in which no persons fail to 
receive Christ and are damned to a world in which some do. Does (4) provide 
a reason for thinking that (1) and (2) are incompatible? Craig concedes that, 
“all things being equal an omnibenevolent God prefers a world in which all 
persons are saved to a world containing those same persons some of whom 
are lost. But (4) is stronger than this. It claims that God prefers any world in 
which all persons are saved to any world in which some persons are 
damned.”90 Craig finds this “far from obvious.” For suppose that the only 
feasible world where all persons in that world receive Christ and so are 
redeemed is a world containing very few persons altogether. Surely, Craig 
argues, it is “at least possible that such a world is less preferable to God than 
a world in which great multitudes come to experience His salvation and a few 
are damned because they freely reject Christ.”91 For why “should the joy and 
blessedness of those who would freely receive God’s grace and love be 
prevented on account of those who would freely spurn it?” On the assumption 
that God is omnibenevolent he no doubt desires as many individuals as 
possible to share in his salvation, but if God does have middle knowledge, and 
so there are true counterfactuals of freedom, then “in order to have a multitude 
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in heaven, [God] might have to accept a number in hell.”92 Thus contrary to 
(4), then, the Molinist might well hold  
(7) God prefers certain worlds in which some persons fail to receive 
Christ and are damned to certain worlds in which all receive Christ 
and are saved. 
 
And as with (6) above, Craig argues that unless we have good reason to think 
that (7) “is impossible or essentially incompatible with Christian theism, the 
objector has again failed to show (1) and (2) to be inconsistent.”93 And thus it 
has not be shown that the soteriological problem of evil is successful. 
 To summarize the discussion in this second section, then, the theory of 
middle knowledge not only plays an important role in mitigating the prima facie 
incoherence in thinking that God can foreknow and providentially control the 
free actions of free creatures, but also in mitigating the prima facie 
incoherence in thinking that an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God is 
logically consistent with both the existence of moral evil and the existence of 
the damned. In response to the logical problem of evil, the Molinist can claim 
that it is at least logically possible that God knows via his middle knowledge 
that there exists no possible world he could have created containing free 
creatures that never use their freedom perversely. Such creatures are said to 
suffer from transworld depravity. If this is correct, then any world God creates 
containing free creatures will in addition be a world containing moral evil. 
Given God’s middle knowledge – knowledge, remember, that is not under his 
control – it is simply not up to him whether free creatures would freely abuse 
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their freedom were he to create them. Hence, it is at least logically possible 
that in creating free creatures God also had to permit the existence of moral 
evil.  
 Similarly, in response to the soteriological problem of evil, the Molinist can 
claim that it is at least logically possible that God knows via his middle 
knowledge that there exists no possible world he could have created 
containing free creatures that never use their freedom to reject him. Such 
creatures condemn themselves by means of their own free will, and on the 
assumption that the will is free in a libertarian sense, it is simply not up to God 
whether it is exercised for him or against him. In addition, it is logically possible 
that there are some free creatures that would use their freedom to reject him in 
any world in which they were created. These are the transworld damned, and 
given God’s middle knowledge, it is possible that there is nothing redemptive 
that he can do for them.  
1.3. LOOKING AHEAD 
In the next chapter I look at perhaps the most challenging obstacle to the 
acceptance of middle knowledge by theists: the grounding objection. I will 
discuss two versions of the grounding objection – one from Robert Adams and 
the other from William Hasker – as well as the standard replies from 
philosophers who are defenders of Molinism. In the end, I argue that the 
various replies are less than satisfactory, and thus that a fresh response to the 
grounding objection is required. That reply is initiated in Chapter 3, and 
completed in Chapter 4. 
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2
The Grounding Objection 
and Replies 
 
In the previous chapter we looked at a detailed development of Luis de 
Molina’s theory of middle knowledge, as well as two applications of his theory. 
The first application, the reader will recall, regards reconciling the alleged 
theoretical inconsistency of God having foreknowledge and providence over 
the free actions of human agents. On the assumption that God exists with 
exhaustive foreknowledge of the future and providential control over human 
free agency – in the libertarian sense that when we act we have the ability to 
do differently than what we do – middle knowledge offers an attractive 
explanation regarding how this is possible. If God knows how free agents will 
exercise their free agency in any conceivable set of circumstances they could 
possibly confront, then God knows what a particular free agent would do were 
he to place them in some specified situation. Hence, God can providentially 
guide any particular agent toward whatever ends he desires without 
compromising the freedom of the agent in question. Thus the paradox 
between foreknowledge, providence, and freedom is resolved; or so the 
Molinst argues. 
 The second application of middle knowledge that we discussed was with 
regard to the problem of evil, in both its logical and soteriological forms. The 
former states that the existence of an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving 
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God is logically irreconcilable with the existence of moral evil in general, while 
the latter states that the existence of the eternally damned is a particular evil 
that is logically irreconcilable with the existence of an all-loving, all-powerful, 
and all-knowing God. Contemporary defenders of theory of middle knowledge 
rely on that theory to answer the logical problem of evil by asserting that it is at 
the very least logically possible for all free agents to suffer from transworld 
depravity. This is the (highly) unfortunate condition of being such that no 
matter what possible world in which we exist, there is some particular action 
we perform that is morally perverse. If all free agents are in this way 
transworld depraved, then not even God could create free agents and at the 
same time preclude their using their freedom perversely; for were he to 
preclude their doing so, he would then compromise their freedom. Hence there 
apparently exists no logical inconsistency between God’s existence and the 
existence of moral evil. 
 As it pertains to the soteriological problem of evil, the advocate of middle 
knowledge can address this problem by saying that just as it is logically 
possible that all free persons are transworld depraved, it is also logically 
possible that all damned persons are transworld damned. Being transworld 
damned is the (highly) unfortunate condition of being such that if one is 
damned, then there exists no possible world that God can actualize where one 
freely decides to be redeemed. And the reason there exists no such world that 
God can actualize is that God, via his middle knowledge, knows that there are 
no circumstances he can actualize that include both the damned and their free 
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decision to be redeemed.  Thus if such circumstances do not exist for God to 
actualize, then not even God can ensure the freely chosen redemption of the 
damned. Hence there apparently exists no logical inconsistency between 
God’s goodness and the existence of the damned.1
So Molina’s theory can arguably be employed to resolve both the problem 
of foreknowledge, providence, and freedom, as well as the problem of evil, in 
each of its logical and soteriological forms. And for these reasons the theory is 
seen as having genuine explanatory power. But aside from the work 
proponents of middle knowledge have enlisted it to perform, is the theory itself 
credible, or does it instead suffer from fairly substantial objections? William 
Hasker and Robert Adams are two of the more recognized critics of middle 
knowledge. At the beginning of this chapter I examine their different versions 
of what is now familiarly known as the grounding objection to Molinism. This 
objection, in short, is roughly either that (i) because there exist no 
metaphysical grounds for the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, 
they are all false, or (ii) because free agents do not bring about the truth of 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (and so do not function as their 
grounds), such conditionals cannot – contra middle knowledge – regard free 
actions at all. Hasker argues for (ii) and Adams for (i), and obviously if either 
argument is sound then middle knowledge appears explanatorily inept at 
 
1 As discussed in the previous chapter, whether or not these solutions are plausible is another 
matter. That they are possible is the only question the Molinist at this point is addressing. So 
long as these solutions are at least logically possible, the logical and soteriological problem of 
evil can be successfully answered (even if the answers themselves do not appear to be 
particularly plausible). 
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reconciling the problem of foreknowledge, providence, and freedom, as well as 
the logical and soteriological problems of evil. Acutely aware of this, critics of 
Hasker and Adams – and thus the grounding objection in general – are not in 
short supply. After stating both versions of the grounding objection, I spend the 
remainder of the chapter both looking at the responses to it, and arguing that 
each is inadequate for the task of defending the theory of middle knowledge. 
Hence if middle knowledge is to maintain its explanatory use with respect to 
the two aforementioned problems, what is needed is a novel reply. 
2.1. THE GROUNDING OBJECTION 
2.1.1. From William Hasker 
 William Hasker’s “refutation” of middle knowledge is self-professedly 
“complex,” and it will take some care (and time) in developing.2 The argument 
is at bottom a reductio ad absurdum argument against the theory of middle 
knowledge. Hasker concedes, “provisionally, that there are true 
counterfactuals of freedom,”3 however a crucial question to ask on the 
assumption that there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom is: “Who 
or what is it (if anything) that brings it about that these propositions are true?”4
In a footnote Hasker comments that the concept of bringing about he has in 
mind is “an asymmetrical relation of dependence of what is brought about on 
the action or event that brings it about,” and that “the dependence in question 
 
2 William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1989) 39. 
3 Hasker 39. 
4 Hasker 39. 
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may be, but is not necessarily, causal.”5 What is important here is Hasker’s 
conception of the relationship between true propositions and grounds, where 
the former are derived (though not necessarily causally derived) from the 
latter. With this in mind, how does Hasker’s argument proceed? 
 To give the argument some “concreteness,” Hasker asks us to imagine that 
a certain doctoral student in anthropology – Elizabeth – is beginning to plan 
her dissertation field research. Elizabeth’s advisor, let us say, has been asked 
to make a recommendation for a foundation grant to be given for observing a 
newly discovered tribe in New Guinea. As the assignment is both exciting and 
to some extent not entirely safe, the advisor asks himself “whether Elizabeth 
would choose to undertake this study, or whether she would prefer to continue 
with her present plans to study a relatively placid group of South Sea 
islanders.”6 In other words, according to Hasker, Elizabeth’s advisor is asking 
himself which of the following two counterfactuals is true. 
 (12) If Elizabeth were offered the grant, she would accept it (O → A). 
 (13) If Elizabeth were offered the grant, she would not accept it (O → ~A). 
 
Now of course according to the theory of middle knowledge, one of these 
counterfactuals is true, and God knows which one it is. For the sake of 
argument, Hasker asks us to assume that it is (12) rather than (13) that is true. 
But to reiterate Hasker’s central question, who or what is it that brings it about 
that this counterfactual is true?  
 
5 Hasker 39. 
6 Hasker 40. 
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According to the Molinist, Hasker notes, it cannot be God “who brings it 
about that counterfactuals of freedom are true,” since if God were to do so it is 
difficult to understand how these counterfactuals could be counterfactuals of 
freedom.7 Instead, Hasker says, the answer to this question “given by the 
friends of middle knowledge is that it is the agent named in the counterfactual 
who brings it about that the counterfactual is true.”8 This is the claim, Hasker 
says, that will be the central subject of discussion throughout his refutation of 
Molinism. Thus, how might it be possible for an agent about whom there is a 
true counterfactual of freedom to bring about its truth? 
 As Hasker sees it, “the only possible way for the agent to do this is to 
perform the action specified in the consequent of the counterfactual under the 
conditions stated in the antecedent.”9 Hasker believes that the proponents of 
middle knowledge accept this, which is why they “claim that the agent brings 
about the truth of the counterfactuals only in those possible worlds in which 
the antecedent is true.”10 Put more specifically, according to Hasker the 
following appears to be an accepted principle: 
(14) It is in an agent’s power to bring it about that a given counterfactual 
of freedom is true only if its truth would be brought about by the 
agent’s performing the action specified in the consequent of the 
conditional under the conditions specified in the antecedent.11 
To discover, though, whether it is possible for an agent to bring abut the truth 
of a counterfactual of freedom in this way we need to know what is required for 
 
7 Hasker 40. 
8 Hasker 40. 
9 Hasker 41. 
10 Hasker 41 
11 Hasker 41. 
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a particular event to bring it about that a proposition is true. According to 
Hasker, the following criterion appears to do the job.12 
(16) If event E brings it about that “Q” is true, then E is a token of an 
event-type T such that (some token of T occurs) → Q and ~(some 
token of T occurs) → ~Q, and E is the first token of T which 
occurs.13 
To illustrate the idea here, suppose that someone, Jones let us say, knocks 
on Smith’s door at 10AM, Harold knocks on Smith’s door at 11AM, and no one 
else knocks on Smith’s door the rest of the day. It is clear that Jones’ knock 
brings it about that the proposition Someone knocks on Smith’s door today is 
true, even though the proposition would still have been true if Jones had not 
knocked on Smith’s door. This means that Jones’ knocking is the occurrence 
of an event token of an event type (someone’s knocking on Smith’s door), 
such that were no token of that type of event to occur today, then nothing 
would bring about the truth of the proposition Someone knocks on Smith’s 
door today. Hence a more colloquial version of (16) is something akin to the 
following: If some event brings about the truth of some proposition, then that 
event is a token of an event type, such that if a token of that type were to 
occur, then the event token would bring about the truth of the proposition in 
question; however, if no such token of that type of event were to occur, then 
nothing would bring about the truth of the proposition in question. For Hasker, 
then, this is what it means for some event E to bring about the truth of some 
proposition Q. In addition it is important to note that if criterion (16) is not 
 
12 Below I omit Hasker’s (15) for the sake of concision; it does not affect the argument. 
13 Hasker 42. 
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satisfied regarding the truth of some proposition Q, then it is appropriate to say 
that “the truth of the proposition is independent of the event in question.”14 
Applying all of this to the case of Elizabeth, then, “what we need to know is 
whether Elizabeth brings about the truth of the counterfactual of freedom ‘O →
A’ by accepting the grant, or whether its truth is independent of her action, in 
the sense just specified.”15 And to determine this, says, Hasker, we need to 
know which of the following two propositions are true. 
 (17) If Elizabeth were to accept the grant, it would be truth that O → A
(or, A → (O → A)). 
 (18) If Elizabeth were not to accept the grant, it would be true that O →
A (or, ~A → (O → A)). 
 
Now there is no question regarding the truth of (17), as Hasker sees it, since 
we supposed that (12) was true – If Elizabeth were offered the grant, she 
would accept it – making the propositions expressed by both “O” and “A” true 
in the actual world, and so bringing about the truth of the counterfactual as 
well. It is in addition tempting to think that there is no question regarding the 
falsity of (18). But this, Hasker thinks, is a mistake, and that is because we are 
probably misreading (18) as meaning the following. 
(19) If Elizabeth were to reject the grant, it would be true that O → A (or, (O 
& ~A) → (O → A)). 
 
This conditional is false, but it is not what is asserted by (18). The antecedent 
of (18) merely says that Elizabeth does not accept the offer, which is not the 
same thing as saying that she rejects it. That she does not accept the offer is 
 
14 Hasker 42. 
15 Hasker 42.  
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logically consistent with that offer never having been made. Thus if Elizabeth 
indeed rejects the offer, then O → A will then be false. However, O → A will 
remain true even if no offer is actually made. Hence, we now need to evaluate 
the following two counterfactuals. 
(20) If Elizabeth does not accept the offer, it will be because she rejected it 
(or, ~A → (O & ~A)). 
(21) If Elizabeth does not accept the offer, it will be because the offer was 
not made (or, ~A → (~O & ~A)). 
 
To step back for a moment and get some perspective on the developing 
argument, remember that we are trying to determine whether or not (17) or 
(18) are true independently of Elizabeth’s action, and true independently in the 
sense specified in (16). Hasker assumes that (17) is true for the sake of 
argument, so the crucial question now as it regards independence is whether 
or not (18) is true. If it is, then since both (17) and (18) are true, (12) is not true 
because of Elizabeth’s action. That is, if (12) is true independently of 
Elizabeth’s action, then the truth of (12) is not brought about by her action. 
And if this is the case, Hasker will argue, then this truth quite plausibly serves 
as the basis for a refutation of the theory of middle knowledge, since if the 
truth of (12) is independent of Elizabeth, then Elizabeth could not do differently 
than accept the grant if it is offered. And this implies that her action is not 
performed freely in a libertarian sense of freedom, as a libertarian sense of 
freedom requires precisely the ability to do differently than accept the grant if it 
is offered. But if middle knowledge includes a libertarian conception of 
freedom in its account of foreknowledge, providence, and freedom and at the 
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same precludes such a conception of freedom given that true counterfactuals 
are true independently of the actions of free agents then middle knowledge, on 
Hasker’s view, stands refuted. It is an important question, then, whether it is 
(20) or (21) that is true.  
 So back to (20) and (21). If it is (20) that is true rather than (21), then (18) 
will come out false and thus the truth of (12) may be said to be dependent on 
Elizabeth’s action in the sense required by (16). On the other hand, if it is (21) 
that is true rather than (20), then (18) will come out true and thus the truth of 
(12) may be said to independent of Elizabeth’s action in the sense required by 
(16). In that case, Hasker believes, middle knowledge will stand refuted. 
Hence, which is it? 
 According to the current semantics for counterfactuals, to decide the 
answer to this question we need to decide whether “a world in which Elizabeth 
received the offer and rejected it [is] more or less similar to the actual world (in 
which the offer was accepted) than a world in which the offer was neither 
made nor accepted?”16 Hasker argues that, in fact, it is (21) that is true rather 
than (20). The reason is that in judging the comparative similarity of two 
possible worlds, it is counterfactual content, rather than factual content, that 
should count more heavily. To see this, Hasker says, suppose “I have been 
hard at work making a poster announcing an upcoming event, and just as the 
poster is nearly completed I knock over my ink bottle, spilling ink on the poster 
 
16 Hasker 43. 
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and forcing me to start all over again.”17 At this point he wonders which of the 
following two counterfactuals are true. 
(22) If no ink had been spilled on my poster, it would have been because I 
did not knock over my ink bottle (~S → (~K & ~S)). 
(23) If no ink had been spilled on my poster, it would have been because I 
knocked over my ink bottle but no ink spilled (~S → (K & ~S)). 
 
Hasker argues that it would be absurd to think that it is (23) that is true simply 
because the (23)-world differs with respect to the actual world only with 
respect to ink spilling, where as the (22)-world differs from the actual world in 
both the ink spilling and the bottle’s being knocked over. And this is because 
there exists the following true counterfactual of natural law. 
(24) If I were to knock over my ink-bottle in such-and-such a way, the bottle 
would fall over and spill ink on my poster. 
 
This counterfactual is not only true in the actual world (as everyday events 
demonstrate), but is also true in the (22)-world though not in the (23)-world. 
Thus “in weighing the comparative similarity to the actual world of the (22)-
world and the (23)-world, the truth in the (22)-world of the counterfactual (24) 
counts far more heavily than the slightly greater similarity of the (23)-world with 
respect to factual content.”18 Therefore counterfactuals can plausibly be said 
to be more fundamental features of the world than are particular facts. And so, 
as was intuitive from the beginning, it is (22) rather than (23) that is true. 
 Now the point of this example is that these same considerations that justify 
our thinking that (22) is true rather than (23) can be brought to bear in 
justifying Hasker’s thinking that it is (21) rather than (20) that is in fact true. For 
 
17 Hasker 43.  
18 Hasker 45. 
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since the counterfactual (12) is true – If Elizabeth were offered the grant, she 
would accept – then it is a counterfactual that is true in both the actual world 
as well as the (21)-world – a world in which if Elizabeth does not accept the 
offer, it will be because the offer was not made.  It is not a counterfactual that 
is true, however, in the (20)-world – a world in which if Elizabeth does not 
accept the offer, it will be because she rejected it. Hence, by parity of 
reasoning with the ink-illustration, “the truth of the counterfactual (12) 
outweighs the slight difference with respect to similarity in factual content, so 
that the (21)-world is indeed more similar to the actual world than the (20)-
world, and it is (21) that is true rather than (20).”19 
As previewed above, though, the truth of (21) implies the truth of (18) – If 
Elizabeth were not to accept the grant, it would be true that O → A. And since 
(17) – If Elizabeth were to accept the grant, it would be true that O → A – is 
also true, it straightforwardly follows that the truth of (12) is “independent of 
whether or not Elizabeth actually accepts the grant.”20 In addition it follows 
from the bringing-about criterion (16) that “Elizabeth’s acceptance of the offer 
does not bring it about that the counterfactual ‘O → A’ is true.”21 In general, 
then, it is not true that the truth of a counterfactual of creaturely freedom is 
brought about by the agent about whom the counterfactual is true. This 
conclusion, as said before, is significant as it regards the libertarian conception 
of freedom to which middle knowledge is committed. Such a conception is 
 
19 Hasker 45. 
20 Hasker 48. 
21 Hasker 48. 
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committed to the idea that when agents act they have it within their power to 
act differently under precisely the same circumstances. So does Elizabeth 
enjoy this sort of power? 
 Apparently not. Though Elizabeth obviously enjoys the power to accept the 
grant since that is precisely what we stipulated that she does in the actual 
world, it is not so clear that she enjoys the power to reject it. The reason is that 
her rejection of the grant “entails that the counterfactual ‘O → ~A’ is true, but 
this counterfactual is in fact false.”22 Hence “she can have the power to reject 
the grant only if it is in her power to bring it about that this counterfactual is 
true.”23 And now, as Hasker notes, the “situation becomes serious.” For it 
would be in Elizabeth’s power to bring it about that O → ~A is true only if the 
truth of this counterfactual would be brought about by her rejecting the offer. 
Unfortunately, as we have seen, “the truth of a counterfactual of freedom is not 
brought about in this way,” and thus it “follows that Elizabeth does not have it 
in her power to bring it about that O → ~A.”24 But if she lacks this power, she 
then also lacks the power to reject the offer. And this is inconsistent with a 
libertarian conception of freedom, a conception to which the theory of middle 
knowledge is committed.  
 Vis-à-vis the grounding objection, then, Hasker’s argument apparently 
shows that any grounds for the truth of counterfactuals of freedom are in 
addition grounds that preclude the agent from doing otherwise in the 
 
22 Hasker 51.  
23 Hasker 51.  
24 Hasker 51. 
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circumstances specified by the counterfactual. But since it is part and parcel to 
a libertarian conception of freedom that the agent be able to do otherwise 
when acting for that action to count as free, any grounds for the truth of a 
counterfactual that preclude the agent from having this ability are grounds that 
preclude the agent from being free in a libertarian sense. And since on middle 
knowledge it turns out that it is not the agent who grounds the truth of a 
counterfactual of libertarian freedom, the agent then lacks the power to act 
otherwise, and so the counterfactuals in the second moment in the structure of 
God’s knowledge are not actually counterfactuals of freedom at all. Hence, if 
Hasker’s argument is sound, middle knowledge does nothing to alleviate the 
alleged incoherence in God’s having foreknowledge of and providence over 
human free agency. 
2.1.2. From Robert Adams 
 A (much) less complicated version of the grounding objection to the theory 
of middle knowledge is presented by Robert Adams. In brief, Adams argues 
essentially that because there is nothing ontologically “there” to ground the 
truth of counterfactuals of freedom, they must then be all false. Or, since there 
exist no plausible metaphysical grounds that would bring about the truth of 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, none of them is true, and so none of 
them can do the theoretical work required by Molinism. Adams develops this 
argument as follows. 
 In the twenty-third chapter of the Biblical book of Samuel, we find David in 
the city of Keilah and King Saul with plans to besiege Keilah in order to 
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capture David. David having caught wind of Saul’s plans says to God, “O Lord 
God of Israel, Your servant has certainly heard that Saul seeks to come to 
Keilah to destroy the city for my sake. Will the men of Keilah deliver me into 
his hand? Will Saul come down, as Your servant has heard? O Lord God of 
Israel, I pray, tell Your servant” (1 Samuel 23:10-11). God responds to David’s 
latter question that Saul “will come down” (v. 11), and to David’s former 
question that men of Keilah “will deliver you” (v. 12). Adams remarks that this 
passage “was a favorite proof text for the Jesuit theologians,” and that they 
took it to prove that God knew the following two propositions to be true.25 
(1) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would besiege the city. 
(2) If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the men of Keilah 
would surrender David to Saul. 
 
Now if we grant that God is omniscient, Adams says, “we cannot consistently 
doubt that He had this middle knowledge unless we doubt that (1) and (2) 
were true.”26 So do we have any reason to doubt that (1) and (2) were true. 
Adams thinks we do. 
 Adams’ principle complaint against thinking that (1) and (2) – or any such 
counterfactual of creaturely freedom – are true, is that he simply does not 
understand what it would be for (1) and (2) to be true, “given that the actions in 
question would have been free, and that David did not stay in Keilah.” He 
explains his incomprehension as follows. 
 
25 Robert Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 14 (1977), 110. 
26 Adams 110. 
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To begin with, Adams says that we must first note that “middle knowledge 
is not simple foreknowledge.”27 That is, the answers that David receives from 
God obviously cannot be understood as categorical predictions. For if they 
were, they would be false. Indeed, Adams notes that most philosophers “have 
supposed that categorical predictions, even about contingent events, can be 
true by corresponding to the actual occurrence of the event that they 
predict.”28 But, of course, propositions (1) and (2) are not true in this way. 
There never was nor will there now ever be an actual besieging of Keilah by 
Saul, nor an actual betrayal of David to Saul by the men of Keilah, and so 
there will never be the actual occurrence of the events to which 
counterfactuals (1) and (2) might correspond. Hence if there are grounds for 
the truth of (1) and (2), they must come from elsewhere besides actual events 
in the actual world. 
 Other grounds that might be suggested for the truth of (1) and (2) appear to 
be “ruled out by the assumption that the actions of Saul and the men of Keilah 
are and would be free in the relevant sense.”29 For example, Adams argues 
that the suggestion that Saul’s besieging Keilah follows by logical necessity 
from David’s staying in Keilah is simply incredible. What would it mean to say 
that David’s remaining in Keilah logically entails that Saul then besieges the 
city? Adams thinks this makes very little sense. As another example, a more 
plausible sort of necessity, as Adams sees it, that might be used to link 
 
27 Adams 110. 
28 Adams 110. 
29 Adams 111. 
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David’s remaining in Keilah and Saul’s besieging Keilah, or David’s remaining 
with Saul’s besieging and the Keilahites delivering David, is causal necessity. 
However, although this sort of link would clearly ground the truth of either (1) 
or (2), such a link would be far too strong. Indeed, as Adam’s argues, such a 
suggestion appears straightforwardly inconsistent with the assumption that 
both Saul’s and the men of Keilah’s actions are free.30 Thus if logically 
necessitating grounds are nonsensical and causally necessitating grounds 
preclude genuine freedom, might there be nonnecessitating grounds for the 
truth of (1) and (2) that theoretically fair better? 
 Adams suggests that such nonnecessitating grounds for the truth of 
counterfactuals of freedom may be found “in the actual intentions, desires, and 
character of Saul and the Keilahites.”31 Adams notes that it does appear from 
the Biblical narrative that Saul actually intended to besiege the city if David 
remained, and so perhaps is (1) grounded in virtue of its correspondence with 
Saul’s intentions, desires, character, and so forth. And the same thing could 
be said for what grounds the truth of (2): this counterfactual is true in virtue of 
corresponding to the character, desires, intentions, and so forth of the men of 
Keilah.  
 But this suggestion simply will not do, according to Adams, “precisely 
because it is not necessitating.”32 As he correctly notes, a “free agent may act 
 
30 Adams 111. 
31 Adams 111. 
32 Adams 111. 
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out of character, or change his intentions, or fail to act on them.”33 Hence, the 
counterfactuals which may be true in virtue of corresponding to the 
psychological traits of Saul and the men of Keilah are not (1) and (2), but 
rather the following. 
(5) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would probably besiege the city. 
(6) If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the men of Keilah 
would probably surrender David to Saul. 
 
Now (5) and (6) are enough for David to prudently act on, as Adams says, but 
they are not counterfactuals of the sort that middle knowledge requires. For 
middle knowledge requires that God possess infallible counterfactual 
knowledge regarding what would definitely occur (call such counterfactuals 
would-definitely counterfactuals) were some free agent placed in some 
specified set of circumstances. It is not enough that God merely 
counterfactually know what would probably happen or what some free agent 
would probably do if placed in certain situations. Such would-probably 
counterfactual knowledge simply does not provide what middle knowledge 
requires. Middle knowledge needs true would-definitely counterfactuals, and 
this we do not have. 
 But now comes the point of Adams’ argument. If neither logical nor causal 
necessitation, nor psychological contingencies can plausibly link the 
antecedent and consequent in counterfactual conditionals such as (1) and (2), 
 
33 Adams 111.  
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then what can?34 Since Adams himself cannot comprehend what could, he 
simply cannot understand what it would be for would-definitely counterfactuals 
of freedom to be true. There is simply nothing there to ground their truth, and 
so, according to Adams, we have no reason to suppose that any are true. 
Hence the theory of middle knowledge should be abandoned. 
2.2. REPLIES 
2.2.1. From Luis de Molina 
 Replies to the grounding objection are not in short supply, and though 
Hasker’s version has its critics, for the most part the replies are directed at the 
version of the grounding objection articulated by Adams. That is, they are 
directed at the problem of specifying precisely what it is, if anything, that is 
ontologically “there” that can serve as the grounds for the truth of 
counterfactuals of freedom. And as this is perhaps the most significant 
stumbling block to a broader acceptance of middle knowledge among theists, 
it seems natural to begin with the reply of the founder of the theory itself: Luis 
de Molina. 
 Recall from the discussion of Molina’s development of middle knowledge in 
Chapter 1 that, as he views it, God via his natural knowledge thoroughly 
comprehends each possible entity with an “absolutely profound and absolutely 
preeminent comprehension.”35 The reason, recall, for this stipulation is that it 
 
34 In Chapter 4 when developing my own reply to the grounding objection, I will argue that, 
contra Adams, psychological contingencies can in fact plausibly link the antecedent and 
consequent of counterfactuals of freedom. 
35 Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, translated with 
introduction and notes by A. J. Freddoso (Ithaca: London, 1998) 171. 
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is intended to answer the question regarding how God knows what a free 
creature will freely and contingently do in some specified set of circumstances 
C. As Molina says, “in order to see which part a free being will turn itself 
toward, it is not sufficient that there be a comprehension of the being or even 
that there be a comprehension that is greater than is the thing 
comprehended.” Instead, as stated already, what is required is “an absolutely 
profound and absolutely preeminent comprehension, such as is found only in 
God with respect to creatures.”36 This theory of “absolutely profound and 
absolutely preeminent comprehension,” as Freddoso notes, subsequently 
came to be known in the Molinist literature as the theory of 
supercomprehension.37 Thus for Molina, that God supercomprehends some 
possible essence is sufficient to inform him of what that essence would freely 
do if actualized in C. And though on Molina’s view we are not told precisely 
what it is that grounds a counterfactual of creaturely freedom or what it is that 
makes a particular counterfactual of freedom true, we are told that such 
information is available to God via supercomprehension. 
 As Adams understands it, this response to the grounding problem is not at 
all satisfactory. For given that the theory is essentially that “God’s intellect so 
immensely surpasses, in its perfection, all created free wills, that it 
‘supercomprehends’ them,” it seems to follow, Adams says, that God 
“understands more about them than would be necessary merely to 
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comprehend them.”38 And such, he argues, is nonsense. Indeed, Adams 
approvingly refers to Francisco Suarez, a contemporary and critic of Molina, 
who argued in rejecting the theory of supercomprehension that “to 
comprehend something is already to understand about it everything that is 
there to be understood, and it is absurd to suppose that anyone, even God, 
could understand more than that.”39 So, for Adams, Molina seems to want to 
say that “what free creatures would do under various possible conditions is not 
there, objectively, to be known, but that God’s mind is so perfect that He 
knows it anyway. But this is impossible.” The problem that needs to be 
resolved, Adams argues, “is how the relevant subjunctive conditionals can be 
true, and nothing that may be said about the excellence of God’s cognitive 
powers contributes anything to the solution of that problem.”40 
But has Adams (and Suarez) misinterpreted Molina on this point? Alfred 
Freddoso thinks so, and argues against both Adams and Suarez that Molina 
“is not making the absurd claim that by His middle knowledge God knows 
something that is not there ‘objectively’ to be known.”41 The “states of affairs 
which God knows by His middle knowledge really obtain from eternity and the 
corresponding propositions are really true from eternity.” Instead, “Molina is 
claiming that what is ‘there’ to be known prevolitionally about future 
contingents can be known infallibly and with certitude only by a cognitively 
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79
perfect being.”42 Freddoso grants that this account is “arguably the weakest 
link in the Molinist chain,” but “it is not for that reason obviously untenable.”43 
Indeed, if “God is essentially omniscient, one has only to establish that 
conditional future contingents [i.e., contingent counterfactuals] obtain in order 
to show that God has comprehensive and infallible prevolitional knowledge of 
them.”44 This, as Freddoso sees it, renders the theory of supercomprehension 
“superfluous,” and thus he says it can safely be “swept under the rug;” it is just 
not needed.45 Arguably, then, not only have Adams and Suarez misinterpreted 
Molina regarding how the theory of supercomprehension should be 
understood, the theory is not required for middle knowledge in any case.  
 But perhaps Freddoso is giving Adams less credit than his argument 
deserves. For even if we grant that Adams has misinterpreted Molina, and that 
his theory of supercomprehension is superfluous and so not necessary to 
middle knowledge, one could still argue that nothing Freddoso has said (at 
least so far) addresses Adams’ central concern with respect to how “the 
relevant subjunctive conditionals can be true.”46 And nothing from either 
Molina or Freddoso (so far) provides us with any arguments about how we 
should handle that concern. In addition, as Adams correctly notes, “nothing 
that may be said about the excellence of God’s cognitive powers contributes 
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anything to the solution of that problem.”47 Hence, Molina’s theory is 
interesting regarding God’s “absolutely profound and absolutely preeminent 
comprehension” of free creatures as a means by which God comes to know 
the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom that regard them. But in the end 
it must also be seen as impotent as a response to the grounding objection. 
Talk about what God knows or comprehends requires that there is something 
there to know or comprehend. And the bare assertion that something is there 
is not anything like an argument that there is. Hence even if the proper 
interpretation of Molina is that there is something there objectively speaking for 
God to supercomprehend, Adams and others skeptical of Molinism will want 
an account of what exactly that is. Thus, as a reply to the grounding objection, 
Molina’s explanation is unsatisfying. And so a satisfactory response to the 
grounding objection must be sought elsewhere.    
2.2.2. From Francisco Suarez 
 As mentioned already, Francisco Suarez was a contemporary of Molina. 
And though he was a critic of Molina’s theory of supercomprehension, he was 
an advocate of Molina’s theory of middle knowledge. According to Robert 
Adams, in explaining the grounds for counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, 
Suarez’s response seems to be the “least clearly unsatisfactory type of 
explanation for the alleged possibility of middle knowledge.”48 For in 
responding to the grounding problem Suarez “appeals, in effect, to a primitive 
understanding, which needs no analysis, of what it is for the relevant 
 
47 Adams 111.  
48 Adams 111. 
81
subjunctive conditionals to be true.”49 For example, consider a possible free 
creature c (who may in fact never exist) and a possible free action a, which c
may freely perform or refrain from performing in situation s. As Suarez sees it, 
“c has a property … which is either the property of being a possible agent who 
would in s freely do a, or the property of being a possible agent who would in s
refrain from doing a.” Thus, for Suarez, God has middle knowledge regarding 
c in s because God knows whether c has the property of in s doing a, or in s
refraining from doing a. Not surprisingly this sort of property is had for any 
possible agent regarding any possible situation in which that agent might find 
herself. Thus Suarez’s reply to the grounding objection amounts to saying that 
either the agent has the property of performing an action in some specified 
situation, or the agent does not. And the agent’s possession of, or lack of, that 
property is ontologically primitive, such that there is no explanation available 
as to why the agent either has or lacks the property in question. 
 Now the reason Adams says above that this explanation by Suarez is the 
“least clearly unsatisfactory type of explanation for the alleged possibility of 
middle knowledge” is not because Adams thinks that Suarez’s explanation is 
particularly satisfying. Rather, his reason for saying as much is that “it is very 
difficult to refute someone who claims to have a primitive understanding which 
I seem not to have.”50 In other words, Adams confesses that with regard to the 
idea of our having primitive properties regarding actions we would or would not 
perform in counterfactual situations is simply not something that Adams can 
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seriously consider. As he says, “I do not think I have any conception, primitive 
or otherwise, of the sort of … property that Suarez ascribes to possible agents 
with respect to their acts under possible conditions. Nor do I think that I have 
any other primitive understanding of what it would be for the relevant 
subjunctive conditionals to be true.”51 And with Adams I agree. Suarez’s view 
would, of course, answer the question as to what the grounds are for the truth-
values of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Such counterfactuals are true 
because free creature c bears (or more exactly the essence of c includes) a 
property of doing this or that in some situation s. This is enough to bring about 
the truth or falsity of a particular counterfactual of freedom regarding c in s.
However, naturally the next question to ask is why precisely it is that c bears 
the property p of performing action a in s, or the property p* (say) of refraining 
from a in s. Why is it the case that one property is included in a creature’s 
essence rather than another, a fortiori when such properties regard actions 
that are supposed to be contingent?
Now presumably Suarez would consider this an unfair question, reiterating 
that on his account it is simply primitive whether the essence of c includes p or 
p* instead. Thus, given that account, it is simply not legitimate to ask for an 
explanation of a phenomenon that is primitive. But quite arguably this 
response is inappropriate given that what Suarez says is primitive is also 
construed as contingent. If it truly is a contingent matter that there are primitive 
properties included in our individual essences that ground counterfactuals of 
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freedom, it looks entirely reasonable to ask for an explanation for why one 
contingent property over another is essential to us. But aside from this, 
normally essential properties are construed as properties that are themselves 
necessary, rather than contingent. Hence, on Suarez’s view, even though a 
primitive property in our essence would ground the truth of a counterfactual of 
freedom, it is difficult to understand how that counterfactual could in fact 
remain a counterfactual of libertarian freedom. For the necessity of the 
primitive property would render necessary the truth of the counterfactual, in 
which case the agent in question does not enjoy the ability to do otherwise, 
and so does not enjoy freedom of a libertarian sort. But middle knowledge is 
purported to be a theory reconciling foreknowledge, providence, and a 
libertarian conception of freedom – in the sense that our actions are contingent 
and we enjoy the ability to do otherwise – and so it is difficult to see how 
Suarez’s reply answers the grounding objection in terms that are compatible 
with the theory his reply is intended to defend. 
 In short, then, c either having p or having p* would indeed explain why a 
certain counterfactual about c in s is true or false, but it would not explain why 
the essence of c either contingently includes p or contingently includes p*.
Moreover, if either p or p* is not contingent but necessary instead, then what 
needs explaining is how counterfactuals of freedom that are necessarily true 
could also be counterfactuals of libertarian freedom. Hence either way, more is 
needed from Suarez by way of explaining how counterfactuals of freedom 
could be true besides saying that the grounds for such counterfactuals are 
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primitive. This response, arguably, avoids giving an explanation where an 
explanation appears evidently required. Thus, though Suarez’s reply does 
provide an explanation (of sorts) for the truth of counterfactuals of freedom, it 
is not an explanation that genuinely explains what the grounding objector 
legitimately wants explained. Hence, we should look elsewhere for a 
satisfactory reply to the grounding objection. 
2.2.3. From Alvin Plantinga 
 Alvin Plantinga has directly responded to the argument from Robert Adams 
that middle knowledge is implausible given that counterfactuals of freedom, 
because ungrounded, are not true. Plantinga understands Adams to be saying 
not that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom “all just happen to be false,” but 
rather that they are “necessarily false.”52 And this appears quite odd to 
Plantinga since we so often pretheoretically believe that counterfactuals of 
freedom are true. For example, says Plantinga, if “Bob Adams were to offer to 
take me climbing at Tahquitz Rock the next time I come to California, I would 
gladly (and freely) accept.”53 This is a counterfactual that Plantinga believes is 
clearly true, hence what “is the reason for thinking,” he asks, that “we are 
always, on those occasions, mistaken, that we believe what couldn’t possibly 
be true?”54 As Plantinga paraphrases Adams, the reason is that “there seems 
to be no ground or basis for the truth of such counterfactuals; there seems to 
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be nothing … that makes or causes them to be true.”55 So suppose, Plantinga 
says, that we claim that “if Curley had been offered a bribe of $35,000, he 
would have (freely) accepted it.”56 Given that the acceptance of the offer is 
free, “the antecedent neither entails nor causally necessitates the conclusion. 
It is both logically and causally possible that the antecedent be true and the 
consequent false.”57 Adams’ objection, then, posed as a question, is to ask 
exactly what it is that “makes this counterfactual true?”58 
To answer this question properly, says Plantinga, “we should have to 
investigate the implied suggestion that if a proposition is true, then something 
grounds its truth, or causes it to be true, or makes it true.”59 And, Plantinga 
inquires, what kind of thing should we think of performing this kind of role? For 
example, he asks, what grounds the truth of the proposition “this piece of chalk 
is three inches long?”60 The answer to this question, Plantinga thinks, is not at 
all clear. Indeed, he states it seems “much clearer that at least some 
counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than that the truth of 
counterfactuals must be grounded in this way.”61 But setting this intuition aside 
for the moment, Plantinga says suppose we concede, for the purposes of 
argument, that propositions must be grounded in the very way that Adams 
appears to be suggesting. Suppose in fact, he asks us, that yesterday he 
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performed some action A. In that case, what was it or is it that grounded his 
doing so? Plantinga says “I wasn’t caused to do so by anything else; nothing 
relevant entails that I did so. So what grounds the truth of the proposition in 
question.”62 
Perhaps someone will say that what grounds the truth of ‘Plantinga did A’, 
or what makes the proposition that he did so true, is just the simple fact that he 
did A. If this is the response, however, Planting thinks “this isn’t much of an 
answer;” moreover “at any rate the same kind of answer is available in the 
case of Curley.” What grounds the truth of the counterfactual regarding 
Curley’s acceptance of the bribe, Plantinga says, “is just that in fact Curley is 
such that if he had been offered a $35,000 bribe, he would have freely taken 
it.”63 The point, then, is that nearly any grounding objector, and certainly 
Robert Adams, would grant that the proposition ‘Plantinga did A’ is true if 
indeed Plantinga did A. But if such a proposition is true, then according to the 
criteria of the grounding objector the proposition is true only if it is made true or 
grounded by one sort of thing or other. Regarding propositions about the past, 
what would that be? Thus, if it is credible to think that propositions about the 
past are true and so grounded, even though it is not clear what those grounds 
are, why is it not also credible to think that propositions regarding 
counterfactual situations involving free creatures, that may or may not ever 
obtain, are true and grounded as well? In short, if propositions involving free 
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actions about the past can be grounded, Plantinga sees no reason why 
counterfactuals involving freedom cannot be grounded too. 
 As another defense of the possibility that counterfactuals of freedom are 
true, Plantinga considers apparently true counterfactuals regarding divine 
freedom. For example, he says it is highly plausible to suppose that “if Adam 
and Eve had not sinned, God would not have punished them; if they had not 
sinned he would have freely refrained from driving them out of the garden.”64 
And though none of us knows for sure that this counterfactual is true, 
Plantinga concedes, surely at the very least “it is possible that it’s true.”65 
Hence, given this simple example, there seem to be true (or at least possibly 
true) counterfactuals of freedom with regard to God. And if so, Plantinga asks, 
“what would ground the truth of such a counterfactual of freedom?”66 Nothing 
obvious presents itself, so far as Plantinga can tell. Thus he concludes that “if 
counterfactuals about God can be true even if their antecedents neither entail 
nor causally necessitate their consequents, why can’t the same be true for 
similar counterfactuals about other persons?”67 Hence Plantinga finds Adams’ 
argument against thinking there could be true counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom “inconclusive.” 
 By way of critique, it is important to see that Plantinga has made three 
arguments against Adams. First, he has argued that it is simply more intuitive 
to think that counterfactuals of freedom are possibly true than that they must 
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be grounded in the manner that Adams’ requires. Second, he has argued that 
it is not incredible to think that if propositions involving free actions about the 
past can be true and grounded, then counterfactuals involving freedom can be 
true and grounded too. And third, he has argued that given that there are true 
(or at least possibly true) counterfactuals that are true regarding divine 
freedom, why not in addition think that there are true counterfactuals regarding 
creaturely freedom. Let me say something by way of response about each. 
 With regard to Plantinga’s first claim – that the truth counterfactuals is more 
credible than the requirement that they be grounded as Adams’ suggests – 
Thomas Flint appears correctly to comment that “few Molinists would feel 
comfortable responding to the ‘grounding’ objection with nothing more than a 
plea of Socratic ignorance.”68 Flint argues that the suggestions that 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are “true for reasons, and that those 
reasons ultimately have something to do with the causal activities of free 
creatures, seem both clear enough and plausible enough for Molinists to feel 
uneasy about straightforwardly denying them.”69 Indeed this is why, Flint 
concedes, Plantinga proceeds to make the second argument that he does. 
 Regarding this second argument – that if past-tensed propositions of 
freedom can be true and grounded there seems to be no reason for denying 
grounds and truth to counterfactuals of freedom – it seems to be open to the 
following reply. A grounding objector such as Adams, Flint comments, “might 
point out that, though the claim that Plantinga did A is grounded in Plantinga’s 
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actual activity yesterday, no such activity on Curley’s part sufficiently grounds 
the truth of that counterfactual about him.”70 Hence the fact that the former 
state of affairs actually obtained, it can thus arguably serve as grounds for the 
past-tensed proposition of freedom ‘Plantinga did A’. The latter state of affairs 
regarding Curley, however, did not obtain, and it may not ever obtain. Hence, 
because propositions about the past plausibly have grounds should provide us 
with little confidence that propositions about Curley’s counterfactual activity 
can have grounds. The two situations are simply too different. Thus, the 
appeal to the similarity between our inability to specify grounds regarding 
obvious truths about the past and the grounds regarding possible truths about 
counterfactual states of affairs should give us no confidence in thinking that 
because the former are true, so can be the latter. But what about Plantinga’s 
third argument? 
 With respect to Plantinga’s third argument – that since there are true 
counterfactuals of freedom regarding God, we have no reason to deny that 
there could be true counterfactuals regarding other persons as well – I agree 
with Timothy O’Connor that some of the “remarks from Hasker point the way 
towards a proper response to Plantinga’s suggestion.”71 In reply to Plantinga’s 
question regarding what would ground the truth of counterfactuals of freedom 
about God, Hasker says the answer “is obvious.”72 The truth of counterfactuals 
regarding divine freedom are “grounded in God’s conditional intention to act in 
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a certain way.” Humans, however, for the most part “have no such conditional 
intentions about choices they might be called upon to make – or, when they do 
have them, the intentions at best ground ‘would probably’ counterfactuals.”73 
Taking this cue from Hasker, O’Connor comments that if “God really does 
know with absolute certainty precisely how he would respond if certain 
circumstances were to obtain,” this is because such knowledge “is grounded in 
(a) his fixed, detailed, conditional intentions to act in certain ways, and (b) his 
knowledge that he cannot waver in his purposes.”74 However, as O’Connor 
correctly argues, that this could be so does nothing to show that God “can 
have knowledge of human free actions under counterfactual circumstances,” 
given that for such actions there simply “are no analogues of (a) and (b).”75 In 
addition, O’Connor notes that “to whatever extent it may be the case that 
humans develop at least some highly stable fixed intentions, this is a feature of 
their character which develops over time.” And in that case, “God could not 
know prevolitionally what choices would be made in the early stages of a free 
creature’s life which would contribute to the development of such intentions, 
and so he also could not know the resulting character of the intentions 
themselves.”76 
Thus, the response to Plantinga’s third argument is simply that any grounds 
available for grounding the truth of counterfactuals of divine freedom are not 
also available for grounding counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. With God 
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there exists a stable, fixed character out of which arguably the truth of 
counterfactuals might flow. Hence, given God’s goodness and justice, there is 
excellent reason for thinking that God would not have punished Adam and Eve 
for committing the crime of eating the forbidden fruit if they did not in fact eat 
the fruit. Indeed the whole point of Adams’ argument against thinking that 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom could be grounded in the psychological 
states of the agent was that agents may (and in fact sometimes do) act out of 
character. If God cannot, then it is not incredible to think, as Hasker does, that 
God’s conditional intentions ground conditionals of freedom regarding what 
God would or would not counterfactually do. So Plantinga’s argument that 
because true counterfactuals of divine freedom exist, we have reason to affirm 
that true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom exist is questionable. 
 We have seen, then, three arguments from Plantinga as a reply to Adams’ 
version of the grounding objection. We have also seen that arguably all three 
arguments are wanting for one reason or another. Hence, arguably a 
satisfactory response to the grounding objection needs to be sought 
elsewhere.  
2.2.4. From Alfred Freddoso 
 Despite the problems with Plantinga’s proposals for resolving the grounding 
problem, there are those who think his second argument above is a step in the 
right direction. Alfred Freddoso is one such individual, and he develops his 
own proposal for resolving the grounding problem in the following way. 
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Freddoso characterizes Adams’ objection to middle knowledge as “that a 
proposition p is true only if there are what we might call adequate 
metaphysical grounds for the truth of p.” In addition “there are not and indeed 
cannot be adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of the alleged objects 
of middle knowledge [i.e., counterfactuals of freedom, or ‘conditional future 
contingents,’ as Freddoso calls them] – at least not if a strong libertarian 
account of freedom and causal indeterminism is correct.”77 Hence, Freddoso 
refers to Adams as thus endorsing “antirealism with respect to conditional 
future contingents.”78 Freddoso agrees with Plantinga that Adams’ 
requirement of “adequate metaphysical grounds” is not completely clear, but 
given that the grounding objection appears to many to have considerable 
intuitive appeal, he concedes that “the fundamental notion underlying the 
objection has at least some validity.”79 
In articulating his own response to the grounding objection, Freddoso 
thinks we must first “draw a basic distinction between the grounds for the truth 
of metaphysically necessary propositions and the grounds for the truth of 
metaphysically contingent propositions.”80 The former, he says, “presumably 
involve just the constant and necessary relations of natures or properties to 
each other.”81 However, Freddoso argues, such grounds are positively 
inappropriate to underwrite the truth of propositions that are metaphysically 
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contingent, as there are no necessary relations of natures or properties that 
underwrite the truth of such propositions. Grounds for contingent propositions, 
Freddoso argues, “require causal grounding in order to be true,” by which he 
means that the propositions “must be caused to be true by some agent or 
agents, since it is not of their nature to be true.”82 So what sort of account in 
terms of causal grounds might do the job? 
 As Freddoso sees it, the most promising account for the Molinist is one that 
builds “upon the arguments against antirealism regarding the absolute 
future.”83 And by the “absolute future” Freddoso simply means the future that 
may be described by propositions that are not expressed conditionally as are 
counterfactuals. To use one of Freddoso’s examples, take the proposition 
‘Peter will freely sin at time T’. This proposition does not say that given certain 
conditions Peter will freely sin at T, or that on the hypothesis that certain 
circumstances obtain Peter will sin freely at T, it simply states that at T Peter 
will freely sin. Now, Freddoso notes, the antirealist regarding the absolute 
future will deny that ‘Peter will freely sin at T’ is true before Peter sins at T 
even if it turns out that at T Peter freely sins. And they would “support their 
antirealism regarding absolute future contingents with arguments exactly like 
the one Adams produces for the case of conditional future contingents.”84 
Specifically, the antirealist can argue, as does Adams, that the causal history 
of the world up to the present certainly does not logically entail Peter’s sinning 
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at T, and given a libertarian conception of freedom to which the Molinist is 
committed, it does not causally necessitate Peter’s sinning at T either. So, the 
antirealist regarding absolute future contingents concludes, analogous to 
Adams regarding conditional future contingents, that “there are not and cannot 
be adequate metaphysical grounds at present for the truth of the absolute 
future contingent Peter will sin at T.”85 
Now, as stated already, Freddoso thinks that the best reply to the 
grounding objection is analogous to the reply against the antirealist regarding 
absolute future contingents. So how precisely does such a reply proceed? 
Freddoso thinks in this way.  
 Suppose that the Apostle John has regrettably reported beforehand that 
Peter will deny Christ at time T. In that case, says Freddoso, “after Peter’s 
denial at T, John can reasonably maintain that his prediction we true and thus 
that he spoke the truth before T when he asserted the proposition Peter will 
deny Jesus.” Hence, argues Freddoso, “it is reasonable to hold that this 
proposition was true before T.”86 To put the point differently, Freddoso asks us 
to suppose that a prediction is made that the next toss of a fair coin will come 
up heads. Suppose further that the coin’s coming up one way or the other is 
causally indeterminate, even to the extent that prior to the toss the world is not 
even nondeterminstically tending towards the coin either coming up heads or 
coming up tails. Suppose finally that when the coin is tossed, it comes up 
heads. Given that outcome, Freddoso argues, “it is perfectly reasonable for 
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me to claim that my prediction was true, that is, that I spoke the truth in 
asserting beforehand the proposition The coin will come up heads,” and so “it 
is reasonable for me to maintain that this proposition was true before you 
tossed the coin.”87 Hence, as Freddoso sees it, there seem to be absolute 
future contingents that are true. But if there are such true contingent 
propositions, what are the metaphysical grounds for their truth?  
 Freddoso thinks, as does Plantinga, that the same question can be raised 
regarding the truth of contingently true propositions about the past. For 
example, asks Freddoso, what “are the grounds for the present truth of, say, 
the proposition Socrates drank hemlock?”88 Toward answering this question, 
let p stand for present-tense propositions and P for the past-tense 
propositional operator. “The proper response,” then, to the question posed, 
says Freddoso, “is that there are now adequate metaphysical grounds for the 
truth of a past-tensed proposition Pp just in case there were at some past time 
adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of the present-tense counterpart 
p.”89 In analogous fashion to absolute future contingents, Freddoso argues, 
letting F stand for the future-tense propositional operator, the “realist about the 
absolute future will claim that there are now adequate metaphysical grounds 
for the truth of a future-tense proposition Fp just in case there will be at some 
future time adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of its present-tense 
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counterpart p.”90 In short, then, Freddoso is arguing that presently true 
propositions about the past are adequately grounded in virtue of the fact that 
there were at some past time adequate metaphysical grounds for their truth. 
Likewise, propositions about the future can be both true now and adequately 
grounded so long as there will be at some future time adequate metaphysical 
grounds for their truth. According to Freddoso, then, absolute future 
contingents can be both grounded and true, contrary to the claims of the 
antirealist about the absolute future. 
 If the above analysis is correct, then by extension Freddoso says “it seems 
reasonable to claim that there are now adequate metaphysical grounds for the 
truth of a conditional future contingent Ft(p) on H just in case there would be 
adequate metaphysical grounds at t for the truth of the present-tense 
proposition p on the condition that H should obtain at t.”91 To better see this, 
return to John’s prediction about Peter. Instead of John predicting that Peter 
will deny Jesus, he might just as easily have predicted instead that If Peter 
were tempted to deny Jesus anytime soon, he would succumb. Not 
surprisingly, Freddoso says “after Peter’s denial John may reasonably 
maintain that what he had asserted was true.”92 And the same point could be 
made regarding the coin-tossing illustration. Instead of absolutely predicting 
that The coin will come up heads, had Freddoso instead conditionally 
predicted that If you were to toss the coin, it would come up heads, then in the 
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event that you toss the coin and it comes up heads he thinks it is entirely 
reasonable to say that his prediction was true. 
 So, in summary, Freddoso has developed an account of adequate 
metaphysical grounds along the theoretical lines hinted at above in Plantinga’s 
reply to the grounding objection. Simply put, as Freddoso sees it, analogous to 
past-tense propositions, future-contingent propositions and counterfactuals of 
freedom can now be true and adequately grounded so long as there will be or 
would be, respectively, adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of those 
proposition’s present-tense counterparts. Thus, for Freddoso, the grounding 
objection falls flat. 
 Despite this “ingeniously suggested”93 account from Freddoso, the account 
nonetheless has its critics. One such critic is Timothy O’Connor. O’Connor 
begins his critique by noting that Freddoso claims “that there are now grounds 
for the truth of a future-tense contingent proposition p just in case” the 
following proposition is true. 
(15) there will be adequate grounds for the present-tense counterpart of p 
at some future time t. 
 
So in other words, “there are grounds for p just in case (15) is (now) true.”94 
But according to Freddoso, “all true propositions have grounds, even future-
contingent ones.” Hence, O’Connor says Freddoso is committed to  
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(18) (15) has grounds iff the present-tense counterpart of (15) will have 
grounds at some future time t. 
 
O’Connor states that it “should be clear to the reader by now that we are off on 
an infinite regress.”95 In addition, it should clear that the regress is not 
“harmless” since it has the form “α has grounds iff β has grounds, but β has 
grounds iff γ has grounds, …” But if “a ground is [genuinely] to be a ground, 
then all conditions for its being so must be satisfied,” and “this will not be the 
case where any condition c of the putative ground is such that every condition 
on it must satisfy some further condition.” Hence, because at “no point in the 
process is some element independently grounded by the state of the world,” 
O’Connor concludes that Freddoso’s account unintentionally “implies that no 
future-tense contingent propositions have grounds.”96 Thus Freddoso’s 
account of the grounds for the truth of future-contingent propositions has little 
to recommend it. 
 Against O’Connor, however, Eef Dekker argues that O’Connor’s critique 
misses the mark in that “what O’Connor sees as an infinite regress is in fact an 
account of the very nature of a future contingent proposition.”97 To see this 
more clearly, Dekker says “we must explicate the time indices used in the 
various propositions.”98 That is, before concluding that Freddoso’s account 
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comprises a regress, we must consider the actual dates involved in future-
contingent propositions. So recall, says Dekker, that Freddoso’s definition for 
what it was for a future-contingent proposition to now have adequate 
metaphysical grounds is: 
(FG) … an absolute contingent proposition Fp has grounds just if there will 
be adequate metaphysical grounds at some future time for the truth of 
its present-tense counterpart p.99 
Now for the sake of argument, take the F in Fp to refer to January 1st 2009. In 
that case, Dekker says, the following is now true. 
(FG*) Fp has grounds now (i.e. before January 1st 2009) just if at January 
1st 2009 there will be grounds for p.
That is, p is now grounded if there will be grounds for p on January 1st 2009. 
And if so, (FG*) itself has grounds just if the present-tense counterpart of 
(FG*) will have grounds at January 1st 2009. In other words, “just if ‘Fp has 
grounds now just if at January 1st 2009 there are grounds for p’ will have 
grounds at January 1st 2009.”100 Thus, as Dekker stresses, it is clear that the 
truth of Fp hinges on one date – January 1st 2009 – and that the truth of the 
proposition “will be settled at January 1st 2009, or, as the case may be, p may 
turn out to be false at that date.” So it is “no wonder that that very date is 
responsible for the proposition to turn out true or false, no matter how many 
‘just ifs’ we put in the grounding chain.” Hence, Dekker concludes, the infinite 
regress espoused by O’Connor, “if there is any, is harmless” after all.101 
99 Dekker 47. 
100 Dekker 48. 
101 Dekker 48. 
100
But clever as Dekker’s reply to O’Connor may be, I do not think that 
Freddoso’s account has been adequately defended. The reason is that 
because the truth of p will be settled January 1st 2009, it hardly follows that the 
truth of p is settled now.102 Dekker, of course, means to assure us that it does, 
but the bare assertion that “Fp has grounds before January 1st 2009 just in 
case at January 1st 2009 there will be grounds for p” does little if anything to 
assure the grounding objector that there are now adequate metaphysical 
grounds for Fp. No doubt Dekker is correct in saying that when January 1st 
2009 obtains the truth or falsity of Fp will be settled, but I do not see that he 
has given us any reason to think that the matter is at present settled. For what 
is there at present, on Dekker’s view, that is ontologically “there” that can 
plausibly serve as the grounds for Fp? The response seems to be the fact that 
January 1st 2009 will obtain and the world will either be as Fp describes or it 
will not. But this response is hardly satisfying. For why is it true now that the 
world will be (or not be) as Fp describes on January 1st 2009? Responding 
simply that because things will be (or will not be) as Fp describes – as 
Freddoso and Dekker seem to do – does not appear adequate.  
 Hence, I think O’Connor is correct is saying that Freddoso’s account 
generates a regress and unintentionally suggests that no future-tense 
contingent propositions have grounds. Dekker defends Freddoso by arguing 
that Because the future will be (or not be) the way future-tense contingent 
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propositions say, the regress in Freddoso’s account is “harmless.” But, of 
course, that response arguably is only as credible as is the claim that Because 
there will be at some future time grounds for the truth or falsity of future-tense 
contingent propositions, there are now grounds at this time for the truth or 
falsity of such propositions. For my part, the latter claim has no intuitive 
appeal, and thus neither does Dekker’s defense. Thus, the analogy between 
absolute future contingent propositions and conditional future contingent 
propositions that Freddoso employs in his argument appears flawed. So, given 
Freddoso’s arguments, we do not have good grounds for thinking that 
conditional future contingents are true and grounded in the same way that 
absolute future contingent propositions are. And the primary reason is that we 
have not been given good reasons for thinking that absolute future contingent 
propositions are grounded in the first place. Thus, a satisfactory response to 
the grounding objection needs to be sought elsewhere. 
2.2.5. From Calvin Normore  
 Calvin Normore believes that the doctrine of “scientia media” (middle 
knowledge) is the “most ingenious attempt” to reconcile the problem of 
foreknowledge, providence, and human freedom, but he is unimpressed with 
Molina’s and Suarez’s attempt to ground God’s middle knowledge in 
supercomprehension or some sort of primitive property that persons exemplify. 
Instead, his own attempt to make sense of the grounding problem is briefly 
stated as follows.  
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Imagine that Gods’ mind contains a perfect model of each 
possible thing – a complete divine idea of a particular or, if you 
like, an individual concept. Imagine that God simulates possible 
histories by thinking about how the being which is A would 
behave under circumstances C – i.e. he simulates C and ‘sees’ 
how A behaves. Now if there is a way in which A would behave 
in C, a perfect model should reflect it, so if conditional excluded 
middle is valid such a model is possible and God knows the 
history of the world by knowing that model, i.e. by knowing his 
own intellect and his creative intentions.103 
According to Normore, then, on the assumption that the logical principle of 
conditional excluded middle (CEM) is valid – a principle which states that for 
any conditional proposition either If P, then Q is true, or If P, then ~Q is true – 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are thus true. The reason is that, given 
CEM, either the counterfactual of freedom If S were in C, then S would do A or 
If S were in C, then it is not the case that S would do A is true. And given that 
one or the other is true, there is little (if any) reason to think that God would not 
know its truth. Hence, as Normore argues, God knows the truth-values of 
counterfactuals of freedom given CEM, and so given CEM God has middle 
knowledge.  
 The strength of this reply, however, obviously depends on the validity of 
CEM. If CEM is a valid logical principle, arguably that is sufficient to conclude, 
as Normore does, that God (if he exists) has middle knowledge. However, 
even if CEM were valid it clearly would not resolve all concerns regarding the 
theory of middle knowledge. For example, the question would remain as to 
why it is that the affirmation of a counterfactual’s consequent is true rather 
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than the negation – or vice versa. Granted, though, if CEM is valid, then one of 
the counterfactuals If S were in C, then S would do A or If S were in C, then it 
is not the case that S would do A is true, even if we cannot say why. So much 
depends on the principle of conditional excluded middle. Is it valid? Perhaps 
not. 
 Linda Zagzebski argues that CEM is false because there are 
counterexamples to CEM that are more intuitive than is the principle itself. For 
example, she says, consider the following counterfactual of freedom. 
(4) If I lived my life the way I have up to now (May 1988), I would be living 
in Chicago in 1999. 
 
Zagzebski argues “that (4) is false.”104 And the reason (4) is false has to do 
with the nature of contradiction according to counterfactual logic. On 
counterfactual logic the contradiction of the counterfactual If S were in C, S 
would do A is not If S were in C, it is not the case that S would do A. Rather 
the contradiction of If S were in C, S would do A is If S were in C, S might not 
do A, where the ‘might’ in question is not merely an epistemological possibility, 
but is instead a genuine metaphysical or objective possibility; that is, the 
probability of S performing A were C to occur is less than 1. Similarly for If S 
were in C, it is not the case that S would do A. The contradiction of that 
counterfactual is If S were in C, S might do A, where again the ‘might’ is 
objective or metaphysical. Thus what we might call might-counterfactuals 
function as the contradictions of would-counterfactuals. This means that the 
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contradiction of (4) above is If I lived my life the way I have up to now (May 
1988), I might not be living in Chicago in 1999 rather than If I lived my life the 
way I have up to now (May 1988), it is not the case that I would be living in 
Chicago in 1999.
With that background, then, the reason “that (4) is false,” says Zagzebski, 
is because “(4) is equivalent to the following.”  
(5) ~ (If I lived my life the way I have up to now (May 1988), I might not be 
living in Chicago in 1999.) 
 
“But (5) is surely false,” Zagzebski argues.105 And (5) is surely false because 
the following two might-counterfactuals are surely true instead. 
(6) If I lived my life the way I have up to now (May 1988), I might be living 
in Chicago in 1999. 
(7) If I lived my life the way I have up to now (May 1988), I might not be 
living in Chicago in 1999. 
 
Zagzebski believes that it is simply more intuitive to think that both (6) and (7) 
are true, rather than that (4) and (5) are true. And this means that CEM is 
invalid, since the truth of both might-counterfactuals regarding Zagzebski’s 
place of residence in 1999 precludes either would-counterfactual regarding her 
place of residence in 1999 from being true. But since the truth of a would-
counterfactual is just what CEM requires, according to Zagzebski, given the 
strong intuitive appeal of thinking that both (6) and (7) are true, we have better 
reasons than not for thinking that CEM is invalid.  
 To illustrate the point with a different example, consider the events of the 
film It’s a Wonderful Life. In the film George Bailey receives from God the 
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“great” gift of being able to see how the world – and primarily the lives of those 
he loves – would have turned out were he never to have existed. Obviously 
this information regards the obtaining of counterfactual states of affairs, and so 
in addition includes many true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. One 
such counterfactual is that Mary, George’s wife in the actual world (W), is both 
unmarried and a librarian in the counterfactual world (W*) he is privileged to 
see. Hence in that case, the following counterfactual is true. 
(8) If W* were to obtain, Mary would be both unmarried and a librarian. 
 
However, if (8) is true, then so is (9). 
 
(9) ~ (If W* were to obtain, Mary might not have been both unmarried and 
a librarian.)  
 
But surely (8) and (9) are together less intuitive than the suggestion that both 
of the following two might-counterfactuals are true. 
(10) If W* were to obtain, Mary might have been both unmarried and a 
librarian. 
(11) If W* were to obtain, Mary might not have been both unmarried and a 
librarian. 
 
And the reason is that, on the one hand, it is arguably more intuitive than not 
to think that the probability is less than 1 that Mary would be both unmarried 
and a librarian in the event that George never existed. On the other hand, 
arguably it is also more intuitive to think that there is a genuine objective or 
metaphysical possibility that Mary might have been both married and librarian 
in the event that George never existed, rather than that she definitely would 
have been both unmarried and a librarian. Hence, since both might-
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counterfactuals appear more credible than either would-counterfactual, CEM 
appears invalid. 
 Of course, however, if CEM is invalid, then Normore’s suggestion that God 
can “simulate possible histories by thinking about how the being which is A 
would behave under circumstances C” is unfounded. For that ability requires 
the truth of counterfactuals of freedom, which Normore correctly argued CEM 
is in principle capable of providing. But because CEM is invalid, it gives us no 
reason to think that counterfactuals of freedom are true. And so Normore’s 
defense of middle knowledge is inadequate. 
 Perhaps, however, the Molinist might argue that on this point Zagzebski is 
wrong, and consequently that CEM is valid after all. The committed Molinst 
might defend CEM in the same manner that Zagzebski defeats it, by arguing 
that it is more intuitive to think that either If S were in C, then S would do A or 
If S were in C, it is not the case that S would do A is true, rather than that both 
If S were in C, then S might do A and If S were in C, S might not do A are true. 
If the Molinst were to insist on this point, there is always recourse to 
developing hopefully even more intuitively appealing illustrations than those 
given above, but even in those cases the logical space is always there (though 
perhaps not always plausibly there) for the Molinist to argue that either would-
counterfactual is more intuitive than both might-counterfactuals. And were the 
Molinist to do so, a different kind of argument would be required to show that 
middle knowledge is implausible. 
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Timothy O’Connor provides such an argument. His argument against 
Normore’s defense of middle knowledge is one that does not rely upon CEM. 
O’Connor states that Normore’s picture “suggests that God’s intellect may 
construct a ‘test run’ which will necessarily result in the action characterized in 
the consequent” of the true counterfactual of freedom.106 Now to “suppose that 
this simulated world corresponds to how free agents would act – as a matter of 
brute fact – if God had brought about such a world is to suppose that there is 
something about the essence of all created entities (free agents included) 
such that they will inevitably act in a certain manner under certain 
circumstances.” But what reason, O’Connor asks, “do we have to believe that 
the essence of A will act in the same way in every circumstance when 
instantiated in a concrete world as it does when ‘instantiated’ in the ideal 
world, existing only in God’s mind?” O’Connor answers, “I can think of only 
one – if the agent in question is not truly undetermined in choosing a course of 
action, and hence not truly free.”107 
To put this argument in slightly different words, according to the theory of 
middle knowledge the counterfactuals of freedom that are true are would-
definitely counterfactuals, rather than would-probably counterfactuals or 
would-possibly counterfactuals (i.e., might-counterfactuals). This means that 
were the antecedent of the counterfactual to obtain, the consequent would 
definitely follow as well. So if the counterfactual If S were in C, then S would 
do A is true, then in the event that S were to find herself in C, she definitely 
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would then do A, rather than probably doing A, or possibly doing otherwise 
than A. Now the problem O’Connor is bringing to the fore is the question of 
what is it that conceivably links antecedent and consequent in true would-
definitely counterfactuals of freedom. As Robert Adams and others have 
noted, character and psychological traits conceivably do the job only for 
would-probably counterfactuals, but such traits could hardly do the job for 
would-definitely counterfactuals since one may choose to act out of character. 
In addition the link cannot be logical, as it is mysterious in any case what it 
would mean to say that the antecedent logically entails the consequent in a 
true counterfactual of freedom. Lastly it cannot be causal, as arguably that 
would preclude the action contained in the consequent from being performed 
freely. So why does the consequent indeterminately follow from the 
antecedent in a true counterfactual of freedom? Similar to O’Connor, I can 
think of only one answer: that the relationship is causally predetermined. And if 
so, then the counterfactuals of freedom that the Molinist claims are true are 
(arguably) not counterfactuals of freedom, as the agent in question is casually 
determined to perform the action that she does. Hence, contrary to Normore, a 
satisfactory solution to the grounding objection has yet to be seen. 
2.2.6. From Edward Wierenga 
 A quite different reply to the grounding objection is given by Edward 
Wierenga.108 Essentially, Wierenga argues that as things stand the grounding 
requirement in the grounding objection is vague. Wierenga attempts to remove 
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this vagueness by considering various ways of stating the grounding 
requirement. He argues that any plausible construal of the grounding relation 
poses no threat to the theory of middle knowledge, while the only construal 
that does so threaten the theory is not plausible in any case. So how does his 
argument proceed? 
 Wierenga begins by noting that Robert Adams posses the grounding 
objection by asking the question “Who or what does cause [counterfactuals of 
freedom] to be true?”109 Hence, as Wierenga says, it “is tempting to think of 
the problem as on involving causes.”110 Indeed, devout Molinist Thomas Flint 
puts things similarly stating: “But if such [counterfactual] conditionals are 
contingent, they might not have been true. Who, then, makes them true? Or, 
to phrase this question more carefully: Who or what actually causes the ones 
that are true to be true, and the ones that are false to be false?”111 Perhaps 
then, says Wierenga, the idea is the following. 
(GC) For every contingent proposition p, if p is true, then there is 
something x such that x causes p to be true (where x is an agent or 
an event). 
 
Wierenga does not find this construal of the grounding relation plausible at all. 
For consider the counterfactual of freedom that Robert Adams thinks is false. 
(1) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would besiege the city. 
 
Now when Adams argues, Wierenga notes, “that nothing causes (1) to be true, 
he did not then pause to ask whether anything caused not-(1) to be true; 
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rather, he simply concluded that (1) was false.”112 However, Wierenga 
observes, “if nothing causes not-(1) to be true, we should, according to (GC), 
conclude that not-(1) is false, as well;” something Adams obviously would not 
accept.113 Consider also negative existential propositions. To use Wierenga’s 
example, There are no red cows. There may be things, he says, that “cause 
there to be brown cows, but nothing causes the non-existence of red cows.”114 
Hence according to (GC) the proposition There are no red cows is not true 
since there is nothing “there” in the world which causes There are no red cows 
to be true. Of course, Wierenga reasons, ‘There are no red cows’ is true, and 
so there is something wrong with (GC). 
 Perhaps the way to revise (GC) to avoid these problems, Wierenga thinks, 
is to “find a grounding principle that is more general, one that does not insist 
that the grounding relation is causation.”115 Taking a cue from D. M. 
Armstrong, perhaps states of affairs are truthmakers for truths in the sense 
that “the truthmaker for a truth must necessitate that truth.” That is, if “a certain 
truthmaker makes a certain truth true, then there is no alternative world where 
that truthmaker exists but the truth is a false proposition.”116 In that case, 
perhaps the grounding relation should be construed this way. 
(GA) A proposition p is grounded iff there is a state of affairs S such that, 
necessarily, if S obtains then p is true. 
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Thus, the proposition “snow is white is grounded, on this proposal, just in case 
there is a state of affairs, for example, the state of affairs of snow being white,
which is such that, necessarily, if it obtains, then the proposition is true.”117 
Wierenga amusingly notes that the “adherent of middle knowledge can 
cheerfully accept (GA), of course, pointing out that the state of affairs, say, of 
its being the case that if David were to stay in Keilah then Saul would besiege 
the city is what grounds” the proposition  
(1) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would besiege the city. 
 
If correct, this is obviously an unwelcome result for the grounding objector, and 
thus, Wierenga says, what the objector needs is some restriction on what it is 
that can qualify as a ground. The natural suggestion is to “replace states of 
affairs with actual objects and their properties.”118 Perhaps, then, the following 
will do. 
(GS) A proposition p is grounded iff there is an object x and property F
such that x has F and p supervenes on x’s having F.
Wierenga notes that this construal of the grounding relation is meant to 
capture William Hasker’s suggestion that “truths about ‘what would be the 
case … if ’ must be grounded in truths about what is in fact the case.”119 For 
example, take the following counterfactual of natural law: If the match were 
struck, it would light. What makes this propositions true, presumably, is that 
the match has certain properties such that striking it would bring about its 
lighting. In that case, in terms of (GS), the proposition If the match were struck, 
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it would light (p) is grounded because the match (x) bears certain properties 
(F) such that the truth of If the match were struck, it would light supervenes on 
the fact that the match has these properties.  
 Of course, as Wierenga notes, as stated (GS) “does not impose any 
constraint on the nature of the individuals and properties – other than that they 
be existent individuals and properties those individuals have – that comprise 
the grounding condition.”120 Hence, as Wierenga sees it, it “remains easy for 
the defender of middle knowledge to hold that counterfactuals of freedom are 
grounded, even as specified by (GS), provided that the right counterfactual 
properties are available.”121 It will not do, obviously, to say that concrete 
individuals exemplify these properties, since on middle knowledge 
counterfactuals of freedom are true prior to any individuals whatsoever 
existing concretely. But there are “plenty of other candidates” that may 
exemplify such properties, Wierenga believes. For example, perhaps “Saul’s 
essence has the property of being such that if instantiated its instantiation 
would besiege Keilah if David were to stay here.”122 In such a case something 
would exemplify the relevant counterfactual property and so something would 
serve as a ground for the counterfactual truth that Saul would besiege Keilah 
were David to remain there. Hence (GS) is satisfied as well as Hasker’s 
suggestion that “truths about ‘what would be the case … if ’ must be grounded 
in truths about what is in fact the case.” And what is in fact the case, Wierenga 
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suggests, is that Saul’s essence bears counterfactual properties, and this 
grounds truths regarding how he would behave under certain counterfactual 
conditions. 
 Wierenga recognizes that this result is unacceptable to proponents of the 
grounding objection, and says that perhaps the objector “will want to 
reformulate (GS) in a way that rules out counterfactual properties.”123 
Wierenga conjectures that given the way many “philosophers these days 
attempt to give naturalistic explanations of things,” the following construal may 
be what is needed to preclude counterfactual properties from functioning as 
grounds for counterfactual conditionals. 
(GM) A proposition p is grounded iff there is a concrete object x and natural 
property F such that x has F and p supervenes on x’s having F.
This version of the grounding relation clearly precludes freedom-regarding 
counterfactual properties from grounding the truth of counterfactuals of 
freedom. Hence, Wierenga thinks from the perspective of the grounding 
objector it may be seen (at last) as a successful criteria for the grounding 
relation. However, despite this success, Wierenga argues that (GM) “imposes 
an exceptionally stringent constraint on what is required for a proposition to be 
grounded.”124 The reason is that it certainly does not seem that propositions 
which are true now regarding “what has been the case supervene upon 
currently existing physical objects and their natural properties.”125 The point is 
that propositions about the past that are obviously true are in addition 
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apparently ungrounded according to (GM). But if they are ungrounded, they 
should be seen as false, or at the very least lacking any determinate truth-
value at all. And since this is implausible, so is (GM).  
 Thus Wierenga concludes that after surveying “several attempts to say 
what it takes for a proposition to be grounded,” on all attempts but the last “it is 
easy enough for counterfactuals of freedom to be grounded.”126 And since that 
last attempt “has little to recommend it,” it “remains to be seen whether the 
[grounding] objector can devise a grounding principle that is both plausible 
and which counterfactuals of freedom fail to satisfy.”127 
In critique of Wierenga, the grounding objector can easily enough concede 
that counterfactuals of freedom are not grounded according to (GM) and 
perhaps even that (GM) has “little to recommend it.” What the grounding 
object may not so easily concede, however, is that “it is easy enough for 
counterfactuals of freedom to be grounded” according to Wierenga’s previous 
construals of the grounding relation. Take (GS) for example. Recall that (GS) 
construes the grounding relation in the following way. 
(GS) A proposition p is grounded iff there is an object x and property F
such that x has F and p supervenes on x’s having F.
Why should the grounding objector think that counterfactuals of freedom can 
be grounded according to (GS)? The reason Wierenga gives is that (GS) only 
requires that the individuals exist and that they possess the properties in 
question. He then concludes that it is at least conceivable that this criteria is 
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satisfied via individual essences possessing counterfactual properties. So, for 
example, the reason the counterfactual If David were to stay in Keilah, Saul 
would freely besiege the city is true is that Saul’s individual essence “has the 
property of being such that if instantiated its instantiation would besiege Keilah 
if David were to say there.”128 Is this a credible account of how counterfactuals 
of freedom might be grounded on (GS)? Arguably not. 
 The reason (or at least one reason) Wierenga’s explanation is unsatisfying 
is that what is left unexplained is why Saul’s essence includes the property of 
besieging Keilah were David to remain there rather than the property, say, of 
leaving Keilah were David to remain there, or, indeed, indefinitely many other 
counterfactual properties. Arguably unless Wierenga’s explanation provides an 
account of why Saul’s essence includes one counterfactual property rather 
than another, the real explanatory work is before us. The same point has 
already been made in the critique of Suarez (where he thinks counterfactuals 
of freedom are simply primitively true), and the critique of Normore (where he 
thinks counterfactuals are true given the logical principle of conditional 
excluded middle). In neither case do we get an explanation for what the 
grounding objector really wants explained: reasons for thinking that we truly 
would do what the theory of middle knowledge says we would do in 
counterfactual situations. In Suarez’s case, arguing that counterfactuals of 
freedom are simply primitively true is arguably not a satisfying explanation. 
And Normore’s claim that counterfactuals of freedom are true on account of 
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conditional excluded middle fairs no better. In both cases an explanation is 
neglected where an explanation looks required. 
 Otherwise put, on Wierenga’s account, assuming the validity of (GS), if 
counterfactuals of freedom about me are grounded in my individual essence 
exemplifying counterfactual properties, then the answer to the question as to 
why it is that I perform action A in circumstances C is just that my essence 
bears the property being such that if instantiated its instantiation would in C do 
A. And as was the case with Suarez and Normore, this is arguably not a 
satisfying answer. For given this explanation the obvious question to ask is: 
Why does my instantiation exemplify the counterfactual properties that it 
does? And this gets to the heart of the grounding objection. Being told that I 
would do A in C because I bear the property of doing A in C does not really 
explain why it is that in C I do A. What the grounding objector understandably 
wants explained is what the reasons are for thinking that their essence 
exemplifies the counterfactual properties Wierenga believes it is easy enough 
for them to exemplify – a fortiori when these properties are allegedly 
contingent. And because (GS) does nothing aside from merely asserting that 
counterfactual properties ground counterfactual conditionals, Wierenga’s claim 
that (GS) makes it “easy for the defender of middle knowledge to hold that 
counterfactuals of freedom are grounded” is a claim that may be difficult to 
sustain.  
 The same goes for (GA). (GA) stated that A proposition p is grounded iff 
there is a state of affairs S such that, necessarily, if S obtains then p is true.
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Wierenga quickly concludes that (GA) is no threat to Molinism since the state 
of affairs of its being the case that if David were to stay in Keilah then Saul 
would besiege the city could reasonably be what grounds the true proposition 
If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would besiege the city. But this conclusion 
appears too hasty. For why is this state of affairs what it is? What makes it the 
case that this state of affairs has Saul besieging Keilah rather than leaving 
Keilah in the event that David were to remain there? If Wierenga has no 
answer to this question, then as argued above against Suarez and Normore, 
what really needs explaining is the very thing that is left unexplained.  
 In addition, if counterfactual states of affairs are what ground 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, then it looks as if Hasker’s version of 
the grounding objection can be brought to bear against Wierenga as well. For 
recall that Hasker’s objection to middle knowledge was that because the agent 
about whom there is a true counterfactual does not bring about the truth of that 
counterfactual, then the agent cannot do otherwise, and so the counterfactual 
is not a counterfactual of freedom. Hence, if there is a state of affairs of its 
being the case that if David were to stay in Keilah then Saul would freely 
besiege the city then there is not the state of affairs, in those same 
circumstances, of its not being the case that if David were to stay in Keilah 
then Saul would freely besiege the city. And since this is so, Saul could not do 
differently than besiege the city were David to remain there, and so could not 
make the proposition false that If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would freely 
besiege the city. But because this is contrary to the standard libertarian 
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conception of free agency – where freedom requires to ability to do otherwise 
– and because Molinism is committed to libertarianism, it seems evident that 
Wierenga’s solution using (GA) is not a solution amiable to Molinism. Hence, a 
satisfactory response to the grounding objection has not been provided. 
2.2.7. From Thomas Flint 
So far we have looked at responses to the grounding objection only as 
articulated by Robert Adams. We have yet to see a reply to William Hasker’s 
rather complicated version of the objection. In this section we will see just that 
as we look a reply to Hasker from Thomas Flint.  
 By way of review, Flint provides an overview of Hasker’s version of the 
grounding objection saying that Hasker “attempts to show that, if we tentatively 
grant that there are [counterfactuals of creaturely freedom], the Molinist must 
say that we do not bring about their truth.” However, “if we don’t bring about 
their truth, it follows that we lack the power to do anything other than what we 
do.” But, of course, since “no libertarian can countenance such 
powerlessness, Hasker concludes that the tentative concession mentioned 
above needs to be withdrawn: there are no true counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom.”129 
In more detail, Flint says that for purposes of simplification we may view 
Hasker’s argument as depending crucially on four premises. 
(1) If E brings it about that “Q” is true, then E is a token of an event-type T
such that [(some token of T occurs) → Q] and [~(some token of T
occurs) → ~Q], and E is the first token of T which occurs. 
 
129 Thomas Flint, Divine Providence (Cornel University Press: Ithaca, 1998) 138. 
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(2) Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are more fundamental features of 
the world than are particular facts. (Hence, worlds that differ from the 
actual world with regard to factual content are closer than those that 
differ from it with regard to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.) 
(3) If it is in A’s power to bring it about that P, and “P” entails “Q” and “Q” is 
false, then it is in A’s power to bring it about that Q.
(4) If S freely does B in situation A, then it was in S’s power to bring it 
about that (~B & A). 
 
Hasker’s reasoning, then, as Flint describes it, is the following.  
 Suppose that there is a true counterfactual A→B. Flint says that given that 
A obtains, the truth of this counterfactual is brought about “by performing the 
action specified in B.”130 Hence if (1) is true, then the agent about whom the 
counterfactual is true can bring about the truth of this counterfactual only if it is 
true that had the agent not performed the action specified in B, the 
counterfactual would have been false. However, if (2) is true this condition will 
never be satisfied. For, according to Hasker, given (2) there will “always be a 
world in which some of the circumstances specified in the antecedent A are 
false that is closer to the actual world than is any world in which the 
counterfactual of creaturely freedom A→B is false.”131 Thus, there is no A-
world where ~B obtains that is closer to the actual world than a world where 
both A and B obtain. And that means that ~A-worlds are closer to the actual 
world than any world in which A→~B is true. Hence, it is not clear how A→B
could be falsified by the agent by bringing about ~B in A. Further, if (3) is true, 
then for the agent to have the power to bring it about that ~B given A, the 
agent must have the power to bring it about that A→~B. But from (1) and (2) it 
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follows that the agent does not have that power, and so it follows from (1), (2), 
and (3), together with the assumption that A→B is true, that the agent does 
not have the power, given A, to bring about ~B. However, as Flint notes, since 
the Molinist is a libertarian “the Molinist is committed to (4).” That is, the 
Molinist is committed to the claim that, as a free agent, the agent does “have 
the power to bring it about that ~B given A.” Hence, Flint says, if (1)-(4) are 
“beyond reproach, it follows that we have no choice but to surrender our initial 
assumption” that there are in fact true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.132 
Though Flint does have something to say about (1), (3), and (4) by way of 
critique, here I shall focus only on his comments regarding (2). (2) is after all 
recognized as perhaps the most “controversial”133 of the four premises, and of 
course refuting it refutes Hasker’s self-professed refutation of middle 
knowledge. Thus what does Flint have to say about (2)? 
 As it stands, Flint notes that Hasker derives (2) from the following two 
propositions to which Hasker thinks the Molinist is clearly committed. 
(a) Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are more fundamental features of 
the world than are counterfactuals backed by laws of nature. 
(b) Counterfactuals backed by laws of nature are more fundamental 
features of the world than are particular facts. 
 
Flint thinks neither proposition is particularly plausible, and so neither 
proposition (contra Hasker) is one to which the Molinist is clearly committed.  
 Regarding (b), Flint notes that Hasker seems to think that it is “beyond 
dispute.” However, Flint argues, we have “reason to question whether or not 
 
132 Flint 140. 
133 Robert Adams, “An Anti-Molinist Argument,” Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of 
Religion, James E. Tomberlin, ed., (Ridgeview Publishing Company: New York, 1991) 346. 
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[b] expresses anything like a general truth.”134 To see why, consider that “the 
Molinist will want to say that some facts (e.g., that God exists) are more 
fundamental features of the world than are any natural law counterfactuals.” 
But God exists, of course, if a fact is a necessary fact and thus probably, Flint 
concedes, not the sort of fact that Hasker has in mind. However, even if “we 
limit ourselves to contingent facts, might not the Molinist … think that some 
such facts are more fundamental than are some natural law counterfactuals?” 
Flints thinks the answer is Yes, and that the (plausibly) contingent fact that 
“God became a man is more fundamental to our world than is, say, some 
counterfactual about potential causal interaction between two specific 
hydrogen molecules?”135 Flint agrees that surely “many natural law 
counterfactuals are more fundamental than are many particular facts,” but the 
situation is “not nearly as neat” as (b) suggests. Hence Flint does not think that 
(b) is something to which the Molinst need be committed. Therefore, in the 
absence of any further argument from Hasker, Flint rejects (b). But what about 
(a)? 
 One reason, Flint says, on which Hasker relies in arguing for (2) is “based 
on the fact that God can and does perform miracles.”136 If so, then “some 
counterfactuals backed by laws of nature have counterexamples in the actual 
world itself, and therefore also in possible worlds as close to the actual world 
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as you please.”137 And for this reason, Flint notes, Hasker believes that 
counterfactuals of freedom “count for more in determining similarity of worlds 
than do counterfactuals based on natural laws.”138 What should we make of 
this argument? 
 As Flint sees it, Hasker shows only that counterfactuals based on natural 
laws are not always more important in determining similarity than are 
counterfactuals of freedom. In such “(presumably) rare instances when a 
miracle occurs, when a specific law of nature is violated, then at least one 
counterfactual based on that law will be false in the actual world, and hence its 
falsity in some other world needn’t count against that world’s similarity to our 
own.”139 But Flints finds that this “rather obvious” fact about “what is true in 
rather extraordinary circumstances gives us no reason to think that the same 
holds in ordinary, nonmiraculous circumstances.” Indeed, if there is no 
miraculous activity on God’s part and so in addition no violation of a particular 
natural law, Flint sees no reason to believe “that a world in which such a 
violation does occur, and hence in which counterfactuals based on that law 
are false, is closer than a world in which a counterfactual of freedom true in 
our world is false.”140 Flint’s point, then, is that when two worlds – W, the 
actual world, and some other world W*, say – disagree regarding their 
counterfactuals based on a certain natural law save only because of a unique 
miraculous suspension of that law, why should the Molinist think that W and 
 
137 Hasker 72. 
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W* are less similar than W and some third world W**, where W and W** 
disagree with respect to their counterfactuals of freedom? Due to illustrations 
such as the following, Flint finds it much more credible to think that W and W** 
are more similar than W and W*. And if so, then the Molinist is well within her 
rights to reject (a). 
 Consider, then, a variation of Hasker’s illustration of the spilled ink. Flints 
asks us to imagine that he is making a poster while using an open bottle of ink, 
and that he has done this frequently in the past. Imagine further that thanks to 
his “noticeable lack of physical dexterity” he is prone to spilling the ink on the 
floor, much to the dismay of his wife. But despite his clumsiness, she has 
always kindly agreed to purchase more ink. However, on the next occasion of 
ink-spilling she decides that she has had enough, and refuses to purchase any 
more ink. Letting C stand for the circumstances of this most recent spill, C
obviously includes “facts about [Flint’s] past adventures in ink-spilling, the 
present state and position of the bottle of ink, and much information about 
[Flint’s] wife and the various reasons she has had for and against buying [Flint] 
more ink.”141 Now according to the Molinist, Flint says, in the world imagined 
where God does not intervene to counter Flint’s clumsiness, the following two 
counterfactuals would be true. 
(c) I am in circumstances C and I knock over my ink bottle in such-and-
such a way → the bottle of ink falls and the ink spills. 
(d) I am in circumstances C and I knock over my ink bottle in such-and-
such a way → my wife (freely) refuses to buy me more ink. 
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The first is clearly a counterfactual based on natural law, while the second is a 
counterfactual of freedom. Flint then asks: “Which of these two is the less 
fundamental truth about our world?”142 Flint notes that for Hasker the answer 
must be (c), but this is an answer that Flint thinks is clearly mistaken. For 
assuming that (c) is “grounded by natural laws, the easiest way for it to turn 
out false might well be for God to perform a miracle. But, as we know, miracles 
are few and far between,” especially regarding clumsiness with ink bottles.143 It 
seems clear enough, on the other hand, that (d) “could easily have been 
false.” And the reason Flint cites is that in very similar situations in the past his 
wife has agreed to buy him more ink. Thus all we need to falsify (d) is “for her 
to act on the same reasons she has repeatedly acted on in the past.” Hence 
“in nonmiraculous cases such as this, it seems evident that Hasker is 
mistaken,” and that “the possibility of miracles offers precious little support to 
(a).” 144 Flint’s point, then, is that in the case of (c) and (d) it is simply more 
believable to think that (d) is easier to falsify than (c). And if he is correct, then 
it looks as if it is not true, as Hasker claimed, that counterfactuals of freedom 
are always more fundamental features of the world than are counterfactuals 
based on natural law. For arguably worlds that share the latter are at least 
sometimes closer than worlds that share the former.  
 Is Flint correct? Not surprisingly Hasker does not think so.145 But to avoid 
getting bogged down in the details of Hasker’s reply, it is important to note that 
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the conclusion of Hasker’s argument – that the truth of counterfactuals of 
freedom are not brought about by the agents in question, and so are not 
counterfactuals of freedom after all – can be sustained using premises that do 
not appeal to Hasker’s controversial premise (2). Robert Adams develops 
such premises, saying “I believe that by focusing on an idea that Hasker does 
not use in this context, the idea of explanatory priority, the argument can be 
simplified, and points of controversy avoided.”146 
Adams’ argument comes in two stages. The first stage shows “that 
Molinism implies that we do not bring about the truth of counterfactuals of 
freedom about us.” And while Hasker’s version of the argument depends upon 
the thesis that counterfactuals of freedom are more fundamental features of 
the world than are particular facts, this is a thesis, Adams says, “on which I 
would rather not depend.”147 In the following alternative argument, this thesis 
is avoided while Hasker’s conclusion is retained. 
(1) According to Molinism, the truth of all true counterfactuals of freedom 
about us is explanatorily prior to God’s decision to create us. 
(2) God’s decision to create us is explanatorily prior to our existence. 
(3) Our existence is explanatorily prior to all of our choices and actions. 
(4) The relation of explanatory priority is transitive. 
(5) Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 1-4) that the truth of all true 
counterfactuals of freedom about us is explanatorily prior to all of our 
choices and actions. 
(6) The relation of explanatory priority is asymmetrical. 
(7) Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 5-6) that none of our choices and 
actions is explanatorily prior to the truth of any true counterfactual of 
freedom about us. 
(8) Whatever we bring about is something to which some choice or action 
of ours is explanatorily prior.  
 
146 “An Anti-Molinist Argument,” Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, James 
E. Tomberlin, ed., (Ridgeview Publishing Company: New York, 1991) 346. 
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(9) Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 7-8) that we do not bring about 
the truth of any counterfactuals of freedom about us. 
 
Clearly the “central idea in this argument is that of explanatory priority, or 
an order of explanation.”148 Adams emphasizes that this idea is distinct from 
temporal priority, for example, in that even “if there was no time before God 
decided to create us, or if God is timeless, God’s knowing various things can 
be explanatorily prior to God’s deciding to create us.” We saw this same 
distinction between explanatory (or logical) priority and temporal priority 
illustrated in Chapter 1 when discussing the relationship between God and his 
properties.149 If God is essentially good and eternal, for example, then God 
cannot exist without the property of being good, and so his existence depends 
on that property. But if his existence depends on that property, then the 
existence of the property is some sense prior to his own existence. Assuming, 
though, that God is eternal precludes the possibility that the property of being 
good is temporally prior to God’s existence; hence it is said that the property of 
being good is logically or explanatorily prior to his existence. This is the central 
idea on which Adams is relying here. 
 The second stage of his argument is one in which he argues that “agents 
do not have the power to act otherwise than they in fact do, and hence are not 
really free.”150 And in order to make this argument, rather than relying on 
Hasker’s power entailment principle (PEP) – If it is in A’s power to bring it 
about that P, and “P” entails “Q” and “Q” is false, then it is in A’s power to bring 
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it about that Q – Adams again opts for the notion of explanatory priority. Hence 
in conjunction with premises 1-5 of the first stage of the argument, Adams 
adds the following premises to conclude that Molinism implies we are not free. 
(10) It follows also from Molinism that if I freely do action A in 
circumstances C, then there is a true counterfactual of freedom F*, 
which says that if I were in C, then I would (freely) do A. 
(11) Therefore it follows from Molinism that if I freely do A in C, the truth of 
F* is explanatorily prior to my choosing and acting as I do in C. 
(12) If I freely do A in C, no truth that is strictly inconsistent with my 
refraining from A in C is explanatorily prior to my choosing and acting 
as I do in C. 
(13) The truth of F* (which says that if I were in C, then I would do A) is 
strictly inconsistent with my refraining from A in C. 
(14) If Molinism is true, then if I freely do A in C, F* both is (by 11) and is 
not (by 12-13) explanatorily prior to my choosing and acting as I do in 
C. 
(15) Therefore (by 14) if Molinism is true, then I do not freely do A in C.  
 
Adams notes that since “this argument applies to any creature’s doing any 
putatively free action in any circumstances in exactly the same way as to my 
doing A in C, it shows, if sound, that creatures do no free actions if Molinism is 
true – which is of course contrary to an essential tenet of Molinism.”151 
In summary, then, arguably Hasker’s conclusion that any grounds for 
counterfactuals of freedom are grounds that preclude our acting freely can be 
plausibly sustained without appealing to his arguably implausible premise that 
counterfactuals of freedom are more fundamental features of the world than 
are particular facts. And since this seems so, that premise can be rejected 
while the essence of his own intricate twist on the grounding objection can be 
kept. 
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2.3. LOOKING AHEAD 
In this chapter we have seen a lot. We have looked at two different 
versions of the grounding objection, as well as replies to each. What I have 
primarily tried to argue in this chapter is that none of the replies is satisfying. 
All of the replies to Adams’ version do not fully explain what the grounding 
objector, I argue, legitimately wants explained, and Flint’s reply to Hasker’s 
version focuses on premises that are not required to support Hasker’s 
conclusion in any case. Given that none of the replies is satisfactory, then, on 
the assumption that the theory of middle knowledge is worth preserving, a 
fresh response to the grounding objection is in order. That response, I argue, 
should be able to explain, first, the heart of what the grounding objector wants 
explained: why counterfactuals of freedom if true are true (in response to 
Adams). Second, it should be able to explain how the existence of true 
counterfactuals of freedom do not preclude the ability to do differently (in 
response to Hasker). The next two chapters are geared toward achieving that 
goal.  
 In the next chapter, I argue for a credible (semi-) libertarian conception of 
free agency. Developing such a conception, I believe, is crucial in the search 
for adequate metaphysical grounds for counterfactuals of freedom. For, as I 





In the previous chapter we discussed what is referred to as the grounding 
objection to the theory of middle knowledge. That objection, generally put, 
states that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are not true, given that there 
is nothing ontologically “there” that functions as adequate metaphysical 
grounds. Differently put, arguably there is nothing that exists which brings 
about or causes counterfactuals of freedom to be true, and so we have little (if 
any) reason for thinking that any of them are true. If correct, this objection has 
rather devastating implications for the theory of middle knowledge, as the 
success of that theory’s ability to reconcile divine foreknowledge and 
providence with human freedom depends on the truth of counterfactuals of 
freedom. Hence, if none is true, the theory fails.  
 Not surprisingly, given this situation for the theory of middle knowledge, 
many Molinists have sought to reply to the grounding objection. Some replies 
argue for an analogy between counterfactuals of freedom and propositions 
about the future or past, and that if the latter can be true there is no reason to 
deny that so can the former. Others argue that the logical principle of 
conditional excluded middle entails that counterfactuals of freedom are true, 
even if by CEM we cannot say which particular counterfactual actually is true. 
And still others argue that because there is at present no plausible account of 
the grounding relation between a proposition and its adequate metaphysical 
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grounds that plausibly allows for propositions about the past to be grounded 
while precluding counterfactuals of freedom from having grounds, there is 
therefore no reason to think that the grounding objection refutes the theory of 
middle knowledge.  
 I have argued that each of these replies does not adequately address the 
central concern in the grounding objection. That concern, essentially, is that on 
the assumption that counterfactuals of freedom are true, why are they true? 
Indeed, what is it that makes them true? This question, I argue, cannot be 
adequately addressed by appeals to analogies between the past states of 
affairs and counterfactual states of affairs, nor by appealing to the principle of 
conditional excluded middle, nor still by appealing to conceptual problems 
plaguing detailed attempts to articulate the grounding relation. The question as 
to why certain counterfactuals of freedom are true, I believe, can only be 
adequately addressed by actually articulating the reasons for the truth of any 
particular counterfactual of freedom that is itself true. The present chapter is 
the first step in an attempt to satisfactorily articulate such reasons.  
 Broadly put, over the next two chapters I will argue that counterfactuals of 
freedom can be grounded in causal necessitation. Perhaps surprisingly, such 
grounds, I argue, do not threaten our freedom, even when the freedom in 
question regards freedom of a libertarian sort. To make this argument I will 
first develop a credible theory of libertarian free agency, and second show how 
that theory can function as a sort of function for the truth values of 
counterfactuals of freedom to assist the theory of middle knowledge. This 
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latter task is the project of the next chapter, while the former task will occupy 
us in this chapter. In short, if such a theory of free agency can be successfully 
developed and applied, I argue that such a theory can provide what previous 
replies to the grounding objection could not: adequate metaphysical grounds 
for the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.  
3.1. ELEMENTS OF SEMI-LIBERTARIANISM 
The view of free agency I will be developing here is a view I refer to as 
semi-libertarianism (the reason for the prefix ‘semi’ should become clear by 
the end of the chapter). In this section, I will draw from the work of three 
philosophers – John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, and Peter van Inwagen – in 
developing semi-libertarianism. Each has an account of free will that has 
elements that I think are plausible and worth preserving in a credible theory of 
free agency, and, conversely, each has elements that I think can be safely 
discarded. I will evaluate their views according to two central themes 
commonly discussed in debates about free will. The first is whether or not at 
the time of acting the agent requires alternative courses of action in order to 
act freely, and the second is whether or not an action can be said to be free 
even if that action is causally necessitated by events that occurred prior to the 
agent’s intention to act. Otherwise said, I will evaluate their views of freedom 
by focusing on how they address two central concerns: whether freedom 
requires the presence of alternative possibilities, and whether it requires the 
absence of causal determinism. Examining the views of Fischer, Kane, and 
van Inwagen regarding these two concerns provides framework that is 
132
conducive for both articulating and evaluating their views. Now to the task of 
assembling the elements of semi-libertarianism. 
3.1.1. From John Martin Fischer 
 John Martin Fischer articulates his own view of free agency in his work The 
Metaphysics of Free Will.1 In addressing the first concern mentioned above – 
whether or not freedom requires the presence of alternative possibilities – 
Fischer provides an answer to that question by considering what have come to 
be referred to as Frankfurt-type examples or thought experiments. These 
thought experiments or examples were made famous by Harry Frankfurt in an 
attempt to demonstrate that alternative possibilities were not required for moral 
responsibility.2 But there are those philosophers, Fischer among them, who 
use the examples to show in addition that alternative possibilities are not 
required for free agency either. So how does Fischer arrive at this conclusion? 
 Consider the following Frankfurt-style example. Suppose that Black, say, 
“is a quite nifty (and even generally nice) neurosurgeon.”3 However, in 
performing an operation on Jones, say, to remove a brain tumor, unknown to 
Jones Black decides to insert a mechanism into Jones’ brain which enables 
Black to both monitor and control Jones’ behavior. Black has the ability to 
exercise this control over Jones through a sophisticated computer which Black 
has programmed so that, “among other things, it monitors Jones’ voting 
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behavior” in the 1992 presidential elections.4 If Jones, for example, were to 
show any inclination to vote for Bush, then the computer via the mechanism 
implanted in Jones’ brain would intervene to ensure that he would decide to 
vote for Clinton instead. However, if Jones were to decide to vote for Clinton 
on his own, the computer would do nothing but continue to monitor Jones’ 
brain, without interfering whatsoever in Jones’ decision to vote for Clinton. 
Now, suppose that Jones decides to vote for Clinton on his own in the very 
same way he would have had Black implanted no mechanism at all into his 
head. As Fischer says, it “seems upon first thinking about this case, that Jones 
can be held morally responsible for his choice and act of voting for Clinton, 
although he could not have chosen otherwise and he could not have done 
otherwise.”5 Fischer argues that this initial conclusion is ultimately correct, and 
that “moral responsibility does not require the sort of control which involves the 
existence of genuinely open alternative possibilities.”6
Contrary to appearances, though, this conclusion is not to say that moral 
responsibility requires no control at all. There is a sort of control that Fischer 
thinks is required for moral responsibility, it is just that this sort of control does 
not require the ability to do otherwise. To see this, Fischer asks us to consider 
the following.  
Let us suppose that I am driving my car. It is functioning well, and 
I wish to make a right turn. As a result of my intention to turn right, 
I signal, turn the steering wheel, and carefully guide the car to the 
right. Further, I here assume that I was able to form the intention 
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not to turn the car to the right but to turn the car to the left instead. 
Also, I assume that had I formed such an intention, I would have 
turned the steering wheel to the left and the car would have gone 
to the left. In this ordinary case, I guide the car to the right, but I 
could have guided it to the left. I control the car, and also I have a 
certain sort of control over the car’s movements. Insofar as I 
actually guide the car in a certain way, I shall say that I have 
“guidance control.” Further, insofar as I have the power to guide 
the car in a different way, I shall say that I have “regulative 
control.”7
Toward developing the notions of guidance and regulative control more 
fully, Fischer asks us to imagine a second case, one that is analogous to the 
Frankfurt-type situation discussed above. In this second case, imagine that his 
car’s steering apparatus functions properly, but only when he steers his car to 
the right. Fischer is unaware that the car’s steering apparatus is actually 
broken in such a way that were he to try to turn the car in any other direction 
than right, the car would actually veer off to the right in precisely the way it 
would were he himself to steer right. But since Fischer simply wants to go to 
the right, when he turns to the right his car’s steering apparatus functions 
properly and his car correctly turns right. Fischer comments that his “guidance 
of the car to the right is precisely the same in this case and the first car case,” 
where there was no potential steering malfunction at all. So in both cases, 
Fischer thinks, it appears as though he controls the movement of the car in the 
sense of guiding it to the right. Thus, he concludes, in both cases he has 
guidance control over the car. However, because in the second case it is true 
that he can direct his car in no other direction than right, he concludes that in 
this case – though not the first – he lacks regulative control over the car. 
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Hence, as Fischer sees it, it is clear that one can have guidance control 
without regulative control, and so “one can have a certain sort of control 
without having the sort of control that involves alternative possibilities.”8
Now in addition to the fact that guidance control can be divorced from 
regulative control, Fischer believes there is another point to draw from his 
Frankfurt-type analogue; namely, that when we are morally responsible for our 
actions it need not be because we possess a kind of control that involves 
alternative possibilities. Rather, Fischer thinks the suggestion from the 
Frankfurt-type cases is that “the sort of control necessarily associated with 
moral responsibility for action is guidance control,” and thus that “it is not, at a 
deep level, regulative control that grounds moral responsibility.”9 To illustrate 
the point, suppose Fischer finds himself in the second case above – the 
Frankfurt-type case where his steering mechanism malfunctions – and that 
while driving he sees an ambulance quickly approaching behind him. Desiring 
to do his duty and pull to the side to let the ambulance pass, Fischer quickly 
turns right into a parking lot at precisely the moment his steering apparatus 
breaks. Should we hold Fischer morally responsible (in this case praiseworthy) 
for pulling over in order to let the ambulance pass, even though he could not 
have done otherwise than pull over given the steering malfunction? Fischer 
thinks we should. He wanted to pull over and he did; he had guidance control 
over the direction of the car. Indeed, what is lost by way of responsibility by his 
not possessing regulative control over the car’s direction? Fischer does not 
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think anything, and the same would hold in situations of moral blame (e.g., 
where Fischer detests cats and directs his car to the right to run over a cat at 
just the moment the steering mechanism malfunctions, a moment in which he 
could not have done anything different than go to the right and thus hit the 
cat).  
 In sum, then, regarding guidance control and regulative control, as Fischer 
sees it “guidance control is the freedom-relevant condition sufficient for moral 
responsibility.” And by this he means that “guidance control is all the freedom 
required for moral responsibility.”10 So much, then, for Fischer’s take on 
whether free agency requires the ability to do otherwise – it does not.11 But 
what is his take regarding the question of whether free agency is compatible 
with causal determinism? 
 Regarding this question, Fischer argues that, at first glance, “guidance 
control seems entirely compatible with causal determinism.”12 Indeed, as he 
says regarding his guidance control over his car, “when I guide my properly 
functioning automobile to the right in the standard case, my exercise of control 
does not appear to depend on the falsity of causal determinism.”13 But there 
are those who no doubt would object. For even if one were to concede that 
regulative control is not required for moral responsibility, they need not also 
concede that the presence of causal determinism poses no threat to moral 
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conclusion that alternative possibilities are not required for free agency, and he addresses 
these “flicker of freedom” challenges (as he refers to them) at Fischer 134-147. 
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responsibility. In other words, Fischer may be correct in arguing that regulative 
control is not needed in order for us to be morally responsible for what we do, 
but it is something else entirely to argue in addition that the absence of causal 
determinism is not needed in order for us to be so responsible. This latter 
claim requires additional argument, and Fischer is aware of this.  
 Fischer recognizes that for “certain incompatibilists about causal 
determinism and moral responsibility, the reason why determinism threatens 
moral responsibility is that it rules out alternative possibilities.”14 For this sort of 
incompatibilist, Fischer’s claim that moral responsibility need not require 
regulative control is enough for such incompatibilists to reject his position. 
However, Fischer also recognizes that “another sort of incompatibilist might 
grant that an agent can be morally responsible for an action although he has 
no alternative possibility.”15 For this sort of incompatibilist, the reasons for 
rejecting the compatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism are 
different than those for rejecting the claim that moral responsibility requires the 
ability to do otherwise. Thus, what are these reasons and are they strong 
enough to undermine Fischer’s initial intuition that causal determinism posses 
no threat to guidance control, and so no threat to moral responsibility?  
 To begin with, an incompatibilist of this second sort – i.e., one who is 
committed to the view that causal determinism precludes moral responsibility 
apart from considerations about the ability to do otherwise – might view the 
lesson of the Frankfurt examples differently. For consider Jones and Black 
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again, and suppose that the world proceeds in a causally indeterministic way; 
that is, though there are some causal laws, it is not the case that all events are 
causally determined by prior events. Further, suppose that the world proceeds 
in just the sort of way the libertarian requires if agents are correctly considered 
morally responsible for what they do. In this case, an agent’s beliefs, desires, 
purposes, and other psychological states do not causally necessitate an 
agent’s action, but instead influence their actions and so provide rational 
explanations for them. Now in this sort of indeterministic world, as Fischer 
notes, “the libertarian can certainly say that Jones is morally responsible for 
voting for Clinton, even if Black would have brought it about that Jones vote for 
Clinton, if Jones had shown signs of deciding to vote for Bush.”16 The point 
here, then, is that “nothing about Frankfurt’s example requires the actual 
sequence issuing in the decision and action to proceed in a deterministic way; 
if it proceeds in a non-deterministic way that satisfies the libertarian, then 
Jones can be held responsible, even though he could not have done 
otherwise.”17 
The lesson an incompatibilist of the second sort might draw from the 
Frankfurt cases, then, is that attributions of moral responsibility should be 
based on what happens in the actual sequence of events, not on 
considerations about whether the agent could have brought about some 
alternative sequence of events. Hence, in the Frankfurt scenario, such an 
incompatibilist can easily concede that because of Black, Jones could not 
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have done otherwise than vote for Clinton. However, as Fischer recognizes, 
what such an incompatibilist will not so easily concede is that this shows that 
“causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility,” a fortiori since 
“causal determinism is a doctrine about what happens in the actual 
sequence.”18 So, simply because Jones could not have done otherwise than 
vote for Clinton does not imply that were he causally determined to vote for 
Clinton that he would in fact then be responsible for voting for Clinton.  
 There are two ways then, Fischer says, in which it might be said that one 
could not have done otherwise. In the first way, “the actual sequence involves 
some factor that operates and makes it the case that the agent could not have 
initiated an alternative sequence.”19 In the second way, “there is no such factor 
in the actual sequence, but the alternative sequence contains some factor 
which would prevent the agent from doing other than he actually does.”20 
Frankfurt examples resemble the latter, and thus involve factors in an 
alternative sequence. However, causal determinism, if true, involves factors in 
the actual sequence, and so resembles the former. The point, then, is that 
because Frankfurt examples involve factors in an alternative sequence while 
causal determinism involves factors in the actual sequence, one cannot 
conclude from the Frankfurt examples alone that causal determinism is 
compatible with moral responsibility. Hence, contrary to Fischer’s initial 
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intuition that moral responsibility and causal determinism are compatible, 
arguably more is needed than only the Frankfurt examples to conclude that. 
 Attractive as this argument might appear, Fischer does not find it so. The 
reason is that Fischer believes that even “in the absence of a knockdown 
argument that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism, the 
Frankfurt-type examples (conjoined with other considerations) provide very 
strong reason to accept this conclusion.”21 This is so, Fischer argues, because 
it is hard “to see why causal determinism would threaten moral responsibility 
for some reason apart from its relationship to alternative possibilities.”22 
Differently said, why should we think causal determinism undermines moral 
responsibility apart from considerations of whether or not we enjoy alternative 
possibilities when we act? Fischer, for his part, can think of no compelling 
reasons. However, he can think of possible reasons.  
 For example, one reason is that the incompatibilist of this second sort – the 
sort, recall, that thinks causal determinism threatens moral responsibility 
irrespective of alternative possibilities – might think that moral responsibility 
requires the agent to be appropriately “active” or “creative.” If this is so, 
Fischer says, he does not see “any reason to deny that an agent whose action 
is part of a causally deterministic sequence cannot be active and creative in 
any sense plausibly taken to be required for moral responsibility.”23 For 
consider certain examples of genuine creativity. Would we say, Fischer asks, 
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that “Goya and Picasso were not creative” or that “Kant was not original” if “we 
discovered that causal determinism were true?” Fischer thinks the answer is 
obvious: “Clearly not.”24 
Another reason, though, Fischer recognizes that an incompatibilist of the 
second sort might think that causal determinism is incompatible with moral 
responsibility apart from considerations of alternative possibilities, is that they 
might say that “in order for an agent to be morally responsible for an action, 
the agent must be creative in the sense of being the ‘self-initiator’ or ‘self-
originator’ of the action.”25 And such would require the absence of causal 
determinism, since though on causal determinism the agent does cause their 
action, they do not do so in an initial or original sense (only a proximal sense). 
Fischer concedes that he can “see why someone might insist that 
responsibility requires this sort of incompatibilistic creativity, if one is 
committed to the idea that moral responsibility requires alternative 
possibilities.” However, he does not “see any reason to insist on precisely this 
sort of creativity, apart from such a prior commitment.”26 To see why, suppose 
for example, Fischer says, that lightening strikes a barn and thus starts a fire. 
Would we say, Fischer asks, “that the lightening bolt did not start the fire, if it 
turned out that causal determinism were in fact true?” No doubt that for “some 
purposes and in some contexts, perhaps we would withdraw our claim about 
the lightening bolt, if causal determinism were true.” However, surely, he says, 
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“there is a perfectly good sense in which it is true that the lightening bolt 
started the fire, even given the truth of causal determinism.” Hence, Fischer 
thinks there is a perfectly reasonable notion of “initiation” that is compatible 
with causal determinism. Indeed, “why suppose that the indeterministic sense 
is more appealing in the context of ascription of moral responsibility (apart 
from considerations relevant to alternative possibilities)?”27 For his part, 
Fischer can think of no “promising strategy for arguing that causal determinism 
threatens moral responsibility apart from its allegedly ruling out alternative 
possibilities.”28 And so, given that the Frankfurt-type examples demonstrate 
that alternative possibilities are not required for guidance control, and thus with 
a kind of freedom sufficient for moral responsibility, Fischer finds no credible 
reason for denying that causal determinism is compatible with freedom 
sufficient moral responsibility.29 
So far we have seen Fischer’s reasons for concluding that alternative 
possibilities are not required for a sort of freedom sufficient for moral 
responsibility, as well as his reasons for concluding that causal determinism is 
compatible with just such a sort. One final element to consider in relation to 
Fischer’s view of free will is what he refers to as “reasons-responsiveness.” 
The importance of this element should be evident from the following. Suppose 
that an individual, Smith let us say, has been hypnotized, and that the 
hypnotist has induced an urge for Smith to punch the nearest person 
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whenever he hears a telephone ring. On the assumption that Smith has not 
voluntarily requested the inducement, Fischer thinks it is unreasonable to say 
that Smith has guidance control of his punching, and thus is not then morally 
responsible for his doing so. Fischer argues that we have similar intuitions 
regarding a wide range of similar cases. Persons “who perform actions 
produced by powerful forms of brainwashing and indoctrination, potent drugs, 
and certain sorts of direct manipulation of the brain are not reasonably to be 
held morally responsible for their actions insofar as they lack the relevant sort 
of control.”30 
The point that Fischer means to draw from these cases is that when 
“persons are manipulated in certain sorts of ways, they are like marionettes 
and are not appropriate candidates for praise or blame.” Fischer refers to such 
manipulative factors as “responsibility-undermining factors.”31 But why do such 
factors undermine responsibility? Here is where Fischer’s element of reasons-
responsiveness comes into play.  
 Return to the example of Smith. Because Smith is hypnotized to punch the 
nearest individual upon hearing a telephone ring, Fischer believes that he is 
therefore “not sensitive to reasons in the appropriate way.”32 For given the 
hypnosis, Smith “would still have behaved in the same way, no matter what 
the relevant reasons were.” That is, Smith would still have punched “the 
nearest person after hearing the telephone ring, even if he had extremely 
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strong reasons not to.” In such a case the “agent here is not responsive to 
reasons – his behavior would have been the same no matter what reasons 
there were.”33 This sort of case is contrasted with a case where one initially 
decides to contribute, say, to a certain charity, but then decides against it after 
learning about widespread corruption regarding this particular charity. The 
agent in this case does not contribute to the charity regardless of the reasons 
against doing so, and indeed in learning of the reasons against doing so the 
agent decides against contributing. Here, the agent in question is not going to 
contribute no matter what, but is responsive to reasons against contributing in 
a way that Smith is not. For Smith, upon hearing the telephone ring, punches 
the nearest individual no matter his reasons against doing so. 
 On Fischer’s view, then, the essential feature in having guidance control 
and thus being morally responsible for what we do is being reasons-
responsive. So long as we are reasons-responsive to our circumstances, we 
have guidance control of what we do and so are morally responsible for it. 
Fischer takes it that one virtue of this view is that “actual irrationality is 
compatible with moral responsibility (as it should be).”34 To use Fisher’s 
example, consider a case where attending a basketball game would 
jeopardize his meeting a publication deadline. Fischer confesses that in such 
circumstances he would be weak-willed and still go to the game. However, he 
says, surely there are some circumstances where he has sufficient reason not 
to go to the game and he in fact decides not to go. And Fischer informs us that 
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circumstances where “I am told that I will have to pay one thousand dollars for 
a ticket to the game” are precisely such circumstances.35 Hence, though there 
are occasions where Fischer will succumb to weakness of will, it is because 
there are occasions where he will not that he is said to be reasons-responsive. 
Were he to attend the game no matter the reasons against doing so, he would 
not be reasons-responsive, and so would not enjoy guidance control, and so 
would not merit moral responsibility.  
 Putting these elements together, Fischer refers to his view of free agency 
as semi-compatibilism. Central to semi-compatibilism is “the separation of 
acting freely from freedom to do otherwise.”36 Or, put in terms of guidance 
control and regulative control, the separation between a kind of freedom 
sufficient for guidance control and a kind of freedom sufficient for regulative 
control. On semi-compatibilism, “moral responsibility is compatible with causal 
determinism, even if causal determinism is incompatible with freedom to do 
otherwise.”37 And this is the reason for Fischer’s inclusion of the prefix ‘semi’ 
regarding ‘compatibilism’. According to what we might call traditional-
compatibilism, a kind of freedom sufficient for both guidance control and 
regulative control is compatible with causal determinism. Fischer disagrees.38 
As he sees it, causal determinism precludes regulative control. But since he 
thinks reasons-responsiveness and moral responsibility are compatible with 
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38 For the (lengthy) argument that freedom sufficient for regulative control is incompatible with 
causal determinism see chapters 2-6 of Metaphysics of Free Will.
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causal determinism, Fischer is a compatibilist in a non-traditional sense. He 
accepts only part of the traditional compatibilist point of view, thus making 
himself a compatibilist only in part. 
 The lesson I want to take from Fischer’s work is that, arguably, free actions 
neither require the ability to do otherwise, nor the absence of causal 
determinism. Fischer’s use of Frankfurt examples certainly seem to make the 
point that there are at least some actions we perform where we cannot do 
otherwise, and yet on those occasions arguably we are still both free and 
responsible for what we do. However, because that is true of certain of our 
actions, I do not think it necessarily follows that it is true with respect to our 
agency. Intuitively, one difference between the two is that an action is 
something we perform, while agency is an ability we have. Hence, obviously, 
what is true of the one need not also be true of the other. So what reasons do 
we have from Fischer for thinking that since free actions can plausibly be 
causally determined and devoid of alternative possibilities, free agents can be 
so as well? 
 Recall that Fischer argues that apart from considerations of alternative 
possibilities there is no good reason to think that causal determinism is not 
compatible with freedom sufficient for moral responsibility. And since the 
Frankfurt examples show that such freedom does not require the ability to do 
otherwise, Fischer concludes that there is no good reason to think that causal 
determinism is incompatible with freedom sufficient for moral responsibility. I 
think Fischer is mistaken here. For even if he is correct that our intuitions 
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support the conclusion that we are free and responsible for certain actions that 
are both causally determined and without alternative possibilities, it does not 
follow that those intuitions will persist if we turn our attention from the action to 
the agent. Fischer appears to think that they will, since he argues against the 
notion that in order for agents to be free and morally responsible for what they 
do, they need to be “self-initiators” or “self-originators” of their own actions – 
something causal determinism precludes. Against this requirement, Fischer 
says “I can see why someone might insist that responsibility requires this sort 
of incompatibilistic creativity, if one is committed to the idea that moral 
responsibility requires alternative possibilities, but I do not see any reason to 
insist on precisely this sort of creativity, apart from such a prior commitment.”39 
Contra Fischer, I believe that there are such reasons for insisting on just 
this sort of creativity regarding free agents, and they are reasons wholly apart 
from any prior commitment to alternative possibilities. But to see these 
reasons, we need to turn our attention to elements from another account of 
free will. 
3.1.2. From Robert Kane 
 Robert Kane’s account of free will is developed in his book The 
Significance of Free Will.40 Arguably the central theme in his account is that 
“ultimate responsibility lies where the ultimate cause is.”41 As we will see, 
these notions of responsibility and ultimacy play a large role in informing 
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Kane’s conclusions regarding freedom, alternative possibilities, and causal 
determinism. Interestingly, Kane’s account of free will resembles Fischer’s in 
certain crucial respects.  The most notable example regards the question of 
whether actions require both alternative possibilities and the absence of 
causal determinism in order to be free. Kane agrees with Fischer that free 
actions do not, but disagrees with him that in addition free agency does not. In 
examining Kane’s account of free will – as we did with Fischer’s – we will 
consider his account within the framework of alternative possibilities and 
causal determinism. Understanding how Kane thinks free will relates to 
alternative possibilities and causal determinism will help us evaluate the merits 
of his account. We will begin with his views regarding the question of whether 
freedom requires the presence of alternative possibilities.  
 In assessing whether in fact alternative possibilities are a prerequisite for 
free agency – not merely free action – Kane begins his assessment by 
considering two cases from Daniel Dennett.42 The first case regards Martin 
Luther and his well-known parting with the Church in Rome. When Luther said 
“Here I stand. I can do no other,” on the occasion of his breaking with the 
Church, he meant, according to Dennett, “that his conscience made it 
impossible for him to recant.” Dennett notes that Luther may have been wrong 
about this, but that this is beside the point. Even if Luther was correct that he 
could “do no other,” in which case he lacked the ability to do otherwise and so 
lacked alternative possibilities, Dennett says that “we simply do not exempt 
 
42 The following two Frankfurt-type cases are found in Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room: The 
Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984). 
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someone from blame or praise for an act because we think he could do no 
other.”43 As Dennett sees it, in asserting “I can do no other” Luther was not at 
all attempting to avoid responsibility, but was instead taking full responsibility 
for his decision to part with the Church. Hence, if it is credible to think that 
Luther was so responsible even on the assumption that he could not have 
done differently, it appears credible to think as well that alternative possibilities 
are not required for free and morally responsible actions. And given that in this 
example Luther appears so responsible despite not having alternative 
possibilities, Kane agrees with Dennett that free actions must not require the 
ability to do otherwise; or, more carefully, that they at least do not always 
require that ability. 
 To emphasize the point, Dennett offers a personal example. In this 
example, Dennett says that “I hope it is true,” and he thinks “it very likely is 
true,” that “it would be impossible to induce me to torture an innocent person 
by offering me one thousand dollars.”44 Dennett recognizes that no doubt 
someone will object that “what if some evil space pirates were holding the 
whole world ransom, and promised not to destroy the world if only you would 
torture one innocent person?” And he concedes that were evil space pirates 
holding the world ransom, he would probably consent to torture an innocent 
individual in order to rescue humankind. But even if this is true, “so what,” he 
asks; after all this “is a vastly different case.”45 The question before us is 
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whether or not under the original circumstances Dennett could have done 
anything different. That is, could he have done anything other than refuse to 
torture an innocent person for an offer of one thousand dollars? And the 
answer to that question bears no relation to the question of whether or not he 
would likewise refuse in every logically possible situation. Hence, as Dennett 
sees it, he could not have done otherwise than refuse the offer to torture an 
innocent person for one thousand dollars, but his being unable to do otherwise 
does not preclude him from being fully responsible for his refusal. Dennett 
thinks, then, that he would be so responsible, and that his refusal would in 
addition be free.  
 As with the first case, Kane agrees with Dennett that this second case 
plausibly demonstrates that alternative possibilities are not always required for 
free actions. Though Dennett could not do otherwise than refuse an offer to 
torture, his refusal nonetheless looks free, and he looks responsible for it. The 
same is true regarding the case of Luther. Luther looks free and responsible 
for parting with the Church, even though under those circumstances he 
plausibly could not have done otherwise. Thus, Kane believes we have two 
examples that ably illustrate the point that it is at least not always the case that 
free actions require the presence of alternative possibilities. But can this point 
regarding some free actions be generalized to apply to all free actions, even to 
free agency itself? Dennett sees no reason why the point cannot be so 
generalized, and neither, recall, does Fischer. Kane disagrees. 
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The reason Kane disagrees has to do with his understanding of the 
importance of responsibility and ultimacy in debates about free will. Recall that 
above I indicated that these notions play a large role in informing Kane’s 
conclusions regarding freedom, alternative possibilities, and causal 
determinism. Here we see how this notion of responsibility informs his thinking 
regarding the relationship between alternative possibilities and free agency. 
 As Kane sees it, “whether agents deserve praise or blame, punishment or 
reward, for their actions” requires us to “take account of how the persons got 
to be the way they are.”46 More elaborately, before we can assign ultimate 
responsibility to persons for actions that appear to flow from who they are – as 
the actions appear to do in the Luther and Dennett examples – we need to be 
sure we can assign ultimate responsibility to persons for being the way that 
they are; that is, for having the kind of characters, dispositions, and other 
psychological traits that they do, which themselves are involved in bringing 
about (at least some of) their actions. To see the importance of this, consider 
the case of Luther again. We need not deny, Kane says, “Dennett’s claim that 
Luther’s ‘Here I stand’ might be a morally responsible act, even if Luther ‘could 
have done no other’ at the time of making it.” However, to decide whether or 
not he actually was so responsible, Kane insists we would need to know 
“something about the circumstances and background of Luther’s action that 
made him responsible or accountable for it.” Kane believes that if “Luther’s 
affirmation did issue inevitably from his character and motives at the time it 
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was made, then his moral accountability for it would depend on whether he 
was responsible for being the sort of person he had become at that time.”47 So 
was he? 
 Anyone familiar with Luther’s biography knows, Kane says, about the long 
period of inner turmoil and struggle he endured in the years leading up to his 
parting with the Church. Indeed, by “numerous difficult choices and actions 
during that period, Luther was gradually building and shaping the character 
and motives that issued in his act.”48 In fact, the reason we have no hesitation 
assigning responsibility to Luther for his action is because we believe, Kane 
argues, “that he was responsible through many past choices and actions for 
making himself into the kind of man he then was.”49 And here is the crucial 
point. If this is the reason we hold Luther responsible for an action for which he 
did not have alternative possibilities, “the question of whether Luther could 
have done otherwise shifts backwards from the present act to the earlier 
choices and actions by which he formed his character and motives.” Thus if he 
is responsible and accountable for his present act, then “at least some of 
these earlier choices or actions must have been such that he could have done 
otherwise with respect to them.” For were this not the case, “what he was 
would have never been truly ‘up to him’ because nothing he could have ever 
done would have made any difference to what he was.”50 
47 Kane 39. 
48 Kane 39. 
49 Kane 40. 
50 Kane 40. 
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The same point can be made regarding Dennett’s refusal to torture. We 
can take Dennett at his word that he literally could not have done otherwise 
than refuse the offer to torture, but arguably we can hold him responsible for 
his refusal only if Dennett himself is responsible for being the kind of person 
that would, without question, refuse the offer. And if Dennett is responsible for 
having the sort of character that literally precludes him from accepting the 
offer, then, arguably, that is because on previous occasions Dennett 
performed actions that contributed to his character being what it is, which then 
prevented him from accepting the offer. However, if on those previous 
occasions Dennett did not enjoy the ability to do otherwise, then, as Kane 
concludes with respect to Luther, nothing he could ever have done would have 
made any difference to what he was. In short, in order for Dennett to be both 
free and responsible for refusing an offer he literally could not accept, he 
needs to be ultimately responsible for his being the kind of person who literally 
could not accept the offer. And since this appears to require performing 
actions that contribute to Dennett enjoying the kind of character that literally 
could not accept the offer, this appears to require that at least some of the 
actions Dennett performed in the past enjoyed alternative possibilities. 
 With respect to the question, then, of whether alternative possibilities are 
required for free agency, Kane believes that they are, but not in the way 
conventionally understood. On Kane’s view, not all of our morally responsible 
choices and free actions need to be such that we could have done otherwise 
with respect to them directly. However, Kane does argue that at least some of 
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our morally responsible choices and free actions do need to be such that we 
could have done otherwise with respect to them directly, otherwise we would 
not be responsible for what we do. Put differently, when it comes to free will 
and alternative possibilities, Kane believes that free will does not require that 
all free and responsible actions enjoy alternative possibilities, but he does 
believe that some actions in the life histories of agents do require alternative 
possibilities in order for agents to appropriately assume responsibility for those 
times when they could not have acted differently. Hence, we can concede to 
Dennett “that responsible actions need not always be such that the agents 
could have done otherwise with respect to those actions. But we can concede 
this without also conceding that [alternative possibilities are] irrelevant to 
responsible action generally, or to free will.”51 Thus, as Kane sees it, 
alternative possibilities are required for free agency, but not for all of our free 
actions.  
 So much, then, for Kane’s understanding of the relationship between 
alternative possibilities and free will. What about his understanding of the 
relationship between free will and causal determinism? Kane is an 
incompatibilist regarding free will and causal determinism, meaning that the 
presence of one precludes the presence of the other. Now we have already 
seen that considerations regarding ultimate responsibility play a large role in 
leading Kane to the conclusion that free agency requires alternative 
possibilities (though the same is not true of all free actions) .It is no surprise, 
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then, that additional considerations regarding ultimate responsibility play no 
less a role in leading him to conclude that causal determinism is incompatible 
with our having free will. So what are those considerations? 
 The first has to do with Kane’s distinction between three distinct types of 
control. The first type of control he refers to as “constraining control,” where 
one is subject to constraining control just in case one is knowingly forced to do 
something against their will.52 Cases where someone is forced at gunpoint to 
do another’s bidding typify constraining control. Constraining controllers, such 
as the gunman, “get their way by creating constraints or impediments that 
thwart the wills of those they control, preventing other agents from doing what 
they want to do.”53 
The second type of control that Kane distinguishes is a kind of control he 
refers to as “nonconstraining control.”54 Nonconstraining control is like 
constraining control in that it is manipulative. However, nonconstraining control 
is typified by cases of behavioral conditioning and other sorts of behind-the-
scenes manipulation. Nonconstraining controllers then, like constraining 
controllers, get their way, but they “do not get their way [as the latter do] by 
constraining or coercing others against their wills.” Instead, they get what they 
want “by manipulating the wills of others so that the others (willingly) do what 
their controllers desire.”55 Thus nonconstraining controlled agents do not feel 
controlled or coerced in what they do. They act in concert with their own 
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wants, desires, and overall intentions, yet nevertheless they are controlled “by 
others who have manipulated their circumstances so that they want, desire, or 
intend only what the controllers have planned.”56 Kane finds the most 
interesting cases of nonconstraining control cases in which the controllers are 
covert. In such cases of covert nonconstraining control, the agents being 
controlled are unaware that they are being controlled, and so unaware of their 
controllers.  
 An excellent illustration of covert nonconstraining control, Kane argues, is 
found in B. F. Skinner’s novel Walden Two. The citizens of Walden Two live 
collectively in a rural commune; they share duties of farming and raising 
children they have plenty of time for leisure. In addition, they pursue arts, 
sciences, crafts, engage in musical performances, and enjoy what appears to 
be a generally pleasant sort of existence. Moreover, the citizens of Walden 
Two are free to do whatever they want or choose, which leads Frazier, the 
founder of the commune, to declare that Walden Two is “the freest place on 
earth.”57 And indeed, Kane comments, “why should it not be?”58 The citizens 
of this pleasant community are free to do whatever they want or choose, and 
what more could be wanted by way of freedom than doing whatever you want 
or choose? In turns out, however, that the citizens of Walden Two have been 
behaviorally conditioned since childhood only to want and choose whatever it 
is that they want and choose. Moreover, this conditioning has been covert, and 
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thus the citizens of Walden Two are unaware of both the fact of their 
conditioning as well the existence of their controllers. So the citizens of 
Walden Two suffer from covert nonconstraining control. They can do whatever 
they want, but whatever it is that they want has been covertly conditioned by 
others.  
 Now given this additional information, is Frazier’s declaration that Walden 
Two is “the freest place on earth” correct? Kane thinks that it is not. And the 
reason it is not is that “its citizens lack free will in a deeper sense than being 
able to do what they want.” In this deeper sense of freedom, the citizens of 
Walden Two do not have wills that are their own, as “they are not the original 
creators of their own ends and purposes.”59 Instead, these ends and 
purposes, indeed their wills as a whole, are created by their controllers. Thus, 
as Kane sees it, the citizens of Walden Two are not free in a deeper, more 
meaningful sense of freedom than simply having the ability to do what they 
want or choose. Being able to do what we want or choose may be necessary 
for having freedom, but given the situation in Walden Two Kane thinks it 
clearly is not sufficient. To be free in a deeper sense, arguably we need to be 
responsible for the wills that we have. But to be responsible for the wills that 
we have, Kane argues, we need to be free of any covert nonconstraining 
control. And freedom from such control additionally requires us to be the 
originators or creators of our own ends and purposes. Thus, in short, Kane’s 
view is that to be ultimately responsible for what we are we need to be the 
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authors of what we are. And being the authors of what we are precludes being 
authored by another. 
 Given these conclusions from considering the citizens of Walden Two, 
then, Kane inquires whether there is any relevant difference between these 
citizens and us on the assumption that causal determinism is true. Kane 
argues that the threat to freedom posed by covert nonconstraining control is 
not only a problem for the citizens in Walden Two, but also us on the 
assumption that causal determinism is true. And the central reason Kane 
argues for this conclusion is that if one wishes to distinguish between the kind 
of control held by covert controlling agents, and the kind of control had by the 
determination of natural causes, one must argue that while the former “takes 
away freedom in a significant sense, mere determination by natural causes 
does not.’60 However, Kane thinks this claim is difficult to sustain. And it is 
difficult to sustain because it is difficult to locate the relevant difference 
between our powers or abilities in a world actively controlled by covert 
nonconstraining controllers, and a world passively controlled by nature. Why 
would the former compromise our freedom while the latter would not? To 
illustrate this point, Kane asks us to consider the following. 
 Imagine a possible world (W1) “in which every aspect of persons’ lives is 
controlled by invisible gods or spirits.” Now imagine another possible world 
(W2) “in which these persons’ lives are exactly the same as in W1 in every 
detail of thought, belief, and circumstance from birth to death except that in W2
60 Kane 68. 
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everything is produced by natural causes rather than by gods or spirits.” Kane 
now asks, what “powers or abilities or freedoms do the persons have in one 
world that they do not possess in the other?”61 Whatever thoughts, beliefs, 
preferences, dispositions, character traits, and actions that are true in W1 are 
also true in W2. The only difference between the two worlds are the sources of 
such thoughts, beliefs, preferences, and so forth. In W1 the sources are gods 
or spirits, while in W2 the sources are natural causes. But with respect to any 
powers or abilities that we have in W1, it is difficult to see that we do not have 
only those same powers or abilities in W2. Hence, Kane concludes, if we lack 
freedom in the covert nonconstraining controlled world W1, we must also lack 
it in W2, where the covert nonconstraining controllers are not gods or spirits, 
but causally determined events from within the natural world.   
 Kane recognizes that compatibilists attempt to prevent this conclusion by 
arguing (as Bruce Waller does) that the reason we really fear and worry about 
covert nonconstraining control is the potential harm that can be done to us and 
our interests by such controllers. These “manipulators and controllers are 
more likely to have their own good in mind than ours, and therefore we feel 
safer knowing that no purposeful agents are covertly controlling us.”62 Daniel 
Dennett, another compatibilist, argues similarly that “objectionable control is 
exercised by purposeful agents, not natural forces. It is a category mistake to 
think otherwise … For, while nature may determine us, nature (‘not being an 
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agent’) does not control us.”63 Hence, covert nonconstraining control is 
purportedly objectionable “because we do not want to be controlled by other 
agents.” And thus, say certain compatibilists, we think causal determinism is 
“equally objectionable because we illegitimately transfer these feelings about 
control to nature.”64 
But Kane does not think this assessment is quite right. Though 
incompatibilists do not like the idea of agent-controllers any more than the 
compatibilist, he does not think incompatibilists conclude that freedom and 
causal determinism are incompatible simply because they illegitimately 
transferring negative feelings toward such controllers. Rather, as we have 
seen, one reason incompatibilists might insist on the incompatibility of freedom 
and causal determinism is because there is no relevant difference, with 
respect to our powers or abilities, between a world that is thoroughly, though 
covertly, controlled by agents, and a world that is likewise controlled by nature. 
And given that there is no relevant difference between such worlds regarding 
our powers or abilities, and that in one world we lack freedom, we must not be 
free in the other world either. But if this is so, Kane argues, causal 
determinism robs us of powers or abilities that are required for freedom. For 
just as the citizens of Walden Two could not legitimately be said to be 
ultimately responsible for what they are, and so did not have wills that were 
their own, if causal determinism is true, arguably neither can we legitimately 
be said to be ultimately responsible for what we are, and so have wills that are 
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our own. Causal determinism is functionally no different than Walden Two’s 
covert behavioral controllers, and so the freedom-relevant powers precluded 
by them seem additionally precluded by causal determinism.  
 There is another important consideration to mention in relation to power 
that “especially interests incompatibilists,” Kane says.65 This power is the 
“power to be the ultimate source or origin of one’s own ends or purposes 
rather than have that source be in something other than you.” It is not at all 
surprisingly that Kane emphasizes this power, given that his central conviction 
regarding free will, as mentioned already, is that “ultimate responsibility lies 
where the ultimate cause is.”66 This means that in order for one to be 
ultimately responsible for their ends, purposes, or actions, for example, one 
additionally is required to be the ultimate cause of those ends, purposes, or 
actions. So is our having this sort of power or ability consistent with our being 
causally determined to pursue what we do or act as we do? The answer is no. 
According to causal determinism, every event that occurs is causally 
predetermined to occur by some prior event. Hence the event of an agent 
intending to perform a certain action, say, is not an event that is ultimately 
caused by that agent. Rather that event is causally predetermined by previous 
events that occurred in the past, including events that occurred before – 
indeed well before – the agent was even around. These events are obviously 
not events that the agent had any control over, and thus as it regards Kane’s 
understanding of ultimate responsibility, any action ultimately caused by 
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events outside the agent cannot be an action for which the agent is ultimately 
responsible. And since causal determinism precludes us from being the 
ultimate cause of our actions, it additionally precludes us from being ultimately 
responsible for actions, and thus ultimately for what we are. On the 
assumption that causal determinism is true, any actions that flow from our 
characters are not actions that can reasonably be said to be our own, since, if 
causal determinism is true, we cannot be ultimately responsible for our 
characters. Hence, as Kane sees it, causal determinism is simply not 
compatible with our having free agency.  
 So far we have seen the reasons why Kane concedes – to philosophers 
such as Fischer – that free actions are compatible with the absence of 
alternative possibilities and the presence of causal determinism (that is, a local 
version of causal determinism involving particular instances of characters 
causally predetermining actions). We have also seen his reasons for arguing, 
on the other hand, that free agency requires the presence of alternative 
possibilities and absence of causal determinism (that is, a global version of 
causal determinism in which every action is causally predetermined by events 
over which the agent has not control). There is one final and important 
element to consider in Kane’s account of freedom. And that is Kane’s account 
of just how it is that we assume ultimate responsibility for what we are. This is 
important to discuss in articulating Kane’s views on free agency, since 
according to him what we are is sometimes causally responsible what we do. 
But if what we are, at times, causally determines what we do, then in order for 
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us on those occasions to be ultimately responsible for what we do, we need to 
somehow be ultimately responsible for what we are. So how does Kane argue 
that we are indeed responsible for what we are? 
 For Kane, being ultimately responsible for actions that are causally 
predetermined by our characters requires that there exist at least some points 
in our life histories where we performed “self-creating” or “self-shaping” 
actions. Kane argues that these sorts of actions are necessary in order for us 
to assume responsibility for actions causally determined by our characters, 
and his phrase of choice for these sorts of actions is ‘self-forming actions’. 
Essentially, self-forming actions “are the undetermined, regress-stopping 
voluntary actions (or refrainings) in the life histories of agents that are 
required” if agents are to be held ultimately responsible for actions causally 
determined by what the agents are.67 For if there were no such self-forming 
actions, Kane argues, the agent would not be ultimately responsible for what 
they are, and so then not responsible for actions causally determined by what 
they are.  
 To illustrate the point, consider some action (A) causally determined by 
what an agent is – i.e., a complete psychological profile (P) including all of the 
agent’s beliefs, desires, preferences, dispositions, character traits, and so on. 
In this case A is causally predetermined by P, and since it is so determined the 
agent could not have done otherwise than A given P. For the traditional 
incompatibilist regarding freedom and causal determinism, apparently the 
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conclusion to draw is that A is not freely performed because states within the 
agent, rather than the agent herself, causally bring about A. And if such states 
bring about A, rather than the agent, then the agent could do nothing else 
besides A given P, and thus must not be free with respect to A. Kane’s view 
provides a way of avoiding this sort of conclusion. As he sees it, there is 
nothing about a complete psychological profile causing an action that 
precludes that action from being free, and thus the agent from being held 
responsible for it. But Kane thinks this is so only so long as at some earlier 
time the agent performed actions, actions which themselves were not causally 
determined, and which contributed to creating the content of the agent’s 
character. These prior actions must be indeterminate, and so enjoy alternative 
possibilities, as it is by performing these actions that we engage in self-
formation. Kane argues that were such self-forming actions themselves 
causally determined, then nothing an agent could ever do would make any 
difference to what they are. This is the fundamental problem, Kane believes, 
with conjoining global causal determinism and free agency. But it need not be 
a problem, as we have seen, with conjoining local causal determinism and free 
action. 
 So the picture before us is that A caused by P can be something with 
respect to which the agent is free and responsible, but only if on some prior 
occasion the agent indeterminately performed some action A*, and A* 
contributed to creating the content of P. As Kane says regarding the case 
involving Luther, his “Here I stand” would have been “an affirmation for which 
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he was ultimately responsible, even if it was determined and even if he could 
not have done otherwise, so long as it was a willed action (issuing from his 
character and motives) and he was responsible … by earlier undermined [self-
forming actions] for the character and motives from which his affirmation 
issued.”68 This lesson from the Luther example leads Kane to conclude, then, 
that ultimately “responsible acts, or acts done of one’s own free will, make up 
a wider class of actions than those self-forming actions … which must be 
undetermined and such that the agent could have done otherwise.”69 Thus, we 
can be free and responsible for acts that are causally determined by what we 
are, but only if we are free and responsible for what we are. And this requires 
causal indeterminism.   
 Putting together these elements from Kane’s view of free will, then, we may 
refer to his view as hyper-incompatibilism.70 Fischer originally used this term to 
describe incompatibilist views that require causal indeterminism apart from 
considerations regarding alternative possibilities. And though considerations of 
alternative possibilities does play a role in Kane’s conclusions regarding the 
compatibility of free will and causal determinism, such conclusions are 
ultimately underwritten by considerations of ultimate responsibility. Being 
ultimately responsible for our actions requires being the ultimate cause, a 
requirement which itself precludes causal determinism. But if causal 
indeterminism is true, at least on some occasions, then on those occasions we 
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do enjoy the ability to do otherwise, and so our actions do enjoy alternative 
possibilities. In sum, then, Kane is a compatibilist regarding causal 
determinism and free action, but an incompatibilist regarding causal 
determinism and free agency. As Kane sees it, some of our actions (caused 
by our characters) can be actions which are free, and for which we are 
responsible, even if causal determinism is true. However, if all of our actions 
determinately issued from our characters, then nothing we ever did would 
make any difference with respect to what we are, and thus we could not be 
free and held responsible for those actions that determinately issued from our 
characters. Hence on those occasions where our characters – what we are – 
do not causally determine what we do, our actions enjoy alternative 
possibilities. And it is precisely on those occasions, Kane argues, where our 
actions are not causally determined that we engage in self-forming actions; 
actions, indeed, that contribute to the content of our characters and so make a 
difference with respect to what we are. Only by performing these self-forming 
actions, Kane believes, can we be said to be free and responsible for actions 
causally determined by our characters. 
 The lesson I want to take from Kane’s hyper-incompatibilism is a point that 
has been made several times over: actions causally determined by our 
characters are actions that we can be free and responsible for only if at earlier 
times we performed character-forming actions that were themselves causally 
indeterminate. This lesson builds on the lesson from Fischer’s work – that 
local causal determinism is compatible with free action – but precludes 
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Fischer’s additional contention that global causal determinism is compatible 
with free agency. Causal determinism is not compatible with free agency, I 
argue, since free agency requires being the ultimate cause of our actions, and 
causal determinism precludes an agent from playing this sort of causal role. If 
Kane is correct that “ultimate responsibility lies where the ultimate cause is” – 
and it seems plausible to me that he is – then in order for the agent to be free 
and assume ultimate responsibility for their actions, they need to function as 
the ultimate cause of their actions. And since causal determinism precludes 
this, it in addition precludes the compatibility of free agency with global causal 
determinism. Hence, I take it that Fischer’s account of free will is incomplete, 
as it is an account that is plausible only with respect to some free actions, and 
thus not free agency. Kane’s account fills in this important gap left by Fischer’s 
work, and so amounts to significant progress in our attempt to develop a 
credible theory of free agency.  
 Despite the progress made, however, one important question left 
unanswered by Kane’s work is how frequent it is that we engage in self-
forming (or character-forming) actions. Is this an event that occurs, for 
example, many times throughout the course of a day, or is it instead relatively 
rare, occurring only once every so often? Kane does not address this 
question, but it is a question needs addressing in our pursuit of adequate 
metaphysical grounds for counterfactuals of freedom. Hence, we must turn 
now to another account of free will for an answer. 
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3.1.3. From Peter van Inwagen 
 In his article “When Is the Will Free?”71 Peter van Inwagen addresses the 
frequency of free action. For van Inwagen, as an incompatibilist, in order for an 
action to be free, it must be true that, when acting, the agent performing the 
action enjoys alternative possibilities. Hence, as van Inwagen understands it, 
not only does free agency require the ability to do otherwise, but all free 
actions do as well. Given this commitment, then, the central question of van 
Inwagen’s article is “just how often is it that we are able to do otherwise.”72 
Van Inwagen notes that though “belief in one’s free will is the belief that one 
can sometimes do otherwise,” this idea is surprisingly consistent with the idea 
that an agent can have “free will despite the fact that he can almost never do 
otherwise.” So, when is the will free? How often do we enjoy the ability to do 
otherwise when we act, and so act freely? Intriguingly, van Inwagen argues 
that the answer is not often at all. He states that “the incompatibilist must hold 
that being able to do otherwise is a comparatively rare condition, even a very 
rare condition.”73 Indeed we “should concede that one has precious little free 
will, that rarely, if ever, is anyone able to do otherwise than he in fact does.”74 
And if this is so, given that van Inwagen believes that alternative possibilities 
are required for free action, acting freely is a “comparatively rare, even a very 
71 Peter van Inwagen, “When Is the Will Free?,” Philosophical Perspectives 3, James 
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rare” occurrence. But why agree with van Inwagen? What are his reasons for 
this conclusion? 
 To make the argument that we act freely only on rare occasions, van 
Inwagen first claims that there certainly exist occasions in which we are unable 
to act otherwise. Next he argues that we are only able to act otherwise on 
three general sorts of occasions, but that such are unfortunately occasions in 
which we rarely find ourselves. We will begin with the first claim, even though 
this ground has already been covered in discussing the accounts of free will 
from Fischer and Kane, because van Inwagen’s account is more thorough on 
this point than either Fischer or Kane. Both seem to leave the matter with a 
somewhat unexplored intuition – either one is persuaded by the Frankfurt-type 
cases, including the versions involving Luther and Dennett, or they are not. As 
we will see, van Inwagen offers some additional detail, in terms of rationality, 
that, at least as I see it, make it more convincing that it is plausible that on 
some occasions we could not act differently. So let us begin with van 
Inwagen’s first claim. 
 Are there occasions in which are not able to do otherwise? Van Inwagen 
thinks the answer is yes, and that these occasions are of three general sorts 
(but not to be confused with the three general sorts of occasions in which we 
are able to act otherwise). The first occasion van Inwagen mentions in which 
we are unable to do otherwise are occasions in which we find a potential 
course of action “morally reprehensible.”75 Van Inwagen provides an example 
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from personal experience. Recently, he says, “a member of my university, 
speaking on the floor of a College meeting, deliberately misrepresented the 
content of the scholarly work of a philosopher (who was not present), in an 
attempt to turn the audience against him.”76 Van Inwagen now asks us to 
suppose that such course of action were proposed to him. Suppose that 
someone were to propose to him that he misrepresent the work of Smith, say, 
in order to hinder his chances of becoming “Chairman of the Tenure 
Committee,” say. Van Inwagen informs us that he regards “lying about 
someone’s scholarly work as reprehensible,” and that even if he should prefer 
to see Smith not appointed as Chair, he “certainly wouldn’t think of blocking 
his appointment by any such means.”77 
Now given his strong disposition with respect to misrepresenting the work 
of another, van Inwagen asks us to consider the following conditional (call it 
‘C’).  
C If X regards A as an indefensible act, given the totality of 
relevant information available to him, and if he has no way of 
getting further relevant information, and if he lacks any positive 
desire to do A, and if he sees no objection to not doing A 
(again, given the totality of relevant information available to 
him), then X is not going to do A.78 
Van Inwagen now asks, what “is the modal status of C?” As he sees it, it must 
be “something very like a necessary truth,” and the reason is that it is very 
difficult to conceive of circumstances in which the antecedent is true while the 
consequent false. Of course, we can conceive of circumstances, he concedes, 
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where X changes his mind about A (given the discovery of new information 
about A, for example), or where X “just goes berserk,” but building the 
nonoccurrence of these things into the antecedent of C, it appears intuitively 
straightforward “that there is no possible world in which C is false.”79 To 
strengthen that intuition, consider the following. 
 Imagine that X actually proceeds to do A. Imagine, too, that we ask why – 
for we thought X believed a mere moment ago that A was indefensible – and 
that X replies as follows. 
Yes. I did think that. I still think it. I thought that at every moment 
up to the time at which I performed A; I thought that while I was 
performing A; I thought it immediately afterward. I never wavered 
in my conviction that A was an irremediably reprehensible act. I 
never thought there was the least excuse for doing A. And don’t 
misunderstand me: I am not reporting a conflict between duty 
and inclination. I didn’t want to do A. I never had the least desire 
to do A. And don’t understand me as saying my limbs and vocal 
cords suddenly began to obey some will other than my own. It 
was my will that they obeyed. It is true without qualification that I
did A, and it is true without qualification that I did A.80 
This kind of response, van Inwagen believes, is “absolutely impossible.” It is 
not impossible, of course, for X to say it, but it is impossible for X to say it and 
“thereby say something true.”81 The lesson, then, as van Inwagen sees it, is 
that “if I regard a certain act as indefensible [in the sense just described], then 
it follows not only that I shall not perform that act but that I can’t perform it.”82 
And hence it is a clear example of an action, indeed a category of actions, for 
which we do not enjoy the ability to do otherwise. And if so, we do not enjoy 
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the ability to do otherwise regarding actions that we find morally reprehensible, 
and so, according to van Inwagen, we do not enjoy freedom with respect to 
such actions. 
 Van Inwagen extends this conclusion to two other sorts of occasions 
involving action. The first involves cases of “simple, personal desire having no 
moral dimension whatever” – where one has a “very, very strong” desire to 
perform some action and “no countervailing desire of any sort” to refrain from 
so performing it.83 The second involves cases where “things just seem – or 
would seem if we reflected on them at all – to be the obvious things to do in 
the circumstances.”84 In both cases, van Inwagen argues, we cannot tell a 
coherent story where one refrains from performing the action in question, just 
as we could not tell a coherent story regarding X performing an action that he 
finds morally reprehensible. But if we cannot tell such a story, then in neither 
case do we enjoy the ability to do differently, and so in neither case, van 
Inwagen argues, do we enjoy free will.  
 To see this, consider the first sort of cases – cases in which we have an 
unopposed desire. Say an individual named Nightingale, as van Inwagen calls 
him, desperately desires to be a Fellow of the Royal Society. Every year on 
the Society’s election day Nightingale locks himself in his office eagerly 
awaiting a telephone call with news of his admittance or rejection. Each time 
the phone rings Nightingale quickly snatches the telephone receiver and bawls 
“Nightingale here.” Now what van Inwagen wants to know from this story is: 
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“Could he have refrained from answering the telephone?”85 Van Inwagen 
thinks the answer is no. And the reason is that there is no coherent story to tell 
in which Nightingale finds himself in the situation he does, but in which he 
does not additionally answer the telephone. Of course, we could imagine that 
Nightingale “undergoes a sudden religious conversion” when the telephone 
rings, or just goes berserk and “begins to scream and break up furniture,” but 
none of this is part of the situation we are considering. In that situation, 
Nightingale desperately desires news from the Royal Society, and he is 
eagerly waiting for it. And in that situation van Inwagen thinks that “there is no 
possible world in which [the telephone rings] and in which Nightingale does not 
proceed to answer the telephone.”86 
Similarly with the second sort of cases – cases in which from the outset 
what to do is obvious. Sticking with telephone illustrations, van Inwagen thinks 
that most instances of answering the telephone are precisely such cases. As 
he says, on most occasions when the phone rings he has “not been expecting 
the telephone to ring,” and, when it does, with his mind still half on something 
else he picks up the receiver and absently says “Hello?” So consider such a 
case. Suppose van Inwagen is grading papers and the telephone rings. 
Suppose further that he had no reason not to answer the phone, that he does 
answer it, and that he does it without “reflection or deliberation.”87 He simply 
puts down his pen and picks up the receiver. As before, is there a coherent 
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story to tell where van Inwagen is in just those circumstances – and so not 
circumstances in which he has a reason not to answer the telephone, or goes 
berserk, or whatever – and where the telephone rings but he does not answer 
it. Van Inwagen thinks we cannot. As he views it, it is “incoherent to suppose 
that [this] Second Telephone Story is true and that I, nevertheless, do not 
proceed to answer the telephone.”88 
Thus we have seen from van Inwagen three general sorts of occasions 
where we appear to lack the ability to do otherwise. These occasions involve 
duty unopposed by inclination (as in cases where an action is regarded as 
reprehensible, and one has no desire to perform it), inclination unopposed by 
inclination (as in cases where one has a very strong desire to perform some 
action, and no desire to refrain from performing it), and situations where what 
to do is simply obvious (as when the telephone and we have no reason not to 
answer it). On all of these occasions van Inwagen does not think that our wills 
are free, and they are not free precisely because we do not enjoy the ability to 
do otherwise. But how common are such situations? Are they more or less 
common than situations where we do enjoy alternative possibilities?  
 Van Inwagen thinks they are much more common. That is, it is much more 
common, he argues, for our actions to lack alternative possibilities than to 
have them. But why? For van Inwagen, the reason is that the occasions in 
which we enjoy the possibility of doing otherwise are of three general sorts, 
and these very rarely obtain. The first sort are what van Inwagen refers to as 
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Buridan’s Ass cases. In these cases, someone “wants each of two or more 
incompatible things and it isn’t clear which one he should (try to) get, and the 
things are interchangeable.”89 Indeed, van Inwagen says, “their very 
interchangeability is the reason why it isn’t clear to him which to try to get.” 
This is true of Buridan’s Ass when it is placed between two equidistant and 
empirically identical bales of hay. Similar to Buridan’s Ass cases, where the 
objects of desire involved are themselves interchangeable, van Inwagen notes 
that there are cases in which two or more objects of desire are not 
interchangeable. For example, cases in which someone is trying to decide 
between having chocolate or vanilla. Here, the very properties that distinguish 
the objects are themselves the properties about which we have conflicting 
desires.  
 Hence in these situations, characterized by either Buridan’s Ass or 
chocolate/vanilla cases, van Inwagen thinks that our choices or actions do 
enjoy alternative possibilities. And the reason they enjoy alternative 
possibilities is that in these situations the “agent is confronted with alternatives 
and it is not clear to him what to do – not even when all the facts are in.”90 
Thus, in neither class of cases, van Inwagen argues, is it difficult to imagine 
the agent acting differently under the very same set of circumstances. We 
have seen that this is difficult to do regarding cases of duty unopposed by 
inclination, inclination unopposed by inclination, and where what to do was 
simply obvious. But here, since it is not obvious what to do, even when all the 
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facts regarding what to do are in, it is easy to imagine the agent doing 
otherwise, and so van Inwagen believes that the agent actually could do 
otherwise. Hence these cases comprise one class of cases in which the agent 
has the ability to do otherwise. 
 A second class of cases in which it is not obvious what to do are cases van 
Inwagen calls “duty versus inclination.”91 Very often such cases involve moral 
struggle, where what we want to do is not consistent with what we ought to do. 
However, they need not always involve as much. This class of cases can 
easily include situations involving a struggle between “general policy and 
momentary desire,” where what we want to do is inconsistent with some higher 
goal or long term self-interest.92 Van Inwagen amusingly quips that any dieter 
will recognize this kind of non-moral struggle. Hence, cases of duty versus 
inclination, moral or otherwise, comprise a class of actions about which what 
to do is not obvious. Thus, in these sorts of cases – in addition to Buridan’s 
Ass and chocolate/vanilla cases – our actions enjoy alternative possibilities, 
and thus, according to van Inwagen, freedom as well. 
 A third and final class of cases in which we enjoy alternative possibilities, 
and thus freedom, are cases involving “incommensurable values.”93 For 
example, van Inwagen says a “life of rational self-interest (where self-interest 
is understood to comprise only such ends as food, health, safety, sex, power, 
money, military glory, and scientific knowledge, and not ends like honor, 
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charity, and decency) versus a life of gift and sacrifice; caring for one’s aged 
mother versus joining the Resistance; popularity with the public versus 
popularity with the critics:” all these examples are cases involving 
incommensurable values.94 Generally, the question that confronts the agent in 
this third class of cases is “What sort of human being shall I be?” or “What sort 
of life shall I live?” And when deliberation about what to do involves 
consideration of such desires, van Inwagen says “the agent’s present system 
of values does not have anything to tell him.”95 Such cases are characterized 
by “indecision – often agonized indecision.” Moreover, this period “may be a 
long one: weeks, months, or even a really significant part of the agent’s life.”96 
Thus, in these moments of indecision it is certainly not obvious what to do, and 
so, according to van Inwagen, on these occasions we enjoy alternative 
possibilities and thus free will. 
 Now, van Inwagen believes that “these three cases exhaust the types of 
cases in which it is not obvious to the agent, even on reflection, and when all 
the facts are in, how he ought to choose.”97 Moreover, on reflection, van 
Inwagen does not think that the first class of cases – Buridan’s Ass and 
chocolate/vanilla cases – involve free action. The reason, van Inwagen 
argues, is that “when we choose between identical objects symmetrically 
related to us, or when we choose between objects that differ only in those 
properties that are the objects of our competing desires, there occurs 
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something like an internal coin-toss.”98 Van Inwagen speculates that this coin-
toss is the result of a sort of “default decision maker” – a mechanism that is 
always trying to make decisions, decisions which would be wholly arbitrary 
were it to make them, and which is normally overridden by the agent. Hence, 
in cases of the first sort, van Inwagen says “the person’s control over the 
‘default’ decisions maker is eventually suspended and it is allowed to have its 
arbitrary way.” Thus, given the arbitrary nature of the decision, van Inwagen 
thinks it is “pretty clear that in such cases one has no choice about how one 
acts.”99 
But if this is correct, van Inwagen argues, then there are “at most two sorts 
of occasion on which the incompatibilist can admit that we exercise free will:” 
cases involving duty versus inclination, and cases involving a conflict between 
incommensurable values. Van Inwagen believes both “of these sorts of 
occasion together must account for a fairly small percentage of the things we 
do.”100 But since this is the largest class of actions with respect to which we 
enjoy the ability to do otherwise, van Inwagen thinks that we must conclude 
that freedom is a “rare condition, even a very rare condition.”101 
How rare is rare, though? More precisely, even granting that the ability to 
do otherwise is a “very rare condition,” how frequent is it? To this important 
question van Inwagen says it “is perhaps not clear how many of the occasions 
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of everyday life count as making a choice.”102 Consider a first case: The 
stoplight turns green, “and the driver, his higher faculties wholly given over to 
thoughts of revenge or lunch or the Chinese Remainder Theorem puts his car 
into gear and proceeds with his journey.” Did the driver actually make a choice 
between proceeding and remaining? “Presumably not,” van Inwagen says, 
“the whole thing was too automatic.”103 Consider a second case: The rookie 
public official “unexpectedly and for the first time is offered a bribe, more 
money than he ever thought of having, in return for an unambiguous betrayal 
of the public trust.” After a brief, but highly anxious, consideration of the offer, 
he accepts. “Did he make a choice?” van Inwagen asks. “Of course.” However, 
he argues that between “these two extremes lie all sorts of cases, and it is 
probably not possible to draw a sharp line between making a choice and 
acting automatically.” But “wherever we draw the line,” van Inwagen believes, 
“we are rarely in a situation in which the need to make a choice confronts us 
and in which it isn’t absolutely clear what choice to make … [even] on 
reflection.”104 Hence, as van Inwagen sees it, acting automatically is extremely 
common, and acting deliberately – when what to do is not clear – extremely 
rare. But this is about as much as can be said. It is likely not possible to 
specify precisely just how rare acting deliberately actually is. 
 Aside from the rarity of freedom, however, van Inwagen does not think the 
same regarding responsibility. And the reason is that responsibility, he argues, 
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unlike freedom, does not require alternative possibilities. This point can be 
expressed as follows. Suppose that one evening Jones, a recovering 
alcoholic, succumbs to temptation and drinks heavily. Jones struggled mightily 
with the decision – a case of duty versus inclination – but in the end Jones’ 
inclination, rather than his sense of duty, got the best of him. Suppose further 
that afterwards Jones drives drunk, hits another automobile, and that at the 
moment of the wreck Jones was literally unable to do anything different due to 
his intoxication. Is he morally responsible for the wreck? Van Inwagen believes 
that he is, since Jones’ inability at the time of the wreck is an inability that 
Jones could have avoided having. Thus, for van Inwagen, we can be held 
morally responsible for actions in which we lacked the ability to do otherwise, 
so long as that inability can be traced back to actions in which we did have the 
ability to do otherwise, and so were free.  
 Van Inwagen thinks the same point can be made regarding actions that 
flow from our characters (such as in the previously discussed cases of Martin 
Luther or Daniel Dennett). He says it “is an old, and very plausible 
philosophical idea that, by our acts, we make ourselves into the sorts of people 
that we eventually become.”105 Thus consider a certain Mafia hit-man. 
Presumably, van Inwagen says, “most of us have been born with a rather deep 
reluctance to kill helpless and submissive fellow human beings.” However, “if 
there is such a reluctance,” van Inwagen notes, “it can obviously be 
overcome.” And, presumably, “each time this reluctance is overcome it grows 
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weaker, until it finally disappears.”106 So suppose our hit-man did act freely on 
the first occasion that he killed. Such an occasion, suppose, was one of duty 
versus inclination: duty because he was ordered to do so by The Boss, and 
inclination from the (presumably) natural, deep seated moral intuition that it is 
wrong to kill. Now say that he performs the kill, and that “he continued to do 
this when it was required of him until he had finally completely extirpated his 
reluctance to kill the helpless and submissive.”107 Upon the next order to kill, 
this hit-man may very well lack the ability to do anything other than perform the 
kill. If so, then he lacks alternative possibilities and thus, according to van 
Inwagen, lacks free will in relation to this kill. But that does not suggest that he 
is not responsible for performing the kill. For on many previous occasions, van 
Inwagen argues, he could have done differently and so have avoided having 
the present inability that he does. Hence, he is morally responsible for killing, 
even though his character is now such that he cannot act otherwise in relation 
to killing when The Boss orders him to do so. 
 Altogether, we can refer to van Inwagen’s views of free will and moral 
responsibility as restricted-incompatibilism. In terms of our evaluative 
framework of alternative possibilities and causal determinism, Van Inwagen is 
an incompatibilist, as he believes freedom requires having alternative 
possibilities, but that causal determinism precludes our having such 
possibilities. He is, however, an incompatibilist of a unique sort in that he 
believes we very rarely enjoy alternative possibilities when we act. Thus he is 
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an incompatibilist who places unusual restrictions and qualifications on the 
requirement of alternative possibilities for freedom, and thus the term 
restricted-incompatibilism.  
 The lesson I want to take from van Inwagen’s account of free will is the 
answer it provides regarding the question of how often our actions enjoy 
alternative possibilities. Recall that one question we had regarding Kane’s 
views on free will is precisely this question. Kane is committed to the view that 
alternative possibilities are required for free agency only, and thus only for 
some free actions. But Kane does not think that alternative possibilities are 
required for free actions in general. This account of freedom, however, is not 
informative regarding how often our actions enjoy alternative possibilities, and 
I briefly commented that answering this question is important in relation to the 
grounding objection (our project in the next chapter). For our present 
purposes, it is enough that a plausible case can be made for thinking that the 
ability to act otherwise is a relatively rare thing.  
 There are two problems, though, that I would like to mention with respect 
van Inwagen’s view. The first is that I think he too closely associates 
alternative possibilities and freedom of action. For van Inwagen, the absence 
of alternative possibilities precludes an action from being freely performed. But 
given the arguments developed above in discussing Kane’s views on free will, 
I see little merit in the idea that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary 
condition for every free action. Arguably Martin Luther’s “Here I Stand” is a 
case where Luther literally could not do otherwise than break with the Church 
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at Rome, yet given the way Luther fashioned his character, which itself was 
responsible for his inability to do differently, I see no reason to think that 
Luther’s stand was not free. So long as he is ultimately responsible for his 
character, he bears ultimate responsibility for the decision that his character 
caused. All things being equal, what more is needed for freedom than that? 
Moreover, I see no reason why the cases van Inwagen cites in which the 
agent cannot do otherwise – cases of duty unopposed by inclination, 
inclination unopposed by inclination, and where what to do is simply obvious – 
cannot themselves be cases involving freedom. So long as the agent in 
question is ultimately responsible, as Kane articulates it, for the decision that is 
made in each situation, the agents arguably act freely despite the inability to 
act otherwise. Hence, just because our actions lack alternative possibilities, I 
do not agree with van Inwagen that such actions cannot be free.  
 A second point of disagreement with van Inwagen is similar to the first. As 
van Inwagen sees it, we only enjoy alternative possibilities on occasions of 
duty versus inclination, or occasions where we possess incommensurable 
desires. Van Inwagen argues that in cases analogous to Buridan’s Ass and 
chocolate/vanilla situations, despite the presence of alternative possibilities, 
we do not act freely given that our decision is arbitrarily made by what he 
refers to as a “default decision maker.” Regardless of whether van Inwagen is 
correct regarding the existence of such a mechanism, I think we can argue 
that even if the mechanism were to exist, such arbitrary outputs can still be 
free. The reason is analogous to the argument in the previous paragraph: so 
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long as the agent is free and responsible for being in a situation in which the 
mechanism issues an arbitrary decision, there is no reason to say that the 
decision could not be free.  
 Consider the case of deciding between two equidistant and empirically 
identical gallons of milk in the supermarket. Suppose that van Inwagen is 
correct, and thus that when I select the gallon on the left my selection is 
arbitrarily produced by my default decision maker. However, suppose that in 
addition to this I am ultimately responsible for my desire to buy some milk, as 
well as for finding myself at that moment in supermarket. In that case, even if 
my decision to grab the gallon on the left is arbitrary, why should that decision 
in addition not count as free? I gather that such a decision would count as free 
were I contemplating which of two equidistant and empirically identical cars to 
steal. Surely it would be a poor defense after I had stolen the car on the left to 
claim that I did not perform the theft freely because the decision to steal the 
car on the left was arbitrarily made. But if such a defense is implausible, I see 
no reason to believe, as van Inwagen seems to, that we cannot be free and 
responsible for decisions that are arbitrary – as they seem to be in Buridan’s 
Ass cases and chocolate/vanilla cases. 
3.2. THE THEORY OF SEMI-LIBERTARIANISM 
It is time to take stock of the lessons learned above. Amassing the lessons 
from Fischer, Kane, and van Inwagen into a single coherent and credible 
theory of free will, we arrive at the following picture of what it means to be a 
free agent. From John Martin Fischer’s account of free will, we learn that it is 
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credible to think that we can be both free and morally responsible for actions 
that are causally determined. Thus, at the local level of a particular action, 
there seems to be nothing about causal determinism that precludes our acting 
freely and being morally responsible for how we act. Dennett’s claim that were 
he offered a thousand dollars to torture an innocent person, he would not be 
able to do otherwise than refuse the offer, appears to be a case in point. 
Presumably, the reason Dennett could not accept the offer (under the 
circumstances he specified, circumstances which, for example, did not include 
that his acceptance of the offer would save the world, or anything of the sort) is 
that his character (or complete psychological profile) causally precluded him 
from doing so. Dennett believes he is simply the sort of person that literally 
could not accept the offer, and odds are we think as much about ourselves. I 
at least do not believe I could torture someone for a thousand dollars – or any 
amount of money for that matter – and so I see no reason, again apart from 
considerations at the local level of the action, for thinking that Dennett’s 
rejection of the offer to do so is not an action for which he is free and morally 
responsible; even on the assumption that his character causally predetermined 
his rejection. Hence, from Fischer we learn that – again, at least at the local 
level – free agency is compatible with the absence of alternative possibilities 
and the presence of causal determinism. 
 But on reflection, this appears to be true only at the local level of an action. 
Considering the matter at the global level, the level where the entire life history 
of an agent is in view, the intuitions are different. For at this level, if every 
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particular action that an agent performs is itself causally predetermined by 
prior events, events which themselves are causally predetermined by even 
prior events still (a chain leading all the way back to the very first event in the 
universe), then, as Robert Kane has argued, it is difficult to see that an agent 
has any control whatsoever over their characters (that is, to what sort of 
character they end up having). But if this is so, then it is difficult to see – again, 
from this global perspective – that anyone is free and morally responsible for 
any actions that causally flow from their characters. Hence, from Kane we 
learn that it makes a definite difference, with respect to the compatibility of 
causal determinism and free agency, whether one is considering the question 
from a local or global perspective.  
 Consider Dennett’s offer to torture again. Presumably Dennett is free and 
responsible in his rejection of the offer, even if causally predetermined by his 
character to do so, only if he is somehow free and responsible regarding the 
content of his character. Were his character forced upon him from some 
outside source – that is, a source other than himself, as is the case, we saw, 
with the citizens of Walden Two – then it is not at all clear how Dennett could 
correctly be said to be free and morally responsible for actions that his 
character causally determines. Thus, I agree with Kane’s basic assumption 
that ultimate responsibility lies with the ultimate cause. Hence, in order for 
Dennett to be free and responsible for his rejection of the offer to torture when 
that rejection is causally determined by his character, he needs to be free and 
responsible for his character. And to achieve that, he needs to be ultimately 
187
responsible for his character, which requires that he be the ultimate cause of 
his character. But since he cannot be such a cause if causal determinism is 
true at the global level, it certainly appears as though causal determinism is 
incompatible with free will. Thus, free will requires causal indeterminism at the 
global level, and that at least some of our actions are not causally 
predetermined, which entails that at least some of our actions enjoy alternative 
possibilities. And it is precisely in such movements where what we do makes a 
difference to what we are. The actions we perform in such moments are self-
forming actions, and it is because of such actions that we can be considered 
free and held morally responsible at later times for actions that are causally 
determined by our characters. 
 How frequent, though, are such actions? How often do we perform self-
forming actions and so determine (in part) the content of our characters? 
Arguably not very often. From Peter van Inwagen we learn that, arguably, on 
very few occasions is it not obvious what to do. Indeed, arguably, there are 
only three such occasions. These occasions involve: (1) uncertainty due to 
inclination versus inclination with respect to (a) two or more exactly similar 
courses of action to take (as in Buridan’s Ass cases), or (b) two or more 
incompatible but equally desirable courses to take (as in chocolate/vanilla 
cases); (2) uncertainty due to a conflict of duty verses inclination (as in cases 
of temptation, moral or otherwise); and (3) uncertainty due to a conflict of 
incommensurable desires (as in cases where one considers what kind of life to 
lead). Thus, only occasions of inclination versus inclination, duty versus 
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inclination, or those involving deciding between incommensurable values is it 
not clear what to do, and so it is only on these occasions that we enjoy the 
ability to do otherwise when we act. But since such occasions are rare – 
though how rare, remember, it is difficult or impossible to say – it is rare that 
our actions are indeterminate, and thus self-forming.      
 All of these lessons (elements) together, as a single theory of free will, is 
the view I refer to as semi-libertarianism. According to semi-libertarianism free 
actions do not require the presence of alternative possibilities nor the absence 
of causal determinism, though free agents do. Moreover, the occasions in 
which free agents enjoy the ability to do otherwise are relatively rare. The 
reason for the prefix ‘semi’ is that on traditional libertarian views both free 
actions as well as free agents require the ability to do otherwise and causal 
indeterminism. My view is that (all) free actions do not, though free agents do. 
Hence, my view combines elements of the compatibilist position – namely, that 
(local) causal determinism does not preclude us from performing free and 
responsible actions – but is more libertarian, I think, than compatibilist in that it 
requires causal indeterminism at the global level, and so precludes conjoining 
a global version of causal determinism and free will. 
3.3. LOOKING AHEAD 
In this chapter we have developed what I take to be a coherent and 
plausible view of free will. We have examined three accounts of free will from 
Fischer, Kane, and van Inwagen, and have done so paying close attention to 
what each has to say about alternative possibilities and causal determinism 
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with respect to free will. It is from within this framework that we developed 
semi-libertarianism. Broadly put, this theory of free agency is compatibilist with 
respect to free action and causal determinism, but incompatibilist with respect 
to free agency and causal determinism.  
 As will become clear in the next chapter, taking the time to develop the 
theory of semi-libertarianism does assist us in the search for adequate 
metaphysical grounds for counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. And the next 
chapter attempts to show precisely how this search can conclude by relying on 






In the previous chapter we developed a theory of libertarian free agency. 
There are two reasons we have done so. The first involves the Molinist’s 
commitment to libertarianism. Given that the theory of middle knowledge is a 
theory purportedly reconciling divine foreknowledge and providence with 
human freedom of a libertarian sort, middle knowledge itself must be 
consistent with the essentials of libertarianism. Hence, if there is anything 
required by libertarianism that itself precludes God from enjoying exhaustive 
foreknowledge, then libertarianism itself precludes God from enjoying middle 
knowledge. Part of what I will argue in this chapter is that this is in fact the 
case. Hence, as I see it, middle knowledge requires modifying even if, for one 
reason or another, my own account of how it should be modified is 
problematic.  
 The second reason we developed a theory of libertarian free agency is that 
the grounding objection can partially find a satisfactory reply by employing 
such a theory. More specifically, the particular version of libertarianism that 
has been developed earlier can provide “adequate metaphysical grounds” for 
the truth values of some counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Recall that the 
question of adequate metaphysical grounds was the central concern of the 
grounding objector to the theory of middle knowledge. Philosophers such as 
William Hasker and Robert Adams simply could not find any reasons for 
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thinking that counterfactuals of freedom could be true, and so each considers 
them all false. The central argument of this chapter is that our theory of semi-
libertarianism has the ontological resources to ground the truth values of at 
least some counterfactuals of freedom, though, unfortunately, not all 
counterfactuals of freedom. Hence, given semi-libertarianism, God can have 
partial, but not exhaustive foreknowledge of and providence over libertarian 
free choices. This is the modification that I propose for the theory of middle 
knowledge, it is in this sense that our theory of libertarianism developed in 
Chapter 2 partially provides a satisfactory solution to the grounding objection. 
And since my modification places even further restrictions than does traditional 
theories of middle knowledge (or, traditional-Molinism) on the amount of 
foreknowledge and providence that God enjoys, appropriately I will refer to the 
view as restricted-Molinism.
In what follows I will develop the theory of restricted-Molinism. I will first 
discuss the elements of the theory and then put those elements together into a 
comprehensive theory of partial foreknowledge and providence. Afterwards, I 
will consider some objections to restricted-Molinism, addressing along the way 
the problem traditional-Molinism has in relation to the requirements of 
libertarianism. Thus, since libertarianism is incompatible with traditional-
Molinism (as I will argue), restricted-Molinism is as good as it gets for the 
Molinist in relation to reconciling divine foreknowledge and providence with 
libertarian free agency. Hence, I conclude that restricted-Molinism is 
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theoretically preferable to traditional-Molinism, on the assumption that we 
enjoy libertarian free agency.  
4.1. ELEMENTS OF RESTRICTED-MOLINISM 
In this section I will discuss the elements (or basic materials) of the theory 
of restricted-Molinism. Those elements include the theory of semi-
libertarianism, as well as applications of the type-token distinction in relation to 
actions, agents, situations, and counterfactuals of freedom. We begin with a 
brief review of semi-libertarianism.  
4.1.1. Semi-Libertarianism 
 The theory of semi-libertarianism is libertarian at the core, as the theory is 
committed to causal indeterminism at the global level of free agency. 
Compatibilist views of free agency are not so committed, and are designated 
‘compatibilist’ precisely because they attempt to show that causal determinism 
– at the global level – and free agency are indeed compatible. In the previous 
chapter we argued extensively that this is not so. And the central reason for 
thinking as much is that, quite plausibly, ultimate responsibility lies with the 
ultimate cause. If it is false that we are ultimately responsible for our actions, 
then, clearly, something else is. And according to a global version of causal 
determinism, what is ultimately responsible for all of our actions are events 
over which we have no control; events which themselves obtained in the 
distant past even before we existed. But if events which obtained in the distant 
past, and over which we have no control, are ultimately responsible for our 
actions because they are the ultimate cause of our actions, then it is very 
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difficult to see how those same actions can be regarded as actions that are 
ours, and so be actions that are free. And since global versions of causal 
determinism entail that all of our actions are caused by events over which we 
have no control, and which occurred in the distant past, it simply is not credible 
to think that freedom is compatible with global versions of causal determinism. 
Hence, semi-libertarianism is committed to causal indeterminism – at least at 
the global level – principally because global versions of causal determinism 
preclude us from being the ultimate causes of our actions, which (arguably) 
precludes us from enjoying free agency. 
 However, because freedom requires causal indeterminism at the global 
level, it does not follow that all of our actions must themselves be causally 
indeterminate. In other words, just because compatibilism regarding free 
agency and global causal determinism is false, it need not also be the case 
that compatibilism regarding free actions and local causal determinism is false. 
Previously we illustrated this point with Martin Luther’s declaration that “Here I 
stand, I can do no other.” It seems credible that on this occasion Luther was 
speaking the literal truth, and thus that on this occasion he could do no other 
than break with the Church at Rome. Moreover, it seems plausible that the 
reason Luther could do no other is that he had, by many previous actions, 
made himself into the sort of person – that is, with the sort of character – that 
literally could do no other on that occasion. It seems further reasonable to 
suppose that Luther’s character causally precluded him from doing otherwise, 
and so causally determined his breaking with the Church in the circumstances 
194
in which he did. If so, does the fact that his break with the Church was causally 
predetermined by his character preclude his breaking with the Church from 
being freely performed? Arguably not, so long as Luther was not likewise 
determined on those previous occasions in which he made himself into the 
sort of man that he was; that is, having the sort of character that he had. As 
long as Luther is the ultimate cause of his character, then he can assume 
ultimately responsibility for his character. Hence even if on certain occasions 
his character causally determines his actions, he can be responsible for those 
actions, as well as free with respect to them, given that he is the ultimate 
cause of his character. Such causally indeterminate occasions in which Luther 
made a causal contribution to his character are occasions in which Luther 
performed self-forming actions. These indeterminate actions made Luther into 
the kind of man that he was, and they are essential if Luther is to be 
considered free and responsible for actions that are caused by his character. 
Thus, all free actions need not be causally indeterminate; some can indeed be 
casually predetermined. However, in order for free agency to exist, a global 
version of causal indeterminism must exist as well.  
 But how often do our actions enjoy causal indeterminacy, and so function 
as actions that are self-forming? Arguably not very often. It is plausible to think 
that our actions are only indeterminate, and so not caused by our characters, 
on occasions in which, broadly construed, it is not obvious what to do. Such 
occasions include situations where inclination is opposed by inclination, 
situations where duty is opposed by inclination, and situations where our 
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desires are simply incommensurable with respect to what it is that we should 
do. Situations of these sorts occur relatively rarely, and so it is plausible to 
think that only rarely do we engage in causally indeterminate actions, and thus 
self-forming actions. And though we would like to know exactly how rare such 
situations are, it is likely that it is simply not possible for us to say; such 
information is likely beyond our epistemic reach.  
 In short, then, semi-libertarianism asserts that all free actions do not require 
the absence of causal determinism, but free agency itself does. In addition, 
occasions in which we indeterminately act are relatively rare, but how rare it is 
probably not possible for us to say. 
4.1.2. Action-Types & Action-Tokens 
 In order to discuss the remaining elements (or materials) of restricted-
Molinism, we need to say something about the type-token distinction. For in 
the next four sections I will apply the type-token distinction to actions, agents, 
situations, and counterfactuals. The reason for doing so is that these materials 
are consequently some of the tools that God has at his disposal in order to 
foreknow and providentially plan for the course of the actual world. How these 
tools assist him in this endeavor will become clear when we put all of the 
elements of restricted-Molinism into a comprehensive theory of foreknowledge 
and providence. For now, though, we must stick to developing the type-token 
distinction in regard to the aforementioned four areas.  
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The type-token distinction is roughly the distinction between universals and 
particulars.1 The distinction in terms of ‘types’ and ‘tokens’ was first introduced 
by C. S. Peirce, who illustrated the distinction by pointing to different senses of 
words. For example, in one sense there is only one English world ‘the’. In 
another sense, however, there are numerous words ‘the’ on the present page. 
These latter instances are spatiotemporal objects composed of ink, and, in 
terms of the type-token distinction, are construed as word tokens of the of the 
word type ‘the’. Otherwise put, there is only one word ‘the’, understood as a 
universal, though there are many particular exemplifications of ‘the’.  
 But this distinction between types and tokens appears to be applicable 
beyond its original use in language. For example, there is Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony and particular performances of it, the organism horse and 
individual horses, and even games, such as poker, and particular poker 
games. In each of these examples there is a kind and instances of that kind. 
And in terms of the type-token distinction, the former is a type and the latter a 
token. Interestingly, the type-token distinction plays a prominent role in the 
philosophy of mind. In that context, the distinction is employed to distinguish 
two versions of the  mind-brain identity thesis. Both versions affirm that the 
mind and brain are identical, but they differ with regard to the nature of the 
identity relation involved. Is it that types of mental states are identical to types 
of physical states (type physicalism), or is that particular mental states are 
 
1 The brief explication that follows of the type-token distinction relies on Linda Wetzel, 
“Type/Token Distinction,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and 
New York: Routledge (1998). 
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identical merely to particular physical states (token physicalism)? But be that 
as it may, for our purposes it is enough to think of types roughly as kinds or 
universals, and tokens as instances of those kinds or concrete particulars. 
Obviously among philosophers there are differing views regarding the 
ontological nature of types and tokens – e.g., there are realist views, 
nominalist views, and conceptualist views – but nothing in the following 
discussion presupposes one metaphysical position over another. What follows 
is ontologically neutral in relation to the actual ontology of tokens and types. 
 With that brief introduction in mind, the second element in the theory of 
restricted-Molinism is the distinction between act-types and act-tokens. 
Following Alvin Goldman, we can think of act-types as “simply an act-
property,” such as “mowing one’s lawn, running, writing a letter, or giving a 
lecture.”2 Thus when we ascribe an act to an agent, we say that the agent 
exemplified, at a certain time, an act-property. For example, in saying that 
“Jones mowed the lawn,” we are asserting that Jones exemplifies the property 
of mowing the lawn at a certain time. Goldman notes that though normally 
philosophers tend to apply the term ‘property’ to “such things as being six feet 
tall, being a bachelor, or having red hair,” it is not clear that we need to “restrict 
the term ‘property’ to static properties.”3 For just as owning a Chevrolet is a 
property that can be exemplified by Jones at a particular time, it seems that 
Jones might also exemplify the property of buying a Chevrolet at some 
particular time.  
 
2 Alvin Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970) 10. 
3 Goldman 10. 
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To perform an act, then, is simply to exemplify a certain property. Hence, to 
perform the act of giving a lecture is simply to exemplify the property of giving 
a lecture. To perform the act of writing a letter is simply to exemplify the 
property of writing a letter; and so forth. A particular act, then, as Goldman 
says, “consists in the exemplifying of an act-property by an agent at a 
particular time.”4 And this exemplification of an act-property is just what 
Goldman refers to as an act-token. So an act-token is not itself a property, but 
rather the exemplifying of an act-property by an agent. Act-tokens, then, 
include Jones’ mowing his lawn at a certain time, Jones’ writing a letter at a 
certain time, Jones’ given a lecture at a certain time, and so on. Thus, act-
types are act-properties, and act-tokens exemplifications of such properties by 
agents.  
4.1.3. Agent-Types & Agent-Tokens 
 We can extend Goldman’s analysis of act-types and act-tokens to cover 
individual agents as well. On this analysis, agent-types will be construed as 
collections of properties, but only properties of a certain sort. The properties 
included in agent-types will be construed only as static properties, such as, 
recall, being six feet tall or having red hair. The properties included in the 
collection of properties that comprise an agent-type would thus not include 
properties such as buying a Chevrolet. Properties such as buying a Chevrolet 
are what we might call dynamic properties. Such dynamic or relational 
properties are properties that are exemplified by the agent, but only in virtue of 
 
4 Goldman 10. 
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certain relations in which the agent stands. Static properties, on the other 
hand, or non-relational properties, are properties that are exemplified by the 
agent independent of any such relations. These properties are exemplified by 
the agent simpliciter, and thus not exemplified because of the agent’s 
relationship to some concrete particular (as is the case with respect to the 
property of owning a Chevrolet).  
 Let us say, then, that agent-types are collections only of static properties, 
as these are the only properties exemplified by the agent independent of 
something else. The properties that comprise this collection include the 
aforementioned physical properties (being six feet all, having red hair), but 
also include psychological properties. Examples of such properties are 
believing that the sky is blue, desiring to live life well, and being disposed 
toward intellectual honesty. An exhaustive and self-consistent set of physical 
and psychological properties, then, would be an agent-type. Such types are 
possibly exemplifiable, and so it is possible for actual agents to collectively 
exemplify particular agent-types. Some types, though logically possible, are no 
doubt however not nomologically possible. It is possible that an agent-type 
include the property of being fifty feet tall, but there is very little chance, if any, 
that a particular agent will ever exemplify that particular agent-type. Of course, 
since the very same physical and psychological properties can be had by 
more than one agent, there will obviously be many agent-types that enjoy the 
overlapping properties – as when, for example, two distinct individuals are six-
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feet tall, believe that the sky is blue, are disposed toward intellectual honesty, 
and so forth.  
 When a specific agent, then, as a concrete particular exemplifies all of the 
properties comprising a certain agent-type, that agent can be said to be an 
agent-token of that agent-type. All of us, then, are particular tokens of 
universal agent-types, but it is not the case that we remain particular types for 
any significant length of time. Among other things, our weights are constantly 
changing (for better or worse), as well as our stock of beliefs, desires, 
preferences, and so forth. Thus the agent-types that we exemplify are likewise 
constantly changing too. Indeed, whenever a single property that we did 
exemplify now fails to be exemplified, or that we did not exemplify is now 
exemplified, collectively we exemplify an entirely new agent-type. Hence, the 
agent-tokens that we are are themselves impermanent; we are continually 
proceeding from the exemplification of one agent-type to another. 
4.1.4. Situation-Types & Situation-Tokens 
This analysis can be further extended to cover situations; that is, 
circumstances or states of affairs in which we might find ourselves. Such 
situation-types – as I will refer to them – include every possible permutation of 
copossible properties. These properties are not merely static, but dynamic as 
well. Thus, situation-types will include static properties such as being in the 
afternoon, being sixty-five degrees, being Spring, there being two cats, and 
the like. But they will also include dynamic properties such as there being two 
bookshelves to the left of the mantle, there being a chair three feet from the 
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wall, or there being a table five feet from the door. In short, with regard to 
situation types, the static properties determine what specific objects (along 
with their own properties) any possible situation-type might include, and the 
dynamic properties determine precisely how those specific objects are situated 
within the situation itself.  
 It is important to note that some of the things that are a part of situation-
types are agent-types. Concrete situations very often include agents, and so, 
at the level of types, situation-types very often include agent-types as well. For 
example, the concrete situation of two close friends, Jones and Smith, say, 
flying to New York is but a situation-token of a certain situation-type. The token 
includes Jones, Smith, the plane, their seating position on the plane, their 
beliefs regarding where they are heading, their desires for a safe flight, the 
menu for the flight, and many other such property tokens besides these. The 
situation-type, then, includes not only static and dynamic properties such as 
the menu for the flight, there being a plane, there being a certain number of 
seats on the plane, one row of seats being so many feet from another row of 
seats, and so forth, but also all of the psychological properties that Jones and 
Smith exemplify. Hence, whatever particular agent-types Jones and Smith are 
agent-tokens of – which recall is determined by precisely which beliefs, 
desires, aspirations, dispositions, and other such psychological properties, 
along with all of the physical properties that Jones and Smith exemplify – such 
types are themselves included in the situation-type. This is a salient point, as 
we will see, in our development of restricted-Molinism.  
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Another important point to emphasize is that situation-types very often 
include not only agent-types, but action-types. In the concrete situation of 
Jones and Smith flying to New York, there are no doubt many actions being 
performed, by themselves as well as others, as they travel on their way. Jones 
and Smith are thinking, conversing, looking out the window, stretching their 
legs (as much as can be done), and other passengers doing much of the 
same. The flight attendants are offering drinks, meals, pillows, and blankets, 
and (most importantly) the pilots are flying the plane. All of these are actions 
that agents are performing in the situation-token of Jones and Smith flying to 
New York. The situation-type, then, must include such actions if Jones and 
Smith flying to New York is truly a situation-token of some specific situation-
type. So in our analysis of situation-types, it is important to keep in mind that 
they include action-types as well as agent-types. 
 Given this picture of situation-types, then, not surprisingly we can define a 
situation-token quite easily. A situation-token – as with action-tokens and 
agent-tokens – is simply the concrete exemplification or instantiation of the 
properties included in some situation-type. The actual situation of Jones and 
Smith on the plane is simply the concrete instantiation of all of the properties 
included in the universal situation-type. Thus, situation-tokens are simply 
exemplifications of situation-types.  
 One question that I have not thus far addressed is how broadly a situation 
should be construed. The situation I have described thus far (i.e., Jones and 
Smith on the plane) are relatively narrow in their scope, but situations 
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themselves need not necessarily be so narrowly described. We could speak 
not only of the situation of Jones and Smith in New York, but of the situation in 
the Northeast, the situation on the East Coast, the situation in the United 
States, North America, Earth, our solar system, galaxy, and ultimately the 
situation of the universe as a whole. Perhaps a situation can be even more 
broadly construed than the goings on in our universe in the event that there 
are others. The point, then, is that a situation can be quite broad (or narrow – 
we could speak of the situation in one of my cells), so for the purposes of 
developing restricted-Molinism, how broadly should a situation be construed?  
 The answer is that it depends how broadly the situation needs to be 
construed in order to generate, in conjunction with semi-libertarianism, a true 
counterfactual of freedom. To illustrate what I mean, suppose we are 
considering the counterfactual of freedom If Peter were in the situation S, then 
Peter would deny Christ. Suppose further that the counterfactual is true 
because Peter has made himself into the sort of person such that were he to 
find himself in S, he would be causally determined to deny Christ. Now, it 
seems fairly intuitive that the events on the North American Continent are not 
relevant to causally underwriting Peter’s denying Christ. Thus, I gather that the 
situation in which Peter denied Christ need not be so broadly construed so as 
to include those events. However, saying precisely which particular events are 
relevant to Peter’s denial, and so saying with some precision exactly how 
broadly the situation should be construed, such that Peter in S is determined 
to deny Christ, looks very difficult to say. Thus, though situations can be 
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broadly or narrowly construed, I do not think I can say precisely how broadly 
they should be construed for the purposes of developing restricted-Molinism. 
Again, it all depends on which particular events are required to causally yield 
the consequent of a counterfactual of freedom. Hence, I will leave the breadth 
of a situation at the intuitive level as we discuss agents and the situations in 
which they are determined to perform certain actions. 
4.1.5. Counterfactual-Types & Counterfactual-Tokens 
Having discussed action-types and tokens, agent-types and agent tokens, 
and situation-types and situation-tokens, we are now prepared to put these 
together and discuss counterfactual-types and counterfactual-tokens. For our 
purposes regarding restricted-Molinism, we will focus on counterfactuals of 
freedom. As the reader will recall, counterfactuals of freedom are generally of 
the form If some subject S were in certain circumstances C, then S would 
perform action A. Above we spoke of situations rather than circumstances, but 
for our purposes there is no practical difference between the two. Nor, for our 
purposes, is there a practical difference between a subject and a person; we 
can just as easily construe counterfactuals of freedom as being of the form If 
some person P were in a certain situation S, then P would perform action A. In 
what follows I consider the two as synonymous.  
 As with actions, agents, and situations, counterfactuals come in types as 
well as tokens. A counterfactual-type will include as constituents agent-types, 
action-types, and situation-types. Hence, a counterfactual-type will be of the 
form If a certain agent-type were in a certain situation-type, then that agent-
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type would perform a particular action-type. Such counterfactuals will 
obviously include all of the properties that its constituents do, and will 
obviously too be counterfactuals that can be true of more than one particular 
agent performing a particular action in a particular situation. When a 
counterfactual-type has a particular agent-type in a certain situation-type that 
will perform the specified action-type, and those types are instantiated, then 
that counterfactual-type is itself instantiated, and becomes a counterfactual-
token. Thus, on the assumption that Peter would deny Christ in situation S, we 
can say that If Peter were in S, then he would deny Christ is just a 
counterfactual-token of the counterfactual-type If agent-type P* were in 
situation-type S*, then P* would perform action-type A* (where P* is the 
particular agent-type of which Peter is an agent-token, S* the particular 
situation-type of which Peter’s situation is a token, and A* the particular action-
type of which Peter’s denial is a token). Thus, whenever the consequent of a 
counterfactual-type would follow from the antecedent of a counterfactual-type, 
the counterfactual-type itself is said to be true. And thus, whenever all of the 
properties of the consequent of a counterfactual-type would be exemplified 
given the exemplification of all of the properties of the antecedent of a 
counterfactual-type, then there exists a counterfactual-token which can itself 
be said to be true. So are there any true counterfactual-types and -tokens? 
 Indeed there are, at least if we assume that semi-libertarianism (or 
something like it) is true. For according to semi-libertarianism, some of our 
actions are caused by our characters. Hence, given certain psychological 
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properties that we have, in certain situations those properties will cause us to 
react to those situations in certain ways, and thus to behave in certain ways in 
those situations. To return once again to the case of Martin Luther, assuming 
that Martin Luther spoke the literal truth and could do no other than part with 
the Church in the situation in which he found himself, here is a case where 
Luther’s character predetermined his response to his situation, and so a case 
where his psychological properties predetermined what he would do in that 
specific situation. Thus the counterfactual If Luther were in S, then Luther 
would part with the Church is true because Luther’s character causally 
determined that he would do so in S. But if there is such a true counterfactual 
regarding Luther, then there is a true counterfactual-token regarding Luther. 
And if there is a true counterfactual-token regarding Luther, then there is a true 
counterfactual-type regarding which action-type (of which Luther’s parting from 
the Church is an action-token) a certain agent-type (of which Luther is an 
agent-token) would perform in a certain situation-type (of which C is a 
situation-token). The properties included in the antecedent of the 
counterfactual-type causally require the properties included in its consequent. 
More elaborately, this particular counterfactual-type is true because its 
particular agent-type conjoined with its particular situation-type causally 
necessitate its particular action-type. Thus because certain counterfactuals 
can be true because our characters causally determine our actions in certain 
situations, counterfactual-tokens can be true as well as counterfactual-types. 
Whenever a counterfactual-type is such that the constituents of its antecedent 
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causally necessitate its consequent, then that particular counterfactual-type is 
true, and so will be any instantiations (or tokens) of it.  
 Altogether, then, there are action-types, agent-types, situation-types, 
counterfactual-types, including their corresponding tokens. Moreover, 
counterfactual-types and their tokens can be true so long as the antecedents 
of the counterfactuals causally necessitate their consequents. In terms of their 
tokens, we can say that counterfactuals are true so long as the agents 
involved are causally determined by their characters to perform the action in 
question when in the situation in question. It is important to emphasize that 
these counterfactuals can indeed be counterfactuals of freedom, according to 
semi-libertarianism. For, as we have seen in some detail, it is plausible to think 
that some of our actions are free even if they are causally predetermined by 
our characters. So whenever the properties of our characters and the 
properties of our situation causally require that we perform a certain action, 
then a counterfactual-token will be true of our actions. But since properties 
themselves come in types as well as tokens, we can say that certain 
counterfactual-types are true due to their antecedents causally requiring their 
consequents. So there are true counterfactuals of freedom, and they are true 
for the very same reason that counterfactuals in general are true: the 
antecedent causally predetermines the consequent. Hence, we have arrived at 
adequate grounds for counterfactuals of freedom: causal relations. Such 
relations provide a link between the antecedent and the consequent of 
counterfactuals of freedom that is itself sufficient for functioning as adequate 
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metaphysical grounds for the truth of such counterfactuals. Thus we have an 
adequate reply, to some extent, to the grounding objection. And I say ‘to some 
extent’ for the following reason. 
 Though the grounding objection was an objection that there are no 
adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of all of the would-definitely 
counterfactuals of freedom that traditional-Molinism requires, it is not the case 
that we have arrived at adequate metaphysical grounds for all such would-
definitely counterfactuals. Semi-libertarianism demonstrates how some such 
counterfactuals could be true, but it cannot provide adequate grounds for all 
such counterfactuals. To see why, recall that semi-libertarianism only allows 
for some of our actions to be causally determined by our characters, and so 
requires that at least some of our actions are not so caused. Hence, it is only 
in those instances in which our actions are determined by our characters that 
there can be true would-definitely counterfactuals of freedom regarding our 
actions. In those instances in which our characters do not predetermined our 
actions, and so instances in which we perform self-forming actions, there are 
simply no adequate metaphysical grounds for would-definitely counterfactuals 
of freedom. In those instances, there are indeed true counterfactuals of 
freedom, but they are only of the would-probably or would-possibly variety. 
And these, of course, as argued by the grounding objector, do nothing by way 
of providing the metaphysical grounds needed for the traditional theory of 
middle knowledge. In short, when our actions are not determined by our 
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characters, then the only counterfactuals of freedom that are true are akin to 
the following. 




(2) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul might (would possibly) besiege the city. 
(3) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul might not (would possibly not) besiege 
the city. 
 
Thus, according to semi-libertarianism, would-definitely counterfactuals are 
only true when the antecedent causally determines the consequent (and that 
because the agent’s character causally determines their action). Whenever 
there is no such causal link between antecedent and consequent, either the 
would-probably and would-possibly counterfactuals are true, or only the would-
possibly counterfactuals (as in cases where the probability is even that the 
agent will perform, or refrain from performing, the action in question). 
 Given this background then, regarding true would-definitely counterfactual-
types and -tokens, we are prepared to see how they can function in a theory of 
divine foreknowledge and providence with regard to human freedom. 
4.2. THE THEORY OF RESTRICTED-MOLINISM 
Before amassing the above materials together into a comprehensive theory 
of divine foreknowledge and providence, it will be helpful to review the 
essentials of the traditional-Molinist position in order to emphasize the contrast 
between traditional-Molinism and restricted-Molinism. Recall that traditional-
Molinism holds there are four moments in the structure of God’s knowledge. 
The first moment contains God’s natural knowledge, which encompasses his 
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knowledge of all necessary truths. The second moment contains his middle 
knowledge, by which God knows what any free creature would do in any 
possible situation in which they might find themselves. The third moment 
includes God’s decision upon a certain course of action (a “creative act of will”) 
that includes which free agents he will create and place in which situations. 
And the fourth moment includes God’s free knowledge, which is the 
knowledge that results from his decision upon a particular course of action in 
the third moment. The truths, then, that result from God’s creative act of will 
are truths that he determines; they are truths, then, that he has some control 
over. The truths in the first and second moment of God’s knowledge, on the 
other hand, are truths he does not determine, and so does not exercise any 
control over. What is necessarily true is not determined by God, and truths 
about how free creatures will act under certain circumstances, though 
contingent, are likewise not determined by God. For were God to so determine 
the corresponding actions by free agents would not be freely performed, or so 
the traditional-Molinist argues.  
 Given this picture, recall that the selection process of a particular world 
runs as follows. To begin with, a creaturely world-type was defined as simply a 
complete set of logically consistent counterfactuals of freedom. Because there 
are many permutations of logically consistent sets of counterfactuals of 
freedom, there are many distinct creaturely world-types.5 Now since the 
counterfactuals in these creaturely world-types are themselves contingently 
 
5 See Chapter 1 page 30 and following for a more thorough account of creaturely world-types. 
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true, any of the many creaturely world-types could be true as well. And since 
true counterfactuals of freedom do not have their truth determined by God – 
similar to truths that are necessary – then the true creaturely world-type does 
not have its truth determined by God. Thus, even God must abide by the true 
counterfactuals therein when exercising his creative act of will.  
 Calling the true creaturely-world type T1, if God wants to create a world with 
free agents, he must create a world that is consistent with T1. Thus, any world 
inconsistent with T1 is not a world that God can actualize; these worlds are 
said to be infeasible for God. Now there are many possible worlds consistent 
with T1. Traditional-Molinists refer to this collection of worlds as the galaxy of 
T1-worlds. But because there are other possible creaturely world-types, and so 
other collections of possible worlds consistent with those world-types, there 
are other galaxies in the universe of possible worlds besides the galaxy 
consistent with T1. The following diagram illustrates this. 
 
Some of these worlds, however, as already indicated, are not feasible for God 
to create. Given the true creaturely world-type, God is restricted in the possible 
world that he is able to actualize. Hence, the following diagram partitions the 
feasible from the infeasible worlds. 
 
G1 G2 G3 G4
T1 consistent worlds T2 consistent worlds T3 consistent worlds T4 consistent worlds 
Possible Worlds 
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Now given these creative options, God is only able to create a world from 
within galaxy G1, since only the worlds in that galaxy are consistent with T1,
the true creaturely world type. Thus, in the third moment of God’s knowledge, 
God selects a world to actualize, and then actualizes it. The third diagram 
represents just this world – the actual world – as solid. 
 
This, recall, is the picture of foreknowledge and providence that we get on the 
traditional-Molinist view of things. 
 We have seen reasons to think, however, that the traditional-Molinist 
picture cannot work in quite the way described. The grounding objection to the 
theory of middle knowledge is essentially that there is nothing to link the 
antecedent and the consequent in a counterfactual of freedom, and so there 
are no adequate metaphysical grounds to ensure that if the antecedent of a 
counterfactual of freedom were to obtain, that the consequent would then 
obtain too. Now there are possible links between antecedent and consequent 
of a counterfactual of freedom, such as logical or causal necessitation, and 
G1
T1 consistent worlds 
G2 G3 G4
T2 consistent worlds T3 consistent worlds T4 consistent worlds 
Infeasible Worlds Feasible Worlds 
G1
T1 consistent worlds 
G2 G3 G4
T2 consistent worlds T3 consistent worlds T4 consistent worlds 
Infeasible Worlds Feasible Worlds 
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were such to obtain between the antecedent and the consequent, the 
consequent would surely follow from the antecedent. In such cases the 
grounding objector concedes that there would be adequate metaphysical 
grounds for the truth of the counterfactual. However, it is argued (by both 
sides) that such a move would be counterproductive (a sort of cure that kills 
that patient). Because any link between antecedent and consequent in terms 
of logical or causal necessitation rules out the action described in the 
counterfactual from being performed freely, there is no reason to posit such a 
link in a counterfactual of freedom. Thus, though there are possible links, and 
so possible adequate metaphysical grounds, no such grounds, argues the 
grounding objector, provide any assistance to the theory of middle 
knowledge.6
Though there are several popular replies on behalf of the traditional-
Molinist in response to the grounding objection, arguably they all fail. Indeed, I 
will argue here that they must fail. The reason is that given traditional-
Molinism’s commitment to libertarian free agency, there cannot exist adequate 
metaphysical grounds for the truth values of all (would-definitely) 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Libertarian free agency, in one form or 
another, is compatible with some, perhaps even many, counterfactuals of 
freedom having a truth value. But it is not compatible with all such 
counterfactuals having a truth value. Hence, if correct, traditional-Molinism 
 
6 See Chapter 2 for a much more extensive treatment of the grounding objection and 
traditional-Molinist solutions to it. 
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cannot succeed given its commitment to libertarianism. To see why this is so, 
consider the following. 
 Recall that one of the essential elements of any libertarian conception of 
free will is that (at least some of) our actions are causally indeterminate. This 
means that (at least some of) our actions must not be predetermined by the 
events that obtain prior to the agent’s intention to act. In such cases the agent 
is the ultimate cause of her actions, and thus can be considered both free and 
responsible for the action that ensues. The question I want to consider, then, 
is whether it is in principle possible for a counterfactual itself to be 
indeterminate, but yet have a determinate truth value regarding whether the 
consequent would occur were the antecedent to occur? In other words, if a 
counterfactual is logically or causally indeterminate, is there anything that 
would make it the case, prior to the occurrence of either antecedent or 
consequent, that the consequent would occur were the antecedent to occur? 
For my part, I think the answer must be no. Surely part of what it means for the 
link between the antecedent and consequent of a counterfactual to be logically 
or causally indeterminate is that were the antecedent to occur, the consequent 
might occur, or on the other hand that were the antecedent to occur, the 
consequent might not occur. And thus if it genuinely could go either way – not 
simply in an epistemic sense, but in a genuine ontological sense – then it is 
surely in principle impossible for there to be a determinate truth value with 
respect to whether the consequent of a counterfactual of freedom would 
definitely occur were its antecedent to occur. The intuition, then, is that, for 
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counterfactuals, logical or causal indeterminacy precludes alethic determinacy.
Call the principle supported by this intuition the principle of indeterminacy, or 
the indeterminacy principle. The principle says that if a counterfactual is 
indeterminate, there is no saying beforehand whether the consequent would in 
fact occur were the antecedent to occur. The following illustration should 
clarify the intuition, and thus the principle. 
 Consider a fair coin, one side being heads and the other side being tails. 
By all appearances, there is a fifty-fifty chance that the coin would come up 
heads were it tossed, and a fifty-fifty chance that the coin would come up tails 
were it tossed. That means the probability that the coin would land heads were 
it tossed is .5, and .5 as well that the coin would land tails were it tossed. Now 
given that there is a certain probability involved that the coin would land 
heads, is it possible for it to be true before the toss that the coin would land 
heads were I to toss it? It looks as if the answer must be no. It is very difficult 
to conceive of their being an objective, ontological probability involved in the 
tossing of the coin and for there to be a truth regarding just how the toss would 
go in the event that I toss it. The suggestion that there could be a determinate 
truth value, even if I were to decide not to toss the coin at all, simply looks 
incoherent. If the link between antecedent and consequent in a counterfactual 
regarding the toss is genuinely indeterminate – at the metaphysical level – 
then it is very difficult to make sense of the idea that there could be a truth 
value about how the toss would definitely go. Hence, if probabilities supervene 
on some of our actions because some of our actions are causally 
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indeterminate, then it appears simply impossible for there to be truths 
regarding the definite occurrence of those counterfactual’s consequents were 
their antecedents to occur.  
 Now if that conclusion is correct – and it certainly seems more intuitive than 
not (indeed, the burden proof presumably resides on those who would argue 
the opposite) – what are the consequences for the traditional theory of middle 
knowledge? Not good I think. The reason is that on traditional-Molinism God 
enjoys exhaustive foreknowledge of actions by means of his knowledge of 
counterfactuals of freedom that themselves are presumed to have 
antecedents and consequents that are indeterminately linked. But if the 
indeterminacy principle is correct, then it is not in principle possible for there to 
be a truth value regarding exactly which actions we would indeterminately 
perform were we to find ourselves in the situations specified by a 
counterfactual’s antecedent. But if there cannot be a truth value regarding 
which actions we would definitely, though indeterminately, perform, then, on 
the widely accepted assumption that knowledge requires truth, God in 
principle cannot know what we would definitely yet indeterminately do in 
certain situations. Hence, if the indeterminacy principle is correct, God cannot 
enjoy the amount of foreknowledge that traditional-Molinism claims that he 
does. If some of our actions are indeterminate, then there simply cannot be 
true counterfactuals regarding those indeterminate actions. And if there is no 
truth regarding how we would indeterminately act, then there is no knowledge 
there for God to enjoy. Thus, causal indeterminacy, I argue, precludes the 
217
existence of would-definitely counterfactuals of freedom that regard all of our 
actions, and so precludes God from enjoying exhaustive foreknowledge by 
means of his knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom. So given traditional-
Molinism’s commitment to libertarianism (and so causal indeterminism) there 
appears to be good reason for thinking that God cannot enjoy the amount of 
foreknowledge that traditional-Molinism assures us he does.7
If the conclusions reached so far are correct, then we have reasons – given 
our considerations of free agency, and the indeterminacy that it requires – for 
modifying the theory of middle knowledge (assuming we are not inclined to 
scrap the theory altogether). The indeterminacy that is a part of libertarianism 
simply precludes some would-definitely counterfactuals of freedom from 
having a truth value. And thus if they cannot have a truth value, then such 
propositions cannot be known (not even by God). As to scrapping the theory of 
middle knowledge, I think there are still some fruits that the theory might yield, 
and so I am not prepared to make that move just yet. In what follows I detail 
my own proposal for modifying middle knowledge. 
 
7 Clearly, at this point I have taken sides with the grounding objectors (from Chapter 2), at 
least with regard to the idea that some counterfactuals of freedom do not have adequate 
metaphysical grounds. I agree with Robert Adams that the available links between the 
antecedent and consequent of a counterfactual of freedom to guarantee that the consequent 
would in fact occur were the antecedent to occur are logical or causal necessitation. Because 
the traditional-Molinist insists that the link must be free from logical or causal determination, I 
do not think their project can succeed. However, I do not agree with Hasker’s version of the 
grounding objection – roughly, that since agents do not bring about the truth of counterfactuals 
of freedom, they do not freely perform the actions specified by the counterfactuals. Given that 
I think counterfactuals of freedom are true because the link between antecedent and 
consequent is causal necessitation, and that the causal necessitation in question results from 
our characters sometimes causing our actions, and that we are ultimately responsible for the 
characters that we have (via semi-libertarianism), I think that we actually do bring about the 
truth of the counterfactuals of freedom that are true of us.   
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Because the theory of middle knowledge is committed to indeterminacy in 
(at least some of) our actions, and because indeterminacy precludes 
determinate truth values regarding (at least some) would-definitely 
counterfactuals of freedom, middle knowledge cannot deliver what it promises: 
an account of how it is that God enjoys exhaustive foreknowledge and partial 
providence. But middle knowledge can provide an account of how it is that 
God enjoys partial foreknowledge and partial providence, once modified. The 
way to modify middle knowledge, I argue here, is by incorporating semi-
libertarianism into the theory. When we incorporate semi-libertarianism into the 
theory of middle knowledge, we end up with the following picture of divine 
foreknowledge and providence. 
 Semi-libertarianism shows how some of our actions can be both causally 
determined as well as free. Those actions that are causally determined by our 
characters are actions performed in situations about which there can indeed 
be true counterfactuals of freedom. And the reason such counterfactuals can 
be true in such situations is that, first, the actions described can plausibly be 
construed as free. Second, the fact that causal necessitation determines that 
the consequent in the counterfactual follows from the antecedent suggests 
that the counterfactual can be true – and thus known to be true – prior to the 
obtaining of either the antecedent or the consequent. So, for example, 
consider again the case of Martin Luther. If Luther spoke the literal truth that 
“Here I stand, I can do no other,” and was in fact causally predetermined to 
“do no other” in the situation in which he found himself, then as long as Luther 
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was responsible for having the character that he had, which causally 
determined his choice, then Luther can be both free and responsible for his 
choice. Moreover, if Luther’s character did cause him to do as he did, then 
there can be a true counterfactual regarding Luther’s action that can itself be 
true prior to the antecedent’s obtaining. In such a case, the counterfactual If 
Luther were to find himself in S, then he would break with the Church is true 
prior to Luther finding himself in S, and it is true because Luther’s character 
conjoined with S causally necessitates Luther breaking with the Church. But 
this counterfactual need not be true of Luther alone. Instead, the 
counterfactual is true of anyone with Luther’s type of character were they to 
find themselves in Luther’s type of situation. Hence, the counterfactual true of 
Luther is but a token of a type of causal law, where If agent-type P* were 
placed in situation-type S*, then S* would perform action-type A*. Thus for any 
action that is causally determined by our characters in conjunction with a 
certain situation, there is a general causal law in terms of types that is true.  
 But since semi-libertarianism precludes all of our actions from being 
causally determined – indeed it is in those moments of indeterminacy where 
we perform self-forming actions and so take responsibility for what we are – it 
cannot be the case that there exists a true counterfactual regarding what we 
would do in indeterminate situations. True counterfactuals (of the would-
definitely variety) only exist in those situations where our characters determine 
our actions (and so where there is a truth value about what we definitely would 
do). According to semi-libertarianism, indeterminate situations do not occur all 
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that often, but because they nonetheless occur there cannot be true 
counterfactuals of freedom regarding every free action that we perform. And if 
that is true, then God cannot enjoy exhaustive counterfactual knowledge of our 
actions, and so cannot enjoy exhaustive foreknowledge in the way that 
traditional-Molinism describes. God can, however, by means of semi-
libertarianism, know some counterfactuals of freedom – indeed a great many if 
indeed we rarely enjoy the ability to do otherwise – and so God can 
providentially plan the course of the world to some degree. He cannot, of 
course, plan that course completely, given the restrictions placed upon him by 
the limited number of counterfactuals of freedom that are true. However, he 
can plan partially. This is the heart of the view that I have been referring to as 
restricted-Molinism.  
 So how much foreknowledge and providence does God enjoy on restricted-
Molinism? How much of a restriction is it? Toward answering this question, 
consider the following. 
 In developing an account of God’s partial foreknowledge and providence, 
let us speak not in terms of God actualizing entire possible worlds (for this is 
not possible given the causal indeterminacy intrinsic to libertarianism). Instead, 
we will speak of God actualizing possible world-segments, given the partial 
counterfactual knowledge derived from semi-libertarianism that God enjoys at 
any one time. So what is a possible world-segment? In short, a possible world-
segment is akin to a complete possible world on the traditional-Molinist 
account, only because God is in principle not capable of actualizing an entire 
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possible world, he instead actualizes portions of a possible world that are 
consistent with the counterfactuals that he knows at the time of his creative act 
of will. Thus in actualizing only possible world-segments, or portions of 
possible worlds, in creating a world, God is continually engaged in creative 
acts of will. And since he is continually engaged in creative acts of will, he is 
thus continually actualizing segments of worlds. Indeed, actualizing these 
world-segments is his way of providentially adjusting the course of the world 
as things progress in one direction or another. Again, he is able to do so given 
his knowledge of counterfactual-types and counterfactual-tokens. From the 
beginning God knows which counterfactual-types are true, as these 
counterfactuals are true in virtue of the types in the antecedent causally 
requiring the action-types in the consequent. But God does not know which 
counterfactual-tokens are true until he actually creates libertarian free agents, 
and those agents engage in self-forming actions, thus forming themselves into 
one agent-type or another. Once they do engage in self-formation, and so self-
determine a character capable of causally determining some of their actions in 
certain situations, only then does there exist true counterfactual-tokens 
involving precisely those agents. Hence to the extent that there are true 
counterfactual-tokens, to that extent God has middle knowledge. 
 These points can more clearly be seen if we modify the traditional-Molinist 
diagrams above into diagrams consistent with restricted-Molinism. Hence, let a 
creaturely world-type be all the logically possible and logically consistent 
counterfactual-tokens that exist at any one time. That is, a creaturely world 
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type is a set of all logically consistent counterfactuals that regard actual (or 
token) agents. Some of these counterfactuals will be true in virtue of the 
causal laws resulting from conjoining the agent’s characters and certain 
circumstances, and some of these counterfactuals will be false because they 
indicate that a certain causal relation will hold when in fact it will not. Let us 
then call the true creaturely world-type T1. T1 consists of only those 
counterfactual-tokens that happen to be true at some time t. Again, T1 is not 
the only creaturely world-type; there are others – T2, T3, T4, … Tn – but only 
one creaturely world-type includes all the true counterfactuals-tokens that are 
true at any one time.  
 Given that account of creaturely world-types, we can say – as did the 
traditional-Molinist regarding possible worlds – that there are many possible 
world-segments available consistent with T1 that God can choose to actualize. 
Let us call the complete set of possible-world segments consistent with T1 the 
galaxy of T1-consistent possible world-segments. Of course, there are other 
galaxies of possible world-segments, those consistent with T2, T3, and so 
forth, but only one galaxy enjoys world-segments that are feasible for God to 
create. The following diagram, then, provides a rough illustration of the 
possible creaturely world-types at some time t, as well as the possible world-
segments logically consistent with those possible creaturely world-types.  
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We have supposed, however, that T1 is the true creaturely world-type, 
which means that only the possible world-segments in G1 are world-segments 
that are feasible for God to create. All of the other world-segments in G2, G3,
G4, are logically possible world-segments, but they are not world-segments 
that God can create given the true creaturely world-type at the moment we are 
considering. Hence, all of the possible world-segments in galaxies other than 
G1 are not world-segments that God can actualize. The following diagram 
illustrates this point, partitioning the world-segments into those that are 
feasible for God and those that are not. 
 
At this point, out of the G1 feasible world-segments at t, God is free to select a 
possible world-segment to providentially create or actualize. After this 
selection is made, we can represent the actual world-segment on restricted-
Molinism as a solid circle as follows. 
Possible World-Segments 
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Hence, since agents are continually self-forming their characters into one 
agent-type or another, the set of true counterfactuals, or true creaturely world-
segment-type is continually changing as well. Thus, the set of feasible world-
segments for God to providentially actualize will be different at different times. 
So again, given the restricted-Molinist picture, there is no creative act of will in 
the third moment of divine knowledge that settles once and for all which 
possible world will be the actual world, and so settles once and for all the 
content of God’s free knowledge. Because God’s middle knowledge is 
continually changing, so are his creative acts of will, and thus so is his free 
knowledge. And because God’s middle knowledge extends only as far as the 
counterfactual-tokens that he knows will allow, his free knowledge extends 
only as far as his middle knowledge allows. And how far is this? 
 This is an important question. However, not surprisingly, for several 
reasons, it is very difficult to answer. First, recall that it is probably impossible 
to precisely say how many of our actions are predetermined by our characters. 
I argued in Chapter 3 that plausibly very few of our choices enjoy alternative 
possibilities, and thus are not causally predetermined. But how many choices 
this amounts to exactly is just not in our epistemic power to say. Second, 
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because it is impossible to say how many of our choices are causally 
indeterminate, it is impossible to say how many counterfactual-tokens, as well 
as which counterfactuals-tokens, are true. Presumably God can say (indeed 
he must be able to say if restricted-Molinism, or something like it, is true). 
However, if we are not able to say, then, of course, there is no saying here 
exactly how far God’s foreknowledge and providence extends on restricted-
Molinism. But be that as it may, there are, I think, some things that we can say 
that would seem to be of some benefit to God with regard to the extent of his 
foreknowledge and the exercise of his providence. 
 The first thing we can say is that God, though not enjoying exhaustive 
knowledge about the future, does enjoy exhaustive knowledge about the 
present and past. Such knowledge, by definition, includes not only knowledge 
of everything there is to know regarding the physical properties of the 
universe, but also everything there is to know regarding the psychological 
properties presently true of each one of us. He fully comprehends all of the 
tendencies to act in certain ways that creatures with any given psychological 
constitution in fact have. In addition, at every time he knows the probabilities 
that we will act in a certain way given his full comprehension of our 
psychological states. For example, he knows the probability (how likely it is) 
that given my current psychological states that I will continue writing. And 
given that there is some fatigue setting in, God knows what the probability is 
that I will take a break.  
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Now though it is true that some of our actions are not causally determined 
and so incapable of being foreknown, it is also true that in those moments of 
indeterminate action we may very well have strong to moderate leanings one 
way or the other regarding how to act. Thus, even if at some point during his 
providential planning God lacks would-definitely counterfactual conditionals to 
consider, he does at least have some would-probably counterfactual 
conditionals at his disposal. And though such counterfactuals do not, of 
course, yield God bone fide knowledge of what is to come, they are 
counterfactuals that he can nonetheless implement in order to “see” into 
probable futures. Such futures obviously may not come to pass, but if they 
genuinely are probable they provide God with information that is conducive to 
constructing at the very least contingent plans with regard to the future. 
Hence, arguably there is some value to God’s knowing would-probably 
counterfactuals; they extend his foresight into probable futures even when 
there exists no definite future to be seen. 
 Another thing we can say, even if God lacks exhaustive foreknowledge and 
providence, is that God certainly appears capable of influencing us, or even 
causing us, to behave in certain ways that does not entirely detract from our 
functioning as free agents. As William Hasker amusingly says, “God is 
perfectly capable of making someone an ‘offer he can’t refuse.’”8 And though 
making someone such an offer, or causing us to behave in certain ways, might 
“strike us as manipulative,” it is not necessarily so, “so long as a person is not 
 
8 William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1989) 196. 
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influenced to act in a way inconsistent with his own major intention and 
motivations.”9 The idea here, then, toward which Hasker seems to be 
gesturing, can perhaps be developed along the following lines.  
 Suppose some agent – Jones, let us say – has engaged in a sufficient 
number of self-forming actions, such that Jones has developed himself into a 
morally sensitive person. Suppose further that not only has Jones made 
himself into someone who is morally sensitive, but has in addition cultivated 
within himself a disposition toward generosity. Now let us say that God desires 
that a certain charitable organization flourish, and he knows that Jones has the 
sort of character such that were Jones to hear about the organization, his 
charitable character would cause him to make a charitable contribution. In 
such a case, if God were to cause Jones to find himself in a situation in which 
he learns about the organization (say by giving Jones sufficiently strong 
desires to guarantee that he would Google charitable organizations), would 
such activity on God’s part preclude Jones from freely making a charitable 
donation? Arguably not. Jones, clearly, would not have any choice (or control) 
regarding God’s placing him in the situation in which Jones learns about the 
organization, but given that Jones has made himself into the kind of charitable 
person that would give to charitable organizations in certain situations, it does 
not appear that God’s placing Jones in a situation in which he does so 
significantly detracts from Jones’ freedom. But even if intuitions differ on this 
point, and so one thinks that God has significantly detracted from Jones’ 
 
9 Hasker 196. 
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freedom by causing him to be in a situation where Jones is caused to perform 
some particular action that God desires, it is not clear that God has done 
anything (morally) wrong in so detracting from Jones’ freedom. Hence, were 
God to significantly detract from Jones’ freedom in this way, such a detraction 
does not appear objectionable.  
 But what if Jones did not have the disposition to be charitable? Suppose 
that tendency is not a tendency that he had cultivated, though he had 
cultivated a tendency to be morally sensitive, and so had a general disposition 
of good will toward his fellow human beings. If this were the case, and God not 
only caused Jones to search for a charity by giving him a sufficiently strong 
desire to do so, but also caused him to donate to that charity by giving him a 
sufficiently strong desire to donate to that charity, then would it be correct to 
say that God significantly detracted from Jones’ freedom? This case is more 
intuitively complicated than the previous case, but one could still argue that 
God did not significantly detract from Jones’ freedom, given that Jones was 
not, as Hasker put it above, “influenced to act in a way inconsistent with his 
own major intention and motivations.”10 Jones’ “major” intentions and 
motivations are to be morally sensitive to his fellow human beings, these 
intentions and motivations are part of his character as a result of his 
performing self-forming actions, and so if God chooses to “use” Jones in a 
manner consistent with the character that Jones is ultimately responsible for, 
arguably God has not significantly detracted from Jones’ freedom by causing 
 
10 Hasker 196. 
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him to donate to a certain charity. However, as before, even if intuitions differ 
on this point, and thus one concludes that God has in fact significantly 
detracted from Jones’ freedom, it is not clear that God has done anything 
(morally) wrong in so detracting. 
 As a third case, suppose that Jones does not have a disposition to be 
charitable, or even a disposition of moral sensitivity such that he has general 
disposition of good will toward his fellow human beings. In addition, suppose 
that Jones actually has cultivated (or self-formed) quite the opposite sort of 
character and has made himself into a sort of Scrooge; he is wealthy, miserly, 
greedy, and has no “major intention or motivations” to make charitable 
donations. Now in this case, were God to cause Jones to search for a 
particular charity as well as cause him to donate to that charity it does appear 
that God has significantly detracted from Jones’ freedom. But, be that as it 
may, arguably God has still not done anything (morally) wrong in doing so. If 
God desires to use someone’s wealth toward some good end, yet the person 
lacks the sort of self-determined character which yields a counterfactual of 
freedom that God can employ in brining about the free action that he wants, 
then what is objectionable about God causing them to do something good? 
Certainly in this case God detracts from the freedom of the agent, but arguably 
such activity on God’s part is not morally problematic, especially if we draw on 
theological resources which suggest that everything we “own” is actually on 
loan anyway.11 
11 The Biblical parable of the talents comes to mind (Matthew 25:14-30). 
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There is one more situation with respect to Hasker’s gesture to explore. Not 
only can God extend his exercise of providence by directly influencing or 
causing us to behave in certain morally respectable ways – irrespective of the 
character we have chosen – it seems that he can also indirectly influence or 
cause us to behave in certain morally inappropriate ways given the character 
we have chosen. To see this, consider Pharaoh in the Biblical book of Exodus. 
In Exodus 9:12 we find, “And the LORD hardened Pharaoh’s heart, and he did 
not listen to them, just as the LORD has spoken to Moses.” In context, this 
refers to Pharaoh refusing the demand of Moses and Aaron, speaking on 
behalf of God, to let the Hebrew people leave the land of Egypt and worship 
God in the wilderness. This text indicates that the reason Pharaoh refused the 
demand is because God “hardened” his heart (whatever that means exactly). 
Oddly, however, Pharaoh’s refusal is something that God holds Pharaoh 
responsible for (see 9:17), but how so if God (by all appearances) is causally 
responsible for hardening Pharaoh’s heart, which appears causally 
responsible for Pharaoh refusing God’s demand.  
 One way to understand the passage is to understand God as removing a 
certain positive influence from Pharaoh that Pharaoh did not want in any case. 
Twice before the first mention of God hardening Pharaoh’s heart we are told 
that Pharaoh hardened his own heart: “when Pharaoh saw that there was 
relief, he hardened his heart and did not listen to them;” “But Pharaoh 
hardened his heart this time also, and he did not let the people go” (Exodus 
8:15, 23). Arguably, then, before God hardened Pharaoh’s heart Pharaoh had 
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either previously made himself into the sort of person – that is, with the sort of 
character – where God’s commands would be rejected if commanded, or he 
was performing self-forming actions at those times with a view to making 
himself into the sort of person that would reject God’s commands in the event 
that they were commanded. Either way, Pharaoh is responsible for having a 
hard heart. In Exodus, then, on those latter occasions where God hardens 
Pharaoh’s heart, we may view those cases as follows. Just as God can exert a 
causal influence over one’s life by directly bringing about virtuous desires for 
certain ends, God can also exert a causal influence over one’s life by 
withdrawing virtuous desires, which he had previously provided, for certain 
ends. In Pharaoh’s case, this may be what happened. God withdrew from 
Pharaoh an influence he did not want in any case – given the previous 
occasions in which Pharaoh hardened his own heart – thereby leaving him to 
the destiny of the character he had self-determined.  
 If correct, something similar may be true in cases involving actions over 
which God enjoys providence but which themselves are morally vicious. Such 
actions may play some role in God’s planning and preferring one possible 
world-segment over another, and so God may have morally sufficient reasons 
for withdrawing, or simply not providing, certain positive or virtuous influences 
over our lives in order to bring about that world-segment. If so, then God can 
leave us to the characters that we have either already self-formed, or are in 
the process of self-forming, and so exercise some providence even over free 
actions that themselves are vicious.   
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Now the point in mentioning these four cases is that along with the true 
would-definitely and would-probably counterfactuals of freedom that are, in a 
sense, naturally true, given that they are true without God’s (direct or indirect) 
intervention, there very well could be an entire range of would-definitely and 
would-probably counterfactuals that are, in a sense, artificially true, given that 
they are true as a result of God’s (direct or indirect) intervention. If so, then the 
counterfactuals that God has to work with, so to speak, in exercising his 
foreknowledge in providentially planning which possible world-segment to 
actualize next, are not only those counterfactuals of freedom that are naturally 
true (as we are calling them), but may include those counterfactuals that are 
artificially true as well. Hence, since God has the ability to make certain 
counterfactuals true, even if in the end they do not qualify as counterfactuals 
of freedom, the number of counterfactuals that God has to work with is 
potentially much greater than may have been initially thought. And this can 
only extend the amount of foreknowledge and providence that God enjoys.   
 One might wonder, though, given the forgoing, why God does not positively 
influence all, or at least a majority, of our actions or even cause us always to 
behave in morally appropriate ways if such does not either significantly detract 
from our freedom, or is not morally objectionable. I admit that what has been 
so far said may indicate that this is indeed possible. However, because God 
presumably has the ability to causally determine us to perform certain actions 
either in a way that does not significantly detract from our freedom, or in a way 
that does, but which itself is not morally objectionable, it does not follow from 
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this that it is not morally objectionable for God to causally determine a 
majority, or even a significant minority, of our actions. Among theists it is quite 
common to think that one of the goods with which God has endowed 
humankind is free agency. Indeed, the reader will recall in the discussion in 
Chapter 1, regarding Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense to the problem of 
evil, that one of the reasons that God did not create a world without evil is that 
he could not do so given the free choices of his created free creatures. Hence, 
though creating a world without evil is logically possible, the Free Will Defense 
argues that it is not metaphysically possible given the free decisions that 
human beings would make. Now God could create a world with creatures and 
without evil were he to create creatures that are not free, but causally 
determined to perform every “action” that he pleases. But since freedom and 
responsibility are arguably values that God regards, he chooses not to create 
such a world. Indeed, according to the Free Will Defense, it appears accurate 
to say that God values freedom and responsibility more than a world without 
evil.  
 Therefore, as stated already, just because God can cause us to perform 
certain actions in ways that are not morally objectionable (according to 
restricted-Molinism), does not imply that it is not morally objectionable were he 
to do so regarding even a significant minority of our actions. For if God 
becomes too causally active in our lives, then we cease to have the sort of 
control over our lives that God presumably values. To put it differently, if God 
is causally responsible, and so ultimately responsible, for too many of our 
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actions, then there is a risk that we will then forgo too many indeterminate 
situations, situations which themselves are required for us to engage in self-
formation, and thus assume responsibility for what we are. And on the 
assumption that God values that we enjoy this sort of control, and so assume 
responsibility for what we become, God cannot be too causally active in 
creating counterfactuals of freedom that themselves are not natural.  
 In summary, then, we have developed a comprehensive theory of divine 
foreknowledge and providence that is consistent with libertarianism. That is, 
we have developed a comprehensive theory of divine foreknowledge and 
providence that is consistent with causal indeterminism (for at least some of 
our actions). The theory that some of our actions are actions that we can be 
both free and responsible for is semi-libertarianism, and the theory of 
foreknowledge and providence that incorporates the insights from semi-
libertarianism is restricted-Molinsim. The theory is genuinely unique, as it 
occupies uncharted conceptual territory between two common positions in 
discussions of foreknowledge and providence. One position is open-theism 
(which says that God does not have any foreknowledge), and the other is the 
traditional conception of middle knowledge (which says that God has 
exhaustive foreknowledge). Restricted-Molinism lies somewhere between the 
two; it says that God has some foreknowledge. On restricted-Molinism, God 
has as much foreknowledge as the true counterfactuals of freedom will allow, 
but there are only as many true counterfactuals of freedom as the characters 
that we self-determined will allow. To increase even further the stock 
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counterfactuals that God has to work with, God can artificially determine that 
certain counterfactuals are true (even though there can be some debate about 
whether these counterfactuals are plausibly counterfactuals of freedom). And 
in the event that he does so artificially generate counterfactuals (of freedom), 
the amount of foreknowledge and providence that God enjoys will be even 
greater. All of this together is the way in which I propose to modify the 
traditional theory of middle knowledge. Hence, on a scale with open-theism on 
one end and traditional views on middle knowledge at the other, restricted-
Molinism lies somewhere in between, as the following diagram illustrates. 
 
4.3. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
We are now at a point where we will consider a couple of objections and 
replies to the theory of restricted-Molinism. The objections we will consider 
regard, first, whether the possibility of an ever-present but nonintervening 
Frankfurt controller can supply traditional-Molinism with what semi-
libertarianism denies it (exhaustive foreknowledge and providence for God). 
The second objection pertains to whether semi-libertarianism adequately 
accounts for moral responsibility, a fortiori if certain actions performed later in 
life were caused by character traits that themselves were cultivated rather 
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4.3.1. Regarding Alternative Possibilities and an Ever-Present Nonintervening 
Frankfurt Controller 
 
Recall the Frankfurt-type counterexamples that we encountered in Chapter 
3. There we considered a Frankfurt-type example involving a “generally nice” 
neurosurgeon Black, and Jones, who is deciding for which candidate to vote in 
the 1992 presidential election. Remember that unknown to Jones, Black has 
inserted a mechanism into Jones’ brain allowing Black full control over Jones’ 
behavior, and that Black desires to see Clinton win the election. Toward this 
end, in the event that Jones decides to vote for Clinton on his own, there is no 
reason for Black to intervene and so implement the mechanism in Jones’ brain 
to ensure that Jones in fact votes for Clinton. However, should Jones decide, 
or lean toward deciding, to vote for Bush, then Black will implement the 
mechanism in Jones’ brain to guarantee that Jones votes for Clinton. As things 
go, however, Jones decides to vote for Clinton on his own, and so there is no 
need for Black to intervene.   
 The point of such examples, remember, is to show that a free action need 
not require the ability to do otherwise. In the example Jones decides to vote 
for Clinton, thus fulfilling Black’s will, but given the mechanism that Black 
placed in Jones, it is argued that there is nothing else that Jones could have 
done. In such a case, was Jones’ decision to vote for Clinton free, even 
though Jones could not have done differently than vote for Clinton? Those 
who offer Frankfurt-type examples as counterexamples to the claim that free 
actions require alternative possibilities think the answer is “Yes.” Given that 
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Jones votes for Clinton on his own and so is not causally predetermined to do 
so by Black, there is no reason to think that Jones’ decision was not free just 
because Jones could not have done otherwise. Hence, so the argument from 
Frankfurt-examples goes, the ability to do otherwise – having alternative 
possibilities when we act – must not be required for performing free actions. 
And so if they are not, then because one cannot act differently than they do on 
some occasion provides no reason for thinking that on that occasion they do 
not act freely.  
 One of the central arguments of this project, however, is that alterative 
possibilities are indeed required for (at least some) free actions (that is, on 
those occasions in which we engage in self-formation). Given this 
requirement, I argued that God could not then enjoy exhaustive foreknowledge 
and providence, since such alternative possibilities preclude God from 
“seeing” beyond such choices, and thus from providentially planning for and 
around such choices. Hence, I argued that if middle knowledge – at least in 
some form – is to be maintained, it needs to be modified in some way to 
account for the restriction in God’s foreknowledge and providence that 
alternative possibilities imposes. Thus, the traditional view on middle 
knowledge, I have argued, requires modification.  
 But is this conclusion mistaken? Is there a way to preserve traditional-
Molinism by means of a special sort of Frankfurt-controller? For example, what 
if a Frankfurt-controller existed throughout the entire lifetime of Jones, but 
never intervened in Jones’ decisions, such that everything Jones did he did on 
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his own, though he could not ever have done anything differently. Would the 
existence of an ever-present but nonintervening Frankfurt-controller allow for 
all of Jones’ actions to be freely performed, but also exhaustively foreknown 
by the ever-present though nonintervening controller?12 If so, the implications 
appear beneficial for the traditional view of middle knowledge. For if an ever-
present but nonintervening controller is present throughout the life of some 
agent, then that controller can get what he wants and foreknow what he gets 
in the event that the agent in question always does what the controller wants. 
Hence, if such cases are possible, they benefit traditional-Molinism because 
then it is not the case that even some actions require alternative possibilities in 
order to be free, and so it is not the case that there are some actions that an 
ever-present controller  cannot “see” beyond and so cannot providentially plan 
for. Thus if the conception of an ever-present but nonintervening controller is 
coherent, such that all of the choices of an agent can be both performed on 
the agent’s own and fail to enjoy alternative possibilities, then the traditional-
Molinist might argue that the traditional view of middle knowledge does not 
require the modifying that I have argued it does. Is this conclusion correct? I 
argue that it is not. 
 Toward showing that it is not one could make the argument that, contrary to 
appearances, one actually does enjoy the ability to do otherwise in the 
Frankfurt cases that we have considered. Robert Kane is one libertarian who 
 
12 This thought experiment is an adaptation of an objection that Timothy O’Connor, Alfred 
Mele, and John Martin Fischer raised against Robert Kane’s claim that alternative possibilities 
are necessary for freedom. For more on that objection, see Robert Kane, The Significance of 
Free Will (Oxford University Press: New York, 1996) 42-3, 142-4, 222. 
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argues for such a position.13 The Frankfurt cases that Kane considers in 
making this argument, however, are only those Frankfurt cases that involve a 
“prior sign” which alerts the Frankfurt controller that the agent is on the verge 
of making the “wrong” choice (e.g., a growing inclination to vote for Bush). Not 
all Frankfurt cases involve such a sign, however. Indeed, some philosophers 
argue that Frankfurt cases can be constructed that involve no prior sign, but 
rather the elimination of a necessary condition for doing otherwise that does 
not in addition causally require that the agent perform the action that they do.14 
If such cases demonstrate as much, then clearly Kane is incorrect (and so am 
I) in thinking that alternative possibilities supervene on causal indeterminism, 
and thus that any libertarian conception of freedom will then entail that we 
enjoy alternative possibilities for at least some of our actions. But be that as it 
may, assessing whether such cases genuinely involve causal indeterminism 
as well as the inability to do otherwise is a discussion that is probably better 
left for another dissertation. Fortunately, however, one can argue that the 
traditional-Molinist is mistaken in thinking that the possibility of a global 
nonintervening Frankfurt controller is all that is required to show that God 
could enjoy exhaustive foreknowledge, without first entering the debate about 
whether all Frankfurt cases are successful in precluding the agent from 
enjoying the ability to do otherwise. 
 
13 Kane 142-4. 
14 For more on such cases, see Derk Pereboom, “Source Incompatibilism and Alternative 
Possibilities,” Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, David Widerker and Michael 
McKenna, eds. (Ashgate: Burlington, 2003) 185-200.  
240
Now, the first thing we can say against the idea that a global but 
nonintervening Frankfurt controller provides the traditional-Molinist all that they 
want by way of foreknowledge is this: it is not clear such a controller would 
enjoy the right sort of foreknowledge. Clearly such a controller would enjoy 
some foreknowledge. A global nonintervening Frankfurt controller would know 
what actions would be performed, and so enjoy exhaustive foreknowledge of 
the future actions of free creatures. And this is part of what traditional-Molinism 
requires. However, Frankfurt controllers only know the future actions of agents 
in Frankfurt scenarios because they first know either that they will intervene in 
the event that the agent is inclined to perform the “wrong” action, or because 
they actually do intervene to remove a necessary condition for doing other 
than what the controller wants. In other words, the Frankfurt controller can be 
well aware of the end (the action), but it is less clear that they can also be 
aware of the means (whether the agent will perform the action on their own or 
as a result of intervention). No Frankfurt cases, so far as I am aware, are 
cases in which the Frankfurt controller enjoys prior knowledge of both the 
means and the end. But such knowledge appears to be precisely what middle 
knowledge affords God. On traditional views of middle knowledge, God not 
only knows what action an agent will perform in some specified situation, but 
also that the agent will perform the action in question on their own. Indeed this 
is part of the beauty of the theory. In a counterfactual of creaturely freedom, 
God does not, and need not, intervene in the circumstances to know that the 
action specified by the consequent is performed in the event that the 
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antecedent obtains. It is the agent herself, on her own, who brings about the 
action specified by the consequent in a counterfactual of freedom in the event 
that its antecedent obtains.  
 The point, then, is that even if in the end the arguments for thinking that 
certain Frankfurt scenarios do in fact preclude the ability to do otherwise 
without causally predetermining which action an agent performs – and so it 
turns out that the ability to do otherwise is actually not required for libertarian 
free agency, contrary to what I argued in Chapter 3 – it does not follow that 
traditional-Molinism is victorious. Traditional views on middle knowledge 
require that God enjoys a certain sort of foreknowledge that is importantly 
different from the foreknowledge enjoyed by a global but nonintervening 
Frankfurt controller. Hence, because a global nonintervening controller enjoys 
foreknowledge does not entail that God enjoys the sort of foreknowledge 
required by traditional-Molinism. Hence, as I see it, proposing an ever-present 
but nonintervening controller is of no help to the traditional-Molinist in 
defending the traditional theory of middle knowledge.     
4.3.2. Regarding Self-forming Actions and Moral Responsibility 
 The second objection we will consider is first and foremost an objection to 
semi-libertarianism. According to semi-libertarianism, some of our actions – 
indeed, probably a great many of our actions – are caused by our characters. 
Such actions are nonetheless free so long as we are ultimately responsible for 
having the characters that we do. And we are responsible for our characters 
so long as we perform actions that we have referred to as self-forming; that is, 
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actions that themselves are causally indeterminate and in which we are 
ultimately responsible for making a causal contribution to what we are. Hence, 
we can say that Luther is responsible for his “Here I Stand,” even if he lacked 
alternative possibilities and was predetermined to “do no other” by his 
character. And we can say this so long as on many previous occasions Luther 
performed self-forming actions, thus making himself into the man that he was 
when he could “do no other.” But at what point do we become morally 
responsible for the characters that we have, and so morally responsible for the 
actions that flow from them? How early on in our lives can we self-form certain 
traits of character and then be reasonably responsible for actions that we 
perform later that are themselves caused by just those traits?  
 To illustrate the question, consider the following. Suppose that Smith has a 
certain character trait (a disposition toward theft, let us say) that he cultivated 
as a child by performing acts of theft. Suppose too that Smith was encouraged 
by his peers to engage in petty theft (stealing candy, baseball cards, and the 
like) and that his role as a petty thief provided him a niche among his friends. 
Now suppose that later in life (when Smith is twenty-seven, say) Smith steals 
a car. Suppose further that this act of theft was in part caused by character 
traits that he self-formed as a child (around age eight or so) when he engaged 
in theft. Should Smith be held morally responsible for his crime?  
 On the one hand there is a case for saying that indeed he should, given 
that Smith is at an age where he ought to know that such acts are wrong, and 
so know that he ought not perform them. But, on the other hand, there 
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appears to be a case for saying that Smith should not be held responsible 
given that he was, in part, caused to steal the car by a character trait that he 
cultivated as a child, presumably before he fully understood the implications of 
his choices. Now what does semi-libertarianism require? Well, at first glance it 
appears to require that Smith be held morally responsible for stealing the car. 
For even though Smith was caused by his character to steal the car – albeit a 
character that he self-determined when he was a child – because Smith is 
causally responsible for making himself into the sort of person who is disposed 
toward theft, and so at times would be causally determined by his character to 
commit theft, he is ultimately responsible for stealing the car. So semi-
libertarianism seems to suggest that Smith is morally responsible. But is this 
reasonable? Is semi-libertarianism committed to unreasonably conferring 
moral responsibility on agents whose acts are determined by character traits 
they self-formed quite early in life? 
 Happily, the semi-libertarian need not say so, and that for two reasons. 
First, the idea that ultimate  responsibility entails moral responsibility has little 
to recommend it. And the reason is that it is possible to be ultimately 
responsible for events that we clearly should not be held morally responsible 
for. To illustrate this, suppose the keyboard that I am presently using has been 
villainously rigged to ignite distinct forest fires in California every one 
hundredth key stroke that is made. If so, then I bear ultimate responsibility for 
starting numerous forest fires in California. For it is myself, after all, who is 
causally responsible for initiating causal sequences whose end is the ignition 
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of forest fires in California. Clearly, in the unhappy event that I am doing so, I 
am not purposefully doing so – in the sense that I am aware of, or have 
knowledge of, what I am doing. But be that as it may, I am nonetheless 
ultimately responsible for the fires.  
 Now it certainly seems obvious (at least to me) that I should not be held 
morally responsible for starting the forest fires, even though I am in fact 
ultimately responsible for starting the forest fires. Hence, since I could be 
ultimately responsible yet not morally responsible, ultimately responsibility 
must not entail morally responsibility. Hence, in the case of Smith stealing a 
car above, just because Smith may be ultimately responsible for stealing the 
car, the semi-libertarian needs to say that Smith is also morally responsible for 
stealing the car. And so it may be the case that Smith is ultimately responsible 
for cultivating a character trait that caused him to commit theft and also the 
case that Smith is not morally responsible for that act of theft. If the character 
trait that performed a significant role in causing Smith to steal the car was in 
fact cultivated within Smith before he can be reasonably held morally 
responsible for cultivating that trait – before a sort of “age of accountability,” as 
it were – then perhaps Smith should not be held morally responsible for 
stealing the car. And semi-libertarianism does not require that he be so. 
 But even if it is possible that Smith is not morally responsible for stealing 
the car, he may in fact be so responsible. To see this, consider that Smith may 
have had many opportunities to perform self-forming actions that would have 
caused him to have a different character than he has. For example, Smith 
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could have cultivated a respect for the property of others (a respect no doubt 
he himself demands of others), thereby at the very least putting two of his 
character traits at odds with one another. But even if Smith did not engage in 
shaping himself into a person with such a respect – perhaps even through no 
fault of his own – he arguably still has recourse to undermining his self-formed 
disposition to steal. Smith, for instance, could have tried to cultivate himself 
into a person who is at the very least morally sensitive. Indeed, were Smith to 
have cultivated himself into such a person, Smith could then have developed 
other character traits that themselves are inconsistent with his self-formed 
disposition to steal. And in cultivating these other traits, Smith could have 
weakened and ultimately eliminated his disposition toward theft. The point, 
then, is that even if Smith did not (or could not) have directly undermined his 
disposition to steal, it certainly seems plausible to say that he could have 
indirectly undermined that disposition. And the way in which he could have 
done so is by making himself into the sort of person within which such 
dispositions are unwelcome. But if over the course of Smith’s life he does not 
do so, then arguably he is responsible for stealing at age twenty-seven, even if 
he was in part caused to do so by character traits that he cultivated as a child. 
Thus, I do not see that semi-libertarianism requires anything out of the 
ordinary when it comes to evaluating the blameworthiness (or 
praiseworthiness) of another. Differently said, I do not see that it requires 
anything incompatible with our common moral intuitions regarding everyday 
evaluations of moral responsibility.  
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4.4. LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING AHEAD 
We are now prepared to bring this project to a close. I will not attempt to 
review all the terrain that we have covered, but I will mention some high points 
– briefly summarizing the essentials of the theory that I am proposing – as well 
as mention a few areas in which the theory of restricted-Molinism might further 
be applied in later projects. 
 To begin with, the theory of middle knowledge purports to account for God 
enjoying exhaustive foreknowledge and partial providence. His providence is 
partial because it is limited by the free choices of free creatures. Because God 
is no more able to force a free creature to freely choose as he wishes than he 
is to create a four-sided triangle, God’s providence must work cooperatively 
with free agents. However, God can enjoy exhaustive foreknowledge, 
according to middle knowledge, even if his providence is partially restricted by 
free agents if God knows whether all would-definitely counterfactuals of 
freedom (propositions of the form If P were in S, then P would do A) are true 
or false. For with such knowledge, God could providentially guide the actual 
world by creating situations in which he knows we will freely perform a certain 
action. Thus, God can enjoy exhaustive foreknowledge by knowing just which 
situations he will choose to actualize. However, there is a problem. Since the 
actions involved in the consequent of counterfactuals of freedom are 
construed as libertarian, and by consequence causally indeterminate, it is not 
clear how such counterfactuals could have a truth value. In essence, this is the 
grounding objection to the theory of middle knowledge. Counterfactuals of 
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libertarian freedom cannot be true given that there is nothing besides logical or 
casual necessitation to guarantee that the consequent of a counterfactual of 
freedom definitely would obtain were the antecedent to obtain, and both sorts 
of necessitation are rejected by the traditional-Molinist. Hence, counterfactuals 
of freedom cannot be true, and so God cannot have middle knowledge; at 
least as traditionally construed. 
 God can have middle knowledge of a sort, however. For some 
counterfactuals of freedom could indeed be true even if they are are not 
causally indeterminate, but rather causally predetermined. In different words, if 
in certain situations our characters caused us to perform certain actions, then 
counterfactuals of freedom could find their grounds in causation, and thus 
could be known to be true prior to the actualization of the events described in 
the counterfactual. In addition, the actions described in the counterfactual (the 
actions that are caused by our characters), could in fact be construed as free, 
so long as we are both free and responsible regarding the content of our 
characters. And we are free and responsible with respect to the content of our 
characters if we are ultimately responsible for the content of our characters; 
that is, if we are the ultimate cause of some of our actions, actions which 
themselves determine our characters in one direction or another. Now if we in 
fact function as ultimate causes, then causal indeterminacy must reign, at 
least at the global level of free agency. However, because actions can be 
considered free when caused by characters for which we are ultimately 
responsible, casual determinism can reign at the local level for at least some 
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free actions. This theory of free agency – indeterminism at the global level and 
(occasional) determinism at the local level – we have referred to as semi-
libertarianism. The theory employs some elements of incompatibilism and 
some elements of compatibilism, and hence is a hybrid view between the two.  
 Now semi-libertarianism can be put to work in developing a modified view 
of middle knowledge. Since semi-libertarianism includes causal indeterminacy 
for at least some of our actions – actions necessary for self-determining our 
characters and thus for our taking responsibility for them – counterfactuals of 
freedom regarding actions that are indeterminate simply cannot be true (or 
false). Thus, God cannot enjoy exhaustive foreknowledge, as traditional 
theories of middle knowledge say that he can, but he can enjoy partial 
foreknowledge to the extent that there are counterfactuals whose truth or 
falsity is determined by our characters. So how much foreknowledge does this 
amount to? It is probably not possible to say for sure. Though we can plausibly 
conclude that very rarely are our actions indeterminate, there is probably no 
way to say precisely (in terms of specifying a number) just how rare such 
indeterminate actions are.15 And since there is no saying precisely just how 
rare such actions are, there is no saying precisely just how many true 
counterfactuals of freedom that God knows, and so precisely how far into the 
future God’s foreknowledge extends. But since it can extend to some extent, 
God can to some extent enjoy middle knowledge. Thus, in actualizing a 
possible world, God cannot exhaustively know beforehand all of the situations 
 
15 See Chapter 3 pages 178-9 for arguments that underwrite this assertion.  
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that he will actualize in order to achieve the ends that he wants (as traditional-
Molinism affirms). Instead, God must be content with actualizing only as much 
of a world as his middle knowledge affords, and so must be content with 
actualizing possible world-segments. (Again, since we cannot say how many 
counterfactuals of freedom are true, and hence how much middle knowledge 
God enjoys, we cannot say how far into the future these possible world-
segments extend.) Thus, God’s middle knowledge is restricted by the number 
of true counterfactuals that our characters afford him. And this is just what 
restricted-Molinism says. On the conceptual landscape, then, restricted-
Molinism lies somewhere between open-theism (where God lacks 
foreknowledge altogether) and traditional-Molinism (where God’s 
foreknowledge is exhaustive). 
 By way of application, then, what we have looked at thus far is only the 
preferable account restricted-Molinism offers (as opposed to traditional-
Molinism) to the question of divine foreknowledge, providence, and human 
freedom. But restricted-Molinism may have the resources to offer a preferable 
response to the problem of evil as well. To see this, consider the following. 
Though according to traditional-Molinism God is not responsible for evil, he is 
however responsible for creating a world in which he knew there would be evil 
(even foreknowing and planning for all of the horrendous evils of the 20th 
Century). The intuitive problem this poses has been exploited by open-theists, 
who claim that their reply to the problem of evil is preferable to something like 
the free will defense, since on their view God did not create a world in which 
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he knew that all the evils that have transpired would in fact transpire. Indeed, 
one might argue if God had such knowledge, the prudent thing to do in that 
case is not to create anything at all. Restricted-Molinism can capitalize in part 
on this reply as well. For the restricted-Molinist could say that God actualized a 
situation in which it was causally indeterminate whether there would be evil 
(that is, on the Biblical account, whether Adam and Eve would sin). Thus if 
such a situation was not causally predetermined, as we have argued, God 
could not know beforehand that they would sin, and so could not know that the 
world he created would fall into sin. Furthermore, the restricted-Molinist could 
even say that God placed Adam and Even in a situation in which the 
probability was very low that they would sin, even though, of course, there was 
a slight chance that they would. Now one might insist that the mere possibility 
of evil, however remote, renders God imprudent in actualizing a world at all, 
and such may be the case. However, if it is the case, then it seems to follow 
by extension that every parent is likewise imprudent in having children. After 
all, the probability of that child experiencing evil is far greater than we need 
suppose was the probability that Adam and Eve would experience evil. Taking 
all of this into account, the restricted-Molinist may be able to offer a free will 
defense that is preferable to the free will defense offered by the traditional-
Molinist. For the restricted-Molinist’s free will defense may exonerate God from 
responsibility in the existence of evil to a greater degree than does the free will 
defense from the traditional-Molinist.  
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Still other areas where restricted-Molinism may yield fruit include 
discussions of prayer and prophecy. And there remains a need to test the 
theory of restricted-Molinism in relation to Christian creeds and Scriptures. But 
such discussions and tests must await the attention they deserve for other 
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